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Résumé et mots clés 
Le spectre radioélectrique est rapidement en train de devenir le médium central, à 
travers lequel la société communique. Grâce à de multiples facteurs, plusieurs formes 
de communication, anciennement disparates (la radio, la télévision, la téléphonie 
mobile, le Wi-Fi) convergent vers la forme éthérée du spectre. L'orientation future de 
cette convergence dépend largement des acteurs qui sont impliqués dans le design de 
la réglementation de la communication, ainsi que dans celui des technologies et de 
leurs usages.  Cette thèse doctorale élabore une histoire compréhensive de la 
communication sans-fil et de sa réglementation, et propose une nouvelle économie 
politique du spectre, fondée sur la justice sociale.  Elle présente, par la suite, une 
approche épistémologique qui tente de recalibrer les relations entre la société et le 
spectre radioélectrique. Elle propose que le spectre devra être traité comme une sorte 
de « média de vie », étant donné qu'il est une composante naturelle de notre 
environnement et qu'il occupe un rôle central dans notre habilité à exister comme des 
êtres sociaux communicants.  Sa réglementation, alors, devra être sujette au plus haut 
niveau de participation, de transparence, et d'imputabilité. 
Cette recherche repose sur une étude de cas internationale et comparative. Elle aborde 
la capacité des processus de « policymaking » au Canada et en Uruguay à intégrer la 
participation publique.  Elle se fonde sur une documentation extensive et des 
entretiens avec des législateurs, des régulateurs nationaux et internationaux, des 
organisations de la société civile, des experts indépendants, des ministères du 
gouvernement, et des représentants du secteur privé. Des diagnostiques sont établis 
pour chaque pays et des recommandations politiques concrètes sont faites, qui ne 
parlent pas seulement des spécificités des politiques du spectre, mais du tissu même 
de la société démocratique. 
Mots-clés : 
spectre radioélectrique ; politiques de communication ; télécommunication ; Canada ; 
Uruguay Abstract and Key Words 
The radio spectrum is rapidly becoming the central medium through which society 
engages in communication.  Due to a variety of factors, formerly disparate forms of 
radio communication (radio, television, cellular telephony, Wi-Fi) are converging 
around the ethereal form of the spectrum.  The future orientation of this convergence 
depends greatly on the actors involved in the design of communications regulation, 
technology and of its uses.  This thesis details a comprehensive history of wireless 
communication and regulation while constructing a new political economy of the 
spectrum built on a foundation of social justice.  It then presents an epistemological 
approach that attempts to recalibrate society's relationship with the radio spectrum.  I 
propose that the spectrum, in that it is a natural part of our environment and occupies 
such central role in our ability to existas communicative social beings, must be 
considered a form of "life-media".  Its regulation thus must be held to the highest 
level of participation, transparency and accountability. 
The research project is built around an international comparative case study and 
examines the capacity for public participation in spectrum policy-making in Canada 
and Uruguay.  It relies upon extensive documentary evidence, interviews with law-
makers, national and international regulators, civil society organizations, independent 
experts, government ministers and representatives of the private sector.  Diagnostics 
are rendered concerning each country and practical policy recommendations are made 
that speak not only to the specifies of spectrum policy but to the very fabric of 
democratie society itself. 
Keywords: 
radio spectrum; communications policy; telecommunications; Canada; Uruguay --- - - ----- - - --------~ 
1 
Preface 
Before plunging into the big story, I fee! it is important to explain to you what I am 
doing here and how I arrived.  Much more than an academie exercise, this work is the 
culmination of over 20 years of thought, work, play and happenstance. 
My interest in the radio spectrum and communication technology dates back to 
childhood when a good-natured oldies radio DJ took mercy on an 8-year old Beatles 
fan and invited me to co-host his program.  Then, in the late 1980s my family 
purchased a persona! computer and 1 plunged into a new world of tech nol ogy and 
unfettered communications as both a user and builder of bulletin board systems 
(BBSs).  In these pre-internet days, when one computer would cali another across the 
Atlantic to make a "mail drop," it was still possible to build your own "net" on your 
own time and according to your own rules.  Indeed, there was not yet an accessible 
internet to tap into.  In 1993, I took my first information technology (IT) job helping 
to lay the physical infrastructure for one of the first large-scale fibre networks - a 
project that linked multiple hospitals, doctors' offices and an insurance company. 
Before the Web became worldwide, we had built our own.  That same year, I got a 
broadcast license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and became 
a college radio DJ, driving out into the Pine Barrens of New Jersey to WLFR (Lake 
Fred Radio) every week and beginning, in earnest, the long trajectory by which I have 
arrived here today.  Radio communications and wired communications, broadcast and 
broadband.  These invariably conflicted themes of enquiry made themselves known 
long ago.  While historically separate, they have had an unusual tendency to converge 
around me.  As I demonstrate in the thesis you are about to read, I am not unique, this 
process of convergence is taking place around all of us. 
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In  1995 I moved to Montréal where I pursued a BA in English at McGill University 
and more IT work, this time helping to rebuild the physical infrastructure of the 
university computer network.  Four years Iater 1 would immigrate and become the 
network technician of the McGill University Faculty of Law and again, by chance, 
take part in a cutting-edge technological project.  This time 1 developed Canada's first 
fully wired university library.  1 continued to be involved in radio as a programmer 
and editor and joined CKUT Radio's board of directors as a representative of McGill's 
support staff.  It was during this time that my  interest in communications policy 
began to grow. 
Finally, in 2004 I decided to return to university and began my maîtrise en 
communication at UQAM with a desire to turn a constructively critical eye on 
community radio.  Invited by Professor Carmen Rico de Sotelo to undertake a 
research internship in Uruguay, 1 made my first of many trips there in 2005.  I 
returned to the region that same year to the Summit of the Americas and Peoples' 
Summit, this time in Argentina, as part of a delegation of community radio journalists 
from Québec organized by the World Association of Community Broadcasters 
(AMARC).  In the years following, 1 dove into the deep end of communications 
policy advocacy, serving on the board of the National Campus and Community Radio 
Association where I helped establish the Community Radio Fund of Canada and, 
coincidentally, met my wife Joanne!  In 2006, I attended the 9th world conference of 
AMARC in Amman, Jordan where I began to understand the potential for activist-
academic policy collaboration on an international scale and to further understand my 
role as an academie and as a citizen. 
Throughout my years working with independent and alternative media, I have met 3 
people from ali over the world who wish to be able to communicate freely (free of 
censorship) and independently (of governments and corporations) and who see the 
airwaves as integral to this ability.  Community radio, community television and 
community wireless internet groups are the three main groups that set about this task 
in an organized fashion.  In my experience, however, I noticed that while they may be 
organizing around a common theme and utilize a common natural infrastructure (the 
spectrum), there is little collaboration among these groups with regards to spectrum 
policy.  Th  us, one goal of this research - which will be developed more substantially 
throughout- is to develop the idea of the spectrum as a common focal point around 
which these groups can orient themselves more collectively.  Likewise, I will use this 
same model to illustrate the centrality of the spectrum to society in general and to 
question the highly privatized and centralized models upon which we have built our 
communication systems. 
Four years ago, I told Jeremy Schtern, then a doctoral candidate in communication at 
the Université de Montréal, that I wanted to write things about communication policy 
that were enjoyable to read.  Laughing, he told me in  ali seriousness that such a thing 
was not possible.  By drawing the policy straw, we were doomed to a future of well-
mannered observation and dry, humourless analysis.  That said, it is my sincere hope 
that this work brings about more laughs and gasps than yawns and that it may be 
enjoyably used as a tool for enduring positive social change. Chapter 1: Spectrum stakes 
1.1 Spectrum stakes 
This first chapter of six  lays out a distinct strategy for interrogating the radio spectrum 
and our relationship with it as communicative social and political beings.  It addresses 
a number of concepts which will be considered within certain national contexts- in 
this case Canada and Uruguay- throughout the following chapters.  Part one 
examines the notion of the spectrum itself.  What is this thing and why does it matter? 
What is at stake when we talk about the future of the spectrum?  Part two considers 
the concept of convergence and the potentials that present themselves in this CUITent 
cycle of technological and political shape-shifting.  Convergence exists in  many 
forms.  Here, I focus on the tripartite convergence of broadcasting, telephony, and 
internet.  Part three illustrates the epistemologicallimitations of past work on the 
radio spectrum.  Bound by  notions of economies and technology, it is necessary to 
discover new conceptual space in  which to consider the reconstruction of our social 
relationship with the spectrum.  1 propose that we can look to the natural world, and 
to certain social movements that have successfully mobilized around it,  to help devise 
new strategies around thinking about the spectrum in  a manner meant to be relevant to 
citizens, activists, academies and policymakers alike. 
1.1.1 What is the spectrum? 
What is the radio spectrum?  Given the prevalence of radio-based communications 
technologies in the world today, this may seem a silly question with an obvious 
answer.  The response 1 received from many of my interview subjects (whom you will 
meet in Chapters 4 and 5) is perhaps similar to what you are thinking: the airwaves. 
Radiation.  Signais.  Frequencies.  OK, but what are these airwaves you speak of? 
What is the spectrum?  In this section, 1 briefly trace the historical development of the 5 
concept of the "spectrum" from the 1800s to the present.  The historiography 
pinpoints moments in time when the spectrum has been understood in different ways, 
depicting moments of legal, technical and economie enclosure as well as moments of 
technical, social and conceptual opening.  The answer to my leading question is 
actually quite slippery.  Indeed, as we shall see, it is both a legal and technical 
construct and nothing at ali.  Here, I will focus primarily on describing the history of 
the spectrum and the ways we go about regulating it and thinking aboutit.  In later 
chapters, I will shift my attention to the various processes by which the spectrum is 
defined and given form. 
Throughout much writing concerning the spectrum, a variety of literary tropes are 
employed in order to impart material qualities to this immaterial thing.  This 
discursive strategy imposes upon the spectrum symbolic and practical delineations 
that are founded on objects of comparison more so than on the spectrum itself. 
Perhaps most often, the spectrum has been understood as something akin to land and 
has over time been subject to similar debates concerning the idea of property.  That 
said, our comprehension of the spectrum has changed greatly since its "discovery" in 
1887 by Heinrich Hertz (Aitken, 1985, p. 29).  1 propose that this evolution can be 
organized and understood as a series of historical periods similar to  Lewis Hyde's 
documentation of changes in English society's relationship with land  with particular 
attention paid to the place of common land tenure (2010, p. 29). 
1.  Saxon age (pre-Norman conquest): Ail village lands were owned and worked 
in common. 
2.  Post-Norman conquest: Lands became associated with a local manor by royal 
decree.  Tenants were given rights to work the land in exchange for any 
number of tribu tes: a portion of crop and honey production, military servitude, working the manor's lands. 
3.  18th_J9lh century: This was the Age of Enclosure during which 117 of ail 
common English land was converted into private property. 
The much shorter history of the spectrum (or rather, our technical ability to interact 
with it) can be divided into seven historical periods.  Sorne of these periods overlap; 
the first is uniquely ahistorical and literally serves as the foundation of all the others. 
1.1.2 The eternal age of the natural spectrum 
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Most histories related to the spectrum detail its use and the constitution of various 
legal frameworks related to its use rather than concern themselves with the spectrum 
in and of itself.  Typically they begin at the end of the 1800s and early 1900s with the 
invention of the wireless telegraph and eventually broadcast radio- the first examples 
of transmitting electronic signais over air for the purpose of communication (Douglas, 
1987; McChesney, 1993a; Peers, 1969; Raboy, 1990a; Winseck, 1998; Winseck & 
Pike, 2007).  The spectrum, however, has existed forever.  It describes the potential of 
space (the space in which air exists rather than the air itself) to transmit energy 
(Simon, 2010).  This potentiality and many of the types of energy that exist within it 
were around long before we began to create energy of our own in the form of "radio 
waves".  Energy presents itself in various forms: heat, light, naturally occurring 
radiation and magnetism.  However, it is all the same stuff.  Radio waves existing 
within the radio spectrum are simply a subset of the en tire electromagnetic spectrum 
that have historically been utilized for radio communication.  Indeed, all the energy 
that exists within the spectrum can be referred to as electromagnetic waves and is 
central to the very atomic makeup of our bodies and our entire physical environment. 
Electromagnetic waves are composed of energy that is imbued with both electric and 
magnetic properties and create electromagnetic fields.  These fields interact to 7 
generale light that in turn interacts with our eyes, nervous system and brain, bringing 
us vision.  (Feynman, 2007)  Physicist Richard Feynman has shown that these same 
fields exist and interact within the atoms that are the building blocks of our world in a 
way that keeps both the atoms and the things they are a part of uni fied in form 
(Feynman, 1965, chap. 1).  This conceptualization of the spectrum, originating from 
the field of pbysics, ex plains how energy is transmitted and received as weil as the 
integral relationship that naturally exists between humans, our environment and 
energy.  The light-based illustration lends itself easily to metaphor, the sun emitting 
light (like a radio transmitter) which is received by the eye (like a radio receiver that 
converts one type of energetic signal into something audible).  This relationship is 
easy to illustrate, explain and understand.  As we shall see, it has played an important 
role in reinforcing a conceptualization of the spectrum that is dominant, even across 
oppositional schools of thought.  The second part of this explanation of the spectrum 
and the role of electromagnetic energy as a building block for ail existence (living and 
not) is absent from spectrum-related writings outside the field of physics, with the 
exception of a variety of energy-related healing arts.  A natural commons, the energy 
that makes up the spectrum is effectively self-regulating and self-managing just as an 
untouched forest cares for itself (a preceding state of English common land tenure 
which Hyde negates).  The eternal age of the natural spectrum is decidedly ahistorical 
as it did not originale nor will it end with human intervention.  Reconceptualizing the 
spectrum in these terms could alter the manner in which we use and regulate it. 
1.1.3 The age of exploration 
In 1752, Benjamin Franklin conducted a classic experiment where he flew a kite in a 
storm, charging a Leyden jar
1 from the ki te string (Aitken, 1976, p. 86).  This was the 
1  A Leyden jar was a type of early capacitor in which static electricity could be stored. 8 
beginning of experimentation with electricity in  a quickly industrializing society. 
Roughly 100 years later, James Clerck Maxwell would mathematically prove that light 
and electricity were knit of the same electromagnetic cloth (Aitken, 1976, p. 21; 
Maxwell, 1865).  The period of time between 1865 and 1896 would be one of great 
experimentation and exploration.  As with astronomy before space travel, it was as if a 
new world bad been uncovered into which we could begin to peer.  "Man now knew 
that the radiofrequency spectrum existed; he bad developed ways of gaining access to 
it and locating himself in it; and he was beginning to grasp the fantastic range and 
variety of its possible uses" (Aitken, 1976, p. 27).  While other researchers such as 
Maxwell bad proved the theoretical existence of electromagnetic energy, Heinrich 
Hertz set out to prove this in practical terms.  In 1887 Hertz built two deviees.  One, 
the spark-switched oscillator, propagated electromagnetic radiation.  The other, called 
a resonator, measured this energy.  Using the two deviees together, Hertz determined 
a method for measuring the spectrum and thus both quantifying it and illustrating its 
existence (Buchwald, 1994, pp. 217- 292).  To continue the earlier analogy, this period 
was akin to humankind's first steps toward industrial forestry,  pondering the uses of 
the land while becoming familiar with the terrain and creating tools with which to 
work it.  The basis of measurement developed by Hertz (measuring the oscillations of 
waves of electromagnetic radiation) continues to be used today.  While the range of 
energy that is possible to measure has increased (thus the advent of megahertz and 
giga-hertz) the basic measure of radio waves bas remained the same.  The importance 
of Hertz's act of measurement, and delineation, was its foundational role in charting 
out humankind's social relationship with the spectrum.  While not necessarily a goal 
of Hertz, from this time forward, humankind's relationship with the spectrum --
insofar as it is used in conjonction with communication technology -- bas been 
strictly defined, measured and controlled. 1.1.4 The first age of spectrum enclosure 
The year 1896 marks the initial step in the first age of spectrum enclosure.  After 
decades of unfettered experimentation by scientists around the world, Guglielmo 
Marconi filed British patent No. 12,039, the first intellectual property rights claim to 
radio technology (Aitken, 1976, p.  115).  While-several ofMarconi's daims would be 
eventually overturned in a 1943 Jawsuit (U.S. Supreme Court, 1943), the importance 
here is that he staked a daim causing a flood of other radio-related patents to be 
applied for in the United States and the UK in the coming years.  Before the granting 
of this first patent, it could be said- at least legally- that the science of radio was 
purely experimental and exploratory.  From 1896 onward, it gained a new orientation 
and began to chiefly concern itself with the use of radio waves for communication 
and thus the creation of signalling systems, new inventions and patents, and 
commercial applications of these new technologies (Aitken, 1976, pp.  115-225). 
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Technological advances were followed by State regulatory efforts with little delay.  As 
Susan Douglas has noted, this earl  y history of radio constructed the technical, 
economie, legislative and ideological foundation upon which the following history of 
radio communications has been built (Douglas, 1987, pp. 315-317).  International 
coordination of the airwaves and the relevant national legislation be  gan in  1903 with 
the first International Telegraph Union (ITU) conference dedicated to the radio 
spectrum.  This "Preliminary Conference Concerning Wireless Telegraphy" produced 
guidelines stipulating that stations should operate without causing interference with 
other stations (Martinez, 1985, p. 100).  Participating in this first conference were 
State and military representatives from Germany, Austria, Spain, the United States of 
America, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy and Russia (International Telegraph 10 
Union, 1903). 
Three years later, in  1906, delegations from 30 nations negotiated  the first 
Radiotelegraph Convention (commonly referred to as the Berlin Convention)  -the 
world's first treaty related to wireless technology and governance of the 
electromagnetic spectrum (Martinez, 1985, p.  100).  Thomas Streeter's analysis of 
these events notes that the Berlin Convention was mainly a strategy by the American 
and German governments to prevent Marconi from fully monopolizing the technology 
which they, as governments, wanted to use to communicate wirelessly (1996, pp. 76-
77).  It is important to state that the conflict here was not over whether the spectrum 
would be free for the unfettered use of humankind, but rather who would control this 
use, by what means and to what ends.  While several more nations were included in 
this early stage in the development of spectrum policy and technology, participation 
remained limited to federal governments and their respective militaries (International 
Telegraph Union, 1906).  To be clear, these were meetings not of the entire ITU but a 
subset of parties concerned with wireless telegraphy use.  Initially founded in 1865 to 
deal with wire-line telegraphy, the ITU effectively bad two operating bodies- one 
dedicated to the use of the airwaves, the other to wired networks. 
Telecommunications corporations had been active members in the ITU since 1871 
when they began to participate in creating policy around wire-line telegraph 
transmission rates and service regulations (International Telegraph Union, 1872a).  In 
1912, corporations began to directly participate in wireless debates, too (International 
Telegraph Union, 1913). 
During this same period in the early 1900s, spectrum regulation on the nationallevel 
was introduced in a seemingly coordinated fashion.  Not two months after the ITU's 11 
first conference on the subject, New Zealand passed the first spectrum-related 
legislation in the world, the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1903 (Government of New 
Zealand, 1903) which "protected the government's investment in the new "wireline" 
telephone and telegraph networks and was also intended to manage the radio 
spectrum to avoid interference" (New Zealand, 2006).  The UK followed suit with the 
Telegraph Act of 1904 (Aitken, 1976, p.  161 ), followed by Canada's Wireless 
Telegraph Act of 1905 (CRTC, 2008).  Examination of Parliamentary debates in 
Canada and the UK at the time show little concern for the including the public in any 
part of the discussion.  The notion of regulation in the public interest -- often 
addressed in later discussions regarding broadcasting -- is here invoked upon initial 
presentation of Canada's first wireless act in  the House of Commons.  Upon the first 
reading of the proposed Wireless Telegraphy Act in Canadian parliament, then 
Minister of marine and fisheries, Raymond Préfontaine, stated that a telegraphy act 
developed by the Fessenden Wireless Telegraphy Company "was redrafted almost 
entirely on the lines of the law passed in England in  1904, so asto protect the public 
interest.  The object of this bill is therefore to give the government control of wireless 
telegraphy in such a manner as to ensure the greatest efficiency, and to obtain the 
greatest benefit to the public interest."  Préfontaine also stated that "this bill is almost 
an exact copy of a Bill passed by the British parliament last year for the regulation of 
wireless telegraphy in Great Britain." (Government of Canada, 1905).  The notion of 
the public interest, seen through the lens of British parliamentary debates concerning 
this legislation, specifically related to the ability of the public to access commercial 
commmücations networks.  These bills and the Canadian Radiotelegraphy Act of 
1913 (Parliament of Canada, 1913a) made the federal government the central 
controller of spectrum regulation. 12 
In essence, the first enclosure of the spectrum was undertaken through a combination 
of intellectual property law (patents) and State regulation (the introduction of 
licensing).  Thus, the trajectory of spectrum-oriented research and thinking -- the 
epistemology of the spectrum, if you will -- substantially shifted from one of 
exploration to one of utilitarian creation, particularly for commercial, military and 
governmental use (Streeter, 1996, p. 223). 
1.1.5 The age of regulation 
The initial development of radio technology focused on point-to-point 
communications and was primarily concerned with conveying messages for military, 
governmental or commercial purposes.  The Marconi Company was one of severa] 
private enterprises that developed around the world to serve these purposes. 
However, it would be the advent of broadcast radio that propelled the spectrum 
literally into the living rooms of the world.  Broadcast radio was generally introduced 
in one of two manners.  In the United States, for instance, it was developed as a 
primarily commercial pursuit, relegating any idea of non-profit or amateur 
broadcasting to the fringes (Streeter, 1996, pp. 59-63)  In Canada, the Marconi 
Wireless Telegraph Company of Canada became the country's first broadcaster, 
receiving an experimentallicense in 1918 (CRTC, 2008).  The decision of the UK to 
create a state monopoly for radio broadcasting - the British Broadcasting Corporation 
- led to a tension in British-influenced Canada between private· and public interests 
(Raboy, 1990a, pp. 17-47).  Ultimately the first Canadian federal study on 
broadcasting - the Aird.Report- would recommend the creation of a similar state 
monopoly here, subsequently reflected in the 1932 Broadcast Act (Aird, 1929; Raboy, 
1990a, pp. 27-29). 13 
Barly radio-related legislation bad not anticipated broadcasting of any sort and this 
new industry largely made its own way, pushing at the regulatory limits of 
governments and ultimately warranting the creation of specialized regulatory bodies. 
Thus, the emergence of two sets of regulators can be observed: one set managed the 
section of spectrum used by wireless telegraph and another, appearing slightly later, 
managed broadcast radio (and eventually television).  This initial split in the treatment 
of the spectrum for point-to-point communication (later to evolve into 
telecommunications) and broadcasting has had lasting effects on regulatory 
approaches.  Severa! countries (such as Canada, Nigeria and Uruguay) still have 
specialized spectrum regulators, resembling the early ones noted below, which 
manage the spectrum based principally on technical standards. 
Year  Country  Regula  tor 
New Zealand  Governor in Council  1  1903 
~ 
1 1904 
.UK  Post Office 
Canada  Department of Marine and  1905 
Fisheries 
1 
i 
11912  us  Secretary of Commerce and 
Labour 
--
1913  :uruguay  General Administration of 
1 
Mail, Telegraph and Phones 
i 
Table 1.1: Earl  y wireless regula  tors 
Broadcast radio was largely regulated by _ the above organizations Üntil it was decided 
that such a complex medium of great potential economie and social value warranted 
specialized legislation and regulation.  In response, the Federal Radio Commission 
was created in 1927 by the US. Federal Radio Act (Streeter, 1996, pp. 96-97).  In 
1 
1 
1 14 
Canada, the Canadian Radio-broadcasting Act of 1932 mandated the creation of the 
Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (Raboy, 1990a, pp. 21-47).  The UK 
federal government maintained an  absolute monopoly on radio broadcasting until the 
1970s and spectrum regulation remained as a technical pursuit -- the Post Office 
managed the use of frequencies for telecommunications without subjecting the users 
to extensive evaluation.  As the British Broadcasting Corporation maintained a 
Parliament-granted monopoly on radio broadcasting, the task of the regulator was to 
ensure that other no other broadcasters inside or outside the UK interfered with their 
signais (Government of United Kingdom, 1949).  In sorne other countries, Uruguay 
for example, management of the spectrum is qui te opaque and highly politicized; in 
this case ali li censes have al ways been awarded by presidential decree (Light, 2011 , p. 
56). 
During this same early period of regulation, the use of the spectrum for point-to-point 
communication was largely left unregulated with the exception of the administration 
of frequencies, a situation which remains largely unchanged to this day regardless of 
technological changes.  The ITU broadened its regulatory claim in 1932 to include 
more than telegraph or airborne communications, defining the term 
telecommunications, for the first time, as: 
any telegraph or telephone communication of signs, signais, writings, 
images, and sound of any nature, by wire, radio, or other system or 
process of electric or visual (semaphore) signalling (Leinwoll, 1979, p. 
141 ). 
While wireless communication was largely dominated by commercial and state 
interests, it also gave rise to amateur (or ham) radio which itself would revolutionize 15 
radio communication. 
After World War I, many veterans who had been radio operators retumed home with 
new-found knowledge and quickly set to work improving existing techniques for 
point-to-point radio communication.  While in the United States they were legally 
bound to operate within the 1.5 mHz range, enforcement mechanisms and tools had 
not evolved to the extent of being easily utilized and th us the "hams" were left largely 
to operate as they saw fit.  Indeed, rather than be persecuted for operating out of their 
designated frequency range, their skills were so highly regarded that they were asked 
to cooperate with govemment radio research in Canada, Italy, France, the UK and the 
United States (Leinwoll, 1979, pp.  105- 115).  Through building an amateur scientific 
community and openly sharing experiment and design information, amateur radio 
operators in the 1920s created what is known as shortwave radio, a technique of radio 
communication that permits stations to potentially broadcast across the globe 
(Leinwoll, 1979, p. 115).  Eventually, radio communication corporations took notice 
and began to further deve1op this communication method having realized that 
shortwave radio utilized frequencies that allowed for reliable transmission year-round 
while those used by wireless telegraph were Jess reliable during warmer seasons 
(Leinwoll, 1979, p.  137).  While the important early radio experiments and discoveries 
were made by professional scientists, this is the first example of radio technology 
being appropriated by citizens or "amateurs" for the non-commercial practice of 
communication. 
Perhaps due to the important presence of radio and television in the psyche .of-the 
industrializing world, the method by which these sorts of broadcasting licenses (but 
not other wireless licenses) were awarded in the United States would later be the 
subject of market-based regulatory proposais (Coase, 1959; Herzel, 1950).  This 16 
period marks an important conceptual split, recognized in regulatory structure and 
treatment, between the use of the spectrum for broadcasting (which would later 
include television) and the use of spectrum for point-to-point communications (which 
would later become an important part of telecommunications). 
1.1.6 The early age of spectrum propertization 
It is often said that the notion of the public interest was and remains a guiding 
principle in the regulation of broadcasting in North America.  Marc Raboy notes that 
"the US. Broadcasting Act of 1927 (  ... ) provided for government control over 
channels, licensed for limited periods, and deemed the guiding standard for licensing 
to be "public interest, convenience and necessity" (Raboy, 1990a, p. 6).  The 
definition of the "public interest", however, is difficult to pin down given th at "the 
public" necessarily consists of various stakeholders, sorne of whom may have 
competing interests.  Th  us, in order for the interests of these various stakeholders to 
be taken into account, a regulatory system must be able to facilitate effective and 
informed participation from as wide a range of perspectives as possible (Buckley, 
Duer, Mendel, & 0  Siochru, 2008, pp. 6-9). 
The idea that communications regulation is to be carried out in the public interest 
speaks to certain expectation of the State apparatus to be aware of and attentive to its 
citizenry.  As such, this phrase evokes the ideal of a highly functioning democratie 
system, something absolutely positive and acceptable in democratie terms.  Research 
on the origins of this approach to regulation in the 1920s, though, tends to overlook 
important subtleties that indicate a high level of responsiveness of the State to 
corporate - rather than citizen - interests and are often congratulatory rather than 
critical (McChesney, 1993b).  The events leading up to the creation of the Federal 17 
Communication Commission in the US. illustrate an early ordering of political and 
economie influence, a demonstrated divide in the regulatory treatment of corporate 
and non-corporate actors.  In 1912, the US. became the firstjurisdiction in the world 
to introduce private broadcasting.  Previously reserved exclusively for military use, 
"private users demanded access for purposes of radio telegraphy" and it was granted 
in the Radio Act of 1912 (Hazlett, 1990, p.  135).  While the Department of Commerce 
was charged with regulating the spectrum, it had no tools for enforcement and general 
chaos ensued (Hazlett, 1990, p.  135).  In  1923, Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover introduced a political tool for creating order by dividing American radio 
stations into three types: high, medium and low power.  "The high-power stations 
were owned by AT&T, GE and Westinghouse while the low-power stations belonged 
to universities, churches and labor unions" (Douglas, 1987, pp. 315-316).  Hazlett has 
demonstrated how, during this time, a veritable free market in radio licenses operated 
whereby broadcasting permits and their accompanying apparatus were regularly 
bought and sold (Hazlett, 1990, pp. 143-144).  Ultimately, the Federal Radio 
Commission was created in 1927 to introduce more substantial order into the 
country's broadcasting system and proceeded to develop a system of "competitive 
hearings" to select broadcasters "based on various criteria deemed to be important to 
the "public interest"" (Hazlett, 1990, p.  136).  This bureaucratie system did not 
eliminate a market for radio stations and licenses, but instead turned the initial act of 
obtaining a license into a political process rather th an a simple economie one. 
2  This 
is often determined to be the first formalized introduction of the public interest 
principle into communications regulation and, since this time, the connection between 
broadcasting regulation and the public interest has been enduring. 
2  It is still common practice in the U.S. and in Canada for stations and their accompanying 
frequencies, facilities and staff to be bought and sold. 18 
Between 1950-1964, three articles by three different American authors were published 
that directly challenged use of the public interest normative framework in spectrum 
allocation.  As Eli Noam has noted (Noam, 1997, p. 462), these ideas were again 
mobilized in the late 1960s and early 1970s (De  Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, & 
Scott, 1969; Levin, 1971).  While they seemingly lay dormant for many years, the 
ideas in these articles still resonate today, affecting the ways in  which the spectrum is 
thought about and spoken of as well as the legal and political processes that structure 
our technologically-mediated relationship with it.  Leo Herzel, Ronald Coase and Ayn 
Rand each contributed something unique to the argument that market economies 
should be the foundation for the attribution of rights to utilize the radio spectrum. 
The importance of these individua1s lies in the fact th at they took a mode! for 
spectrum regulation that was previously practiced in a largely informai manner and 
reformulated it such that it has not only endured but has become common and formai 
regulatory practice around the world. 
In his seminal article ""Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television 
Regulation" (1950), Leo Herzel vented a certain frustration with the slow pace at 
which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States 
developed a regulatory framework for color television.
3  Hearings on the subject, he 
noted, began "as early as 1940" and by  1949, the Commission was still engaged in 
basic rule-making  (1950, p. 802).  The complexity of this undertaking was due to the 
fact that it was not simply focused upon the technical aspects of television 
broadcasting and receiving, but upon "rules, regulations and standards, as will best 
serve the public interest, convenience or necessity" (Herzel, 1950, p. 803).  For 
Herzel, the decisions the FCC makes concerning spectrum management are, above 
3  Herzel's article was the first documented proposai for applying property rights to the spectrum. 19 
all, economie decisions, not ones concerned with traffic management (1950, p.  809). 
To introduce what he believed to be a neutral economie standard into an arbitrary 
process, he recommended that we "abandon regulation by government fiat altogether 
and substitute the market within the standard of public interest, convenience or 
necessity" (Herzel, 1950, p.  811). 
Ronald Coase later re-presented Herzel's argument, refining and elaborating the 
evidence upon which it was based more than the conceptual argument itself.  Coase 
clarifies a key aspect of Herzel's proposition, the presupposition that the spectrum 
will be and should only be used by commercial interests, that "there is no reason why 
users of radio frequencies should not be in the same position as other businessmen" 
(1959, p. 30).  An accompanying summary of an exchange between Herzel (then a law 
student) and Dallas Smythe (former chief economist of the FCC) makes evident the 
seriousness of this proposition.  While Smythe presents an argument for a complex 
system for frequency allocation that takes into account the various social uses and 
needs such as public safety (Coase, 1959, pp. 15-16), Herzel and Coase insist that 
introducing such ideas simply made for long-winded, inefficient decision-making 
processes.  If the primary objective of spectrum management was to reduce or prevent 
interference, it would be in the interest of "the market," but not necessarily the State, 
to do so as efficiently as possible (Coase, 1959, p. 25). 
Shortly after Herzel and Coase began to question the rationale of spectrum allocation 
in the United States, Ayn Rand stripped their arguments down to the bare essentials 
(Rand, 1964, 1966, pp. 117-124). 
Any material element or resource which, in order to become of use or 
value to men, requires the application of human knowledge and effort, 
should be private property - by right of those who apply the knowledge and effort. ( ...  )This is particularly true of broadcasting 
frequencies or waves, because they are produced by human action and 
do not exist without it.  What exists in nature is only the potential and 
the medium through which th ose waves must travel. (Rand, 1966, p.  1) 
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Rand continues to make the case that, following the "discovery" of the spectrum 
America's legislators should have passed a new version of the Homesteader's Act of 
1862 which defined the size of land one could claim but did not define which piece of 
land one could or could not have and what one could do with it (1964, pp. 2- 3).  From 
the get-go, those who could gather the necessary technical or economie resources to 
stake a claim to a segment of the spectrum should have been permitted to do so.  Her 
arguments are compelling and her insistence on exclusive ownership and use has been 
replicated in debates over spectrum management and even in spectrum management 
practices.  The debate has consistently centred on the question of how the space 
within which this energy can exist - this potentiality - is allocated and utilized.  As 
we will see, Rand's determination that singular private ownership be attributed to 
designated airwaves has been put into practice to varying degrees through the 
auctioning of spectrum for telecommunications use.  During an auction, a specified 
section of the spectrum is granted to an entity (most often a corporation) for exclusive 
use.  While in most cases such auctions pertain to licenses for a limited number of 
years, in the case of Canada it is rare for them not to be renewed (Industry Canada, 
2010b ).  In other jurisdictions, for example in Guatemala, a public interest regula  tory 
framework has been completely abandoned in favour of wholesale private ownership 
and market-based trade of the spectrum (Ibarguen, 2003). 
For Rand, private property rights are the foundation of all other rights and she argues 
that government oversteps its bounds in creating "public property" as opposed to 
leaving spaces for "private property" to naturally emerge (1964, p. 6).  With this, she 21 
introduces an important question which has not yet to been pursued outside the pirate 
radio movement and certainly not by members of any policy community.  How 
exactly did government gain the ability to define the spectrum as property of any sort, 
be it public or private?
4  While Ayn Rand has not typically been regarded as an 
important figure in communication studies, it is worth considering the influence she 
may have had on the development of economie scholars with whom she collaborated. 
Most important among them for the current discussion is Alan Greenspan, Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve of the United States from 1987-2006 during which time 
legislation was introduced that permitted the auctioning off of the radio spectrum. 
The economie effects of this are significant: Snider has shown that the spectrum 
auctioned in the United States during this period has a valuation of $480 billion 
(2007).  While 1 have not found explicit documentation of Greenspan's influence over 
the introduction of spectrum auctions in the United States, it seems logical that his 
financial planning would take into account a set of potential governmental 
transactions of this magnitude.  His relationship with Rand, however, has been weil 
documented and he has credited her directly with extending his understanding of 
economies to take into account the complex effects of economies on society 
(Greenspan, 2008, pp. 51-53; Rubin, 2007). 
This early property rights approach to spectrum management has been discounted as 
one that is irrationally narrow and that ignores the evident complexities of spectrum 
use (Streeter, 1996, pp. 245-255).  lts enduring effects are two-fold.  Firstly, this 
approach employed the comparative material object of land to explain the immaterial 
spectrum.  Doing so made it possible to propose the imposition upon the spectrum of 
a material-oriented property rights regime.  Secondly,  proposing that the decision-
4  This question will be examined in Chapter Two. 22 
making concerning spectrum attribution be undertaken at a high economie levellikely 
limited the pool of potential spectrum users to an economie (and very likely 
corresponding political and/or social) elite.  Accordingly, it would be the role of 
government to create a space in  which these elites can, amongst themselves, manage 
the spectrum by economie means.  While arguments for spectrum property rights, 
especially those of Rand, are couched in a discourse of rugged individuality and a 
citizenship built outside the State, managing the spectrum in such a way provides no 
space for the implication of the citizens (as opposed to market actors) whose interest 
these ideas claim to be concemed with. 
1.1. 7 The untethering 
The period of time from the late 1940s-1990s was one of incredible growth and 
change in communication technology and regulation.  The importance of this period 
in terms of the conceptual evolution of the spectrum has as much to do with ideas of 
enclosure and the creation of property, or 'propertization', as it does with resistance to 
enclosure and the growth of social movements oriented around claiming the spectrum 
as public property.  I refer to this period as "the untethering" due to the formation of 
broad radio-oriented social movements and the emergence of spaces for independent 
communication tethered neither by cables nor laws and due to the emergence of 
increasingly mobile communication technologies that permit us to engage in point-ta-
point radio communication seemingly at ali times.
5 
- The airwaves have been alternately appropriated and reserved for public use since the 
early days of radio.  MacLennan has traced unlicensed broadcasting by non-
5  That said, a large part of cellular telephone networks consists of wired networks.  While it could be 
technically feasible to build an actual point-to-point cellular telephone system, such a thing would 
be grossly inefficient using existing technology (Simon, 2010). 23 
professionals in Canada to the 1920s and 1930s (MacLennan, 2010, pp. 35-49).  In 
the United States, the concept of listener-sponsored non-commercial radio began with 
the founding of radio station KPFA and its accompanying Pacifica Radio Foundation 
in San Francisco, California, in  1949 (Fairchild, 2001 ).  This type of broadcasting 
differs from public/state and commercial broadcasting in that it is oriented around and 
largely funded by the immediate community.  Additionally, local communities often 
control and produce programming content.  Public/state broadcasters such as National 
Public Radio/Public Broadcasting Service in the United States, the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation in Canada and the British Broadcasting Corporation in the 
UK serve local, national and international audiences.  They are professional 
broadcasters with no mandate to provide direct media production access to non-
professionals.  Community-based radio stations in Latin America developed around 
the same time as American stations and generally originate from two traditions.  In 
1947, Radio Sutatenza was founded in Colombia and set the stage for the development 
of what is  now a substantial network of educational radio stations throughout Latin 
America, embodied in the organization of the Latin American Radio Education 
Association (ALER).  Then, in 1952, 26 mining community radio stations in Bolivia 
formed a network as a functional and fondamental part of labour organizing and 
social resistance (Langlois, Sakolsky, & Van der Zon, 2010, p.  24; Robledo, 1998). 
Pirate radio stations-unlicensed and often clandestine-broadcast across Europe 
during the 1970s and 1980s in an effort to provide alternatives to state-monopoly 
broadcasters (Collectif, 1978). 
6  This movement ultimately resulted in the official 
authorization_of local community and commercial radio stations (Sânchez, 2003). 
6  While documented in Canada much earlier, the phrase "pirate broadcaster' is often associated with 
these European stations which broadcast from boats anchored in international waters.  The origin 
of the term "pirate radio", however, has been traced to descriptions of the tendency of powerful 
commercial American radio stations to broadcast into Canada atop the frequency of legitimate 
Canadian commercial radio stations in the 1920s (MacLennan, 2010, p. 35). 24 
Today, there are thousands of community radio stations around the world with many 
of them represented by the World Association for Community Broadcasters 
(AMARC). 
Within this long history of community or independent broadcasting, there are two 
opposing views that, at their root, are concerned with the legitimacy of the State in 
regulating the spectrum.
7  Typically, those who identify as community broadcasters 
have gained or seek to gain regulatory legitimacy while those who identify as pirate 
or unlicensed community broadcasters neither seek recognition from nor recognize 
the regulatory legitimacy of the State in  this domain.  Th us, there remains 
considerable debate even within these movements over regulatory authority and 
whether or not the "public property" of the airwaves can be legitimately regulated.  In 
addition, the ability to build one's own radio transmitter - something that individuals 
within both branches of this movement promote- introduces the concrete reality that 
it is possible to use the radio spectrum "on your own terms.''
8  The great number and 
worldwide presence of these kinds of radio broadcasters are evidence of a persistent 
view of the spectrum as something that really does qualify as public property and 
should be used by the public in order to communicate.  The fondamental question, it 
seems, is one asked earlier:  who controls the spectrum, by what means, and to what 
ends? 
The advent of communication satellites has been the linchpin of other radio-related 
technologies that have greatly affected our ability to be untethered communicators 
7  These sorts of media are often explored within various ru bries: alternative media, independent 
media, citizens' media, etc.  For the sake of simplicity, I will use these terms somewhat 
interchangeably and employ them sparingly. 
8  Pirate radio building: http://www.freeradio.org/ and building for licensed community radio: 
http://prometheusradio.org/ 25 
while maintaining location-based awareness - namely the cellphone and global 
positioning systems (GPS).  While the appropriation of radio broadcasting for 
licensed or unlicensed community use was an important step in enlarging the 
discursive space around the spectrum, this type of broadcaster is typically organized 
around a very specifie geographie location (Fairchild, 2001 ).  The location-based 
awareness introduced through cellular telephones and GPS means that while one may 
have the sensation of being truly untethered, one's communication deviee is in 
constant contact with a third party (  often the corporation providing you with your 
means of mobile communication) that can "see" where you are.  Thus the allocation 
of the spectrum and regulation of its use take on another dimension whereby these 
acts dictate not only methods of communication, but the limits of persona] privacy in 
a spatial sense as opposed to a communicational sense (as in the case of wiretapping). 
In the 1920s, theoretical work was conducted on the potential for launching satellites 
from Earth and putting them into orbit (Samama, 2008, p.  19).  The first published 
proposai for building such a system did not appear until Arthur C. Clarke's Extra-
Terrestrial Relays in  1945 (Clarke, 1945).  In this article, Clarke ponders how one 
could build a radio network which would be able to service the entire world and 
points to orbital satellites as a replacement for enormous networks of cables. 
Development of the various components needed to create communications satellites 
was conducted largely by AT&T in the United States in the 1940s-1950s and in  1946 
the U.S. Army Signal Corps engaged in the first example of extraterrestrial radio 
communication, bouncing radar signais off the moon and detecting them on Earth 
(Leinwoll, 1979, p. 189).  As demonstrated in David J. Whalen's book on the origins 
of satellite communications, this technology was subsequently used as a Cold War 
foreign policy tool by the American govemment and the National Aeronautics and 26 
Space Administration (NASA) (2002, pp. 10-11 ).  In addition, military development 
ofradar (an acronym for "radio detection and ranging") in the early 1940s would set 
the stage for Earth-to-space satellite communications (Leinwoll, 1979, pp. 166-170). 
GPS is a satellite-based continuation of radio-based naval navigations systems that 
had been in constant development since the early 1900s.  An initial version of GPS, 
the TRANSIT system, was made operational by the United States Navy in  1964 and 
became the Global Positioning System in 1973.  GPS finally became functional and 
available for commercial applications in  1995 (Samama, 2008, pp. 1-24).  Today, it is 
a standard feature in basic cellular phones (so one can be found in case of 
emergency), smart phones (so one can find one's way around town), in military 
operations and in automobiles.  Whereas the spectrum is innately placeless, it is 
subject to certain strategies that impose the structure of place upon it.  National and 
international regulators often create technical delineations for it that coïncide with 
national borders and certain parts of the spectrum are often reserved for particular 
uses.  GPS uses the spectrum in a way that creates a very precise construction of 
place.  Often integrated into cellular telephones and automobiles and not al ways 
operating with the knowledge of the user (Vjayan, 2011), GPS "exacerbates issues 
around privacy, consent, and the circulation of persona! knowledge by potentially 
allowing for real-time tracking and thus an  always-locatable subject" (Propen, 2006, 
p.  135).  This potential for ubiquitous surveillance has developed alongside post-2001 
anti-terrorism legislation and its use to surveil individuals has been met with 
important legal challenges in North America and Europe (Jacoby,.2û06).  Today, GPS 
is operated by the United States Air Force (Zeffiro, 2006) and a separate system, 
called Galileo, is operated by the European Space Agency (European Space Agency, 
2011). 27 
While the locations may be different, satellites rely on the same fundaments of radio 
communication as any other point-to-point radio communication technology.  Due to 
the fact that they orbit the Earth and thus have the potential to utilize the spectrum in 
countless locations, satellites require a high level of international coordination 
through the ITU where both the use of frequencies and spatial orbits (of which there 
is a limited number) are allocated (Kane, 2008, pp. 192-199; Martinez, 1985, pp. 53-
83).  The use of satellites to provide a range of communication tools (for example, 
satellite radio and television, as components in internet and cellphone networks, GPS) 
has heightened the presence of spectrum-related technology in our society.  However, 
the displacement of policy discussions in this area to a strictly international arena of 
experts (Martinez, 1985, p. 53) means that citizens have few opportunities to take part 
in decision-making around the use of the spectrum.  The level to which the military 
has been involved in the development and deployment of satellite technology 
demonstrates a further displacement of policy discussions and increased 
militarization of the spectrum, a process that began with the wireless telegraph.  The 
issue of democratie access to policy-making and regulatory processes will be 
examined more fully throughout the following chapters.  It should be noted, however, 
that with each successive technological innovation in wireless technology the 
possibility of democratie policy-making and regulation appears to diminish even as 
these new technologies are touted as having great democratizing potential. 
As a tool for untethering, the cellular phone has been hailed as a communication 
technology of great democratizing potential, making the possibility of ubiquitous 
communication a reality for people throughout the world.  The impact has been 
especially powerful in locations that lack pre-existing telecommunications 
infrastructures.  For instance, recent data shows that two out of three households in Kenya own a cellphone- twice the number that have access to piped water.  In 
contrast, only one percent of the population has a fixed-line telephone (Rice, 2010). 
Far from a tool developed expressly for the developing world, though, the cellphone 
has its roots in that earlier icon of North American mobility - the automobile - and 
was limited to an elite and wealthy population for decades (Klemens, 2010, pp. 42-
49). 
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While there is an unusual dearth of historical treatments of the cellphone, Guy 
Klemens' recent book on the subject shows how early experiments in mobile voice 
communication began with police communication systems in the United States 
between 1920-1940.
9  Eventually, AT  &T introduced the first mobile phone system in 
St. Louis, Missouri in  1946 and the market for this technology had grown to  1.5 
million users by  1964.  During the same period, mobile phone development was also 
taking place in Sweden and Japan.  While the technology of this period did offer a 
certain mobility, one needed an automobile and severa! thousands of dollars to take 
advantage of it (Klemens, 2010, pp. 42-49).  Ultimately, the first cellphone would be 
made available to the public in Tokyo, Japan followed by Finland (1982), the United 
States (1983) (Klemens, 2010, pp. 65- 70) and Canada around the same period 
(Zschoch, 1997, p. 64). 
Rough measurements show that there are 4.6 billion cellphone subscriptions serving 
the world population of approximately 7 billion people and predict that most countries 
will eventually attain a cellphone penetration rate of 100% (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2010a, p. 197).
10  The rise of the cellphone has been 
9  An engineer, Klemens documents, in fine detail, the evolution of cellphone technology. 
10  The penetration rate is determined by the ratio of cellphones to people. Severa! countries currently 
have penetration rates of over 100%, but this does not necessarily mean that 100% of the 
inhabitants own and use cellphones.  Individuals may have multiple phones or SIM cards. 29 
accompanied, in many countries, by a graduai shift in the way that spectrum is 
managed by government bodies.  For instance, in the late 1980s the United States held 
a series of unsuccessful spectrum lotteries to determine which companies would 
receive the right to use portions of the spectrum for provision of cellphone service. 
"Over 320,000 lottery tickets were acquired by spectrum speculators" who often 
proceeded to sell their randomly-attributed asset at great profit (Snider, 2007, p.  1  ). 
Following public outrage at private profit being made directly from sale of the "public 
airwaves", legislation in 1993 that introduced a system to auction the spectrum for 
telecommunications use, thereby assuring that proceeds of spectrum sales would go 
directly to the federal government rather than into private bands (Snider, 2007, p. 1  ). 
New Zealand became the first nation to auction their airwaves in  1989 (New Zealand, 
2011) while Canada's first spectrum auction took place in  1998-1999 (Industry 
Canada, 2011 b  ).  Since 1994, auctions have also been implemented in the following 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Slovenia, Switzerland, Taiwan 
and and the United Kingdom (KB Enterprises LLC, 2009, p. 11).  Thus, while the 
attribution of the radio spectrum for radio and television broadcasting use remained 
based on evaluative systems that took into account the effects of such decisions on 
social, political and economie systems while providing participatory forums where 
the public could intervene, attribution in telecommunications was reduced to a "for 
sale to the highest bidder" rationale. 
Severa! decades after the property rights approach to spectrum management was first 
proposed, it has become a widely used in telecommunications.  This is set to escalate 
due to a confluence of factors that are leading to a dramatic shift in both the 
capabilities of wireless technologies and the structure of our communication and 
L_  _____________________________________________________________________________ ----------- - --- --------- - ----- - - ·- ·- -------
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media system.  On an international scale, national communication regulators are 
migrating their over-the-air television broadcasting systems to digital broadcasting 
systems which will function on different frequencies than those used today. 
Commonly referred to as the "digital dividend," the spectrum that will be vacated by 
the migration will be reallocated for other uses.  In the United States and Canada, 
regulators.have decided that it will be allocated for next-generation cellular telephony. 
The American auction of this spectrum took place in 2008  (Labaton, 2008) while the 
Canadian auction has been scheduled for 2013 (Theckedath & Thomas, 2012).  The 
auctions taking places in these countries are orchestrated by governments and limited 
to the use of spectrum for telecommunications.  Elsewhere, the conversion of the 
spectrum into private property was epitomized in the Guatemalan government's 
decision in  1996 to completely privatize the spectrum under their jurisdiction. 
Consequently, anybody in Guatemala is free to sell, lease and otherwise manage it as 
they like (lbarguen, 2003). 
1 have referred to the historical period from the 1940s-1990s as "the untethering" 
because of the brisk development and socialization of wireless communication 
deviees and the growth of related social movements.  lndividuals and their 
communities increasingly engage in communication practices that rely on the radio 
spectrum.  They can build their own radio transmitters and receivers and participate in 
community and pirate broadcasting while their voices are bounced between 
communication satellites and cellphone networks, ultimately passing through their 
bodies and th ose of their neighbours.  During this same period of untethering, 
administrative processes for allocating and managing the spectrum have been 
constructed far from the public eye.  Our untethering has been matched by enclosure, 
a regulatory acceptance of property rights in the ether.  As originally proposed by --------- --------------------------------------------------, 
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Herzel and Coase, administrative processes have been streamlined through the 
implementation of spectrum auctions and the reduction of spectrum allocation to 
simple monetary exchange.  For many people, this may be just fact, part of the logical 
progression of our greater socio-economic and political systems.  As we will see in 
the following section, however, a movement of different tendencies has been growing, 
bolstered by new ideas around spectrum management and new technologies that 
accompany these ideas. 
1.2 The new commons era 
The model of the commons is being continually adapted and presented as an 
alternative spectrum management framework.  This is similar to the adaptation of 
material-oriented property rights to the spectrum proposed by Herzel and Coase 
which was later put into regulatory practice by various national governments.  The 
origins of this modellie at the intersection of the open-source software movement, 
legal theory and an important technological advance - wireless networking. 
Wireless networking (commonly known as Wi-Fi) was developed in the early 1990s 
and in 1994 Carnegie Mellon University became the first institution to make it 
available, eventually expanding their wireless network to the entire university campus 
in 1999 (Carnegie Mellon University, n.d.).
11  Wi-Fi takes advantage of a portion of 
the spectrum that has historically been sectioned off for unlicensed use.  This means 
that the people using it don't need governmental permission to do so.  In most 
countries, there exists a set of standards to which the equipment, not the users, must 
adhere.  Initially, this part of the spectrum was used by things such as television 
remote controls and garage door openers.  The ability to use this unlicensed spectrum 
11  As a comparison, in 1999 McGill University's Nahum Gelber Law Library was the first university 
library in Canada to offer universal wired connectivity. 32 
space to connect computers to networks (for instance, the internet or a university 
network) or to each other led to the potential to adapt this technique in order to build 
unlicensed networks of varying scale.  Epistemologically, it has opened conceptual 
space for considering that our centrally regulated wireless communication networks 
could exist in a similar decentralized, unsupervised and unlicensed fashion. 
Radio- whether it be broadcast radio, television, satellite, cellular phone or telegraph 
- bas historically been governed according to one central preconception: radio 
communication can only be successful if the sender and receiver utilize the same 
frequency.  This need to exclusively use a portion of the spectrum is fondamental to 
the notion of scarcity that drives much thought and policy concerning the spectrum. 
It is, however, a limitation of the technology being used rather than of the spectrum 
itself.  A useful analogy is a highway with multiple lanes.  More than one vehicle can 
use each Jane and drivers may change lanes depending on where they are going, their 
designated priority in the legal schema that governs their interaction, etc.  Ultimately, 
drivers may change lanes multiple times but reach their destinations having negotiated 
various acts of resource sharing in order to get there.  Traditional approaches to 
spectrum regulation rely upon exclusivity -the notion that a designated entity bas 
exclusive permission to transmit on a specifie frequency.  However, the possibility for 
successful radio communication to occur through the use of varying frequencies (the 
transmission changing frequencies as a car changes lanes) was demonstrated as far 
back as the 1940s and a patent pertaining to such a mechanism was filed in 1942 by 
Hedy Markey and George Altheil (Markey & Antheil, 1942).
12  Commonly referred to 
today as "spread spectrum," this technique later became the basis of secure U.S. Navy 
communications in the late 1950s (Weinberger, 2003). 
12  Known widely as screen actress Hedy Lamarr, Markey received the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) Frontier Award in 1995. Online: http://www.ncafe.com/chris/pat2/index.html 33 
In the 1990s these ideas would percolate into popular practice as wireless networking 
technology for the consumer-market.  From 1994-1995, two authors, working 
independently of one another, proposed that contrary to popular opinion and 
regulatory practice, the spectrum had no actuallimits other than ones that existed due 
to the capabilities of technology to efficiently utilize it.  As technology improves, 
more of the spectrum can be used more efficiently (Baran, 1995; Gilder, 1994). 
Baran, in particular, noted that analogue television broadcasting utilized an inordinate 
amount of spectrum and proposed that it be moved entirely to cable, thereby freeing 
that part of the spectrum (known as UHF) to be used by more efficient 
communication technology.  By using the very sort of technology introduced by  the 
U.S. Navy in  the 1950s, it would be possible to build a boundless and wireless 
communication system requiring little regulation.  These authors presented arguments 
based on technical feasibility and Eli Noam would shortly afterwards support their 
claims, albeit qualifying that there must be economie incentive for such a system to 
work (Noam, 1997).  In contrast to claims that spectrum scarcity is but a temporary 
technicallimit, Noam argues that: 
with open access, scarcity emerges, the resource needs to be allocated, 
and a priee mechanism becomes essential.  Technology is not enough. 
But this does not require exclusive control over a slice of the rainbow. 
(Noam, 1997, p. 463) 
These arguments demonstrate the broad range of the debate at the time: while these 
propositions were being made, spectrum auctions were simultaneously introduced 
around the world.  With neither the requisite technology, legal frameworks nor 
economie models available, these were not mere shouts in the wild.  By 1995, Canada 
had begun to consider moving television and radio broadcasting to digital 34 
broadcasting technology capable of more efficiently using the spectrum (Canadian 
Heritage, 1997; Groupe de travail sur la mise en oeuvre de la radio-diffusion 
audionumérique, 1995a).  In addition, what had begun as military radio 
communication technology would come to be attached to a concept that is key to this 
technology's functionality, despite its military origins rarely appearing in dominant 
discourse from the mid-1990s to the present.  This is the concept of sharing, an .act 
which implies at the very !east a process of negotiation and, to a higher degree, 
collaboration. 
In 1997, legal scholar Yochai Benkler presented the first extensive analysis of the 
place of sharing in new information and communication technologies, examining 
then-emerging technologies, testing the compatibility of existing legal frameworks 
with the concept of open access and interrogating the mode! of economie priority 
(1997).  The alternative Benkler presents against a backdrop of administrative 
licensing and property rights frameworks is the following: machines can manage 
themselves if we give them the ability to do so.  Benkler proceeds to engage with the 
property rights/market mode], concluding that the elaborate economie and 
technological systems needed to "assemble and sublet" the spectrum for use in an 
unlicensed yet monetized manner is grossly inefficient.  Thus, it is more sensible, 
even from the point of economie efficiency, to create a basic rule-set by which 
technology can interoperate without the burden of economics-related bureaucracy 
(Benkler, 1997, pp. 73-76). 
Benkler's proposition was further advanced by Kevin Werbach.  Similar to Benkler, 
Werbach advocates for a technologically-enabled spectrum commons that would be 
shared among users rather than exclusively assigned to companies (Werbach, 2001, 35 
pp.  1-2).  These users are, effectively, technological deviees that negotiate amongst 
themselves the best ways to share limited spectrum space.  While Werbach's primary 
focus is presenting viable technical mechanisms for creating a spectrum commons on 
a large scale, other authors take great inspiration from the open-source software 
movement that relies upon an ethos of sharing (in this case, ideas and programming 
code) as an organizational foundation for collaboration.
13  Lawrence Lessig's The 
Future of  ldeas presents the traditional systems of spectrum management as crucial 
obstacles to be overcome in the battle to ensure the freedoms to communicate and 
innovate (Lessig, 2002).  Sharing, the result of a cognizant negotiation between two 
or more parties over the common use of sorne thing, is a running/prominent theme 
throughout Benkler's writings on both the spectrum and collaborative production 
(Benkler, 1997, 2003, 2004, 2006; Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006).  While much of 
this academie work pushed at the limits of both technical and epistemological 
feasibility when initially presented, it bas bad an continuing effect on the ability of 
civil society groups to develop viable alternatives with sound legal and technical 
grounding.  Most importantly, it drew critical attention to practices of collaboration 
and valourization into the open, painting to them as models to be respected and 
replicated rather than dismissed as marginal phenomena. 
In the background of this academie work (and coincidentally not referred toby any of 
it) a great deal of both technical and regulatory experimentation was undertaken by 
Dewayne Hendricks.
14  With the mid-90s characterized by a technological jump to 
high-speed internet çofmectivity both in the home and at the enterprise level, 
Hendricks set out to make the open spectrum approach -- proposed theoretically by 
13  This thesis has been produced using 100% open-source software: Ubuntu Linux, Openüffice, 
Libreüffice, Firefox, Zotero, Audacity. 
14  Known as "The Broadband Cowboy," Hendricks has unfortunately left little documentation of his 
exploits. 36 
Baran and Gilder -- a reality.  Finding the American regulatory climate problematic 
for building high-speed wireless networks, Hendricks went on to work with interested 
sovereign nations in North America and elsewhere.  Beginning work with Native 
American communities in North Dakota, he continued to build large-scale unlicensed 
wireless networks for other communities in New Mexico and the governments of 
Mongolia and Tonga (Hurtig, 2002; Rennie, 2007).  Hendricks' practical work 
demonstrates that it is possible to build unlicensed wireless communications networks 
on a large scale if the conditions of political will are appropriate. 
What Hendricks, Benkler, Lessig, Werbach and others are arguing for is the creation 
of a spectrum commons.  As with the oft-used analogy of the common management 
of grazing lands, a spectrum commons would be a system of spectrum management 
whereby "anyone can gain access to a block of spectrum or a set of channels, subject 
only to certain basic rules" (Hatfield, 2003, p.  5).  Proponents of this approach to the 
spectrum tend to talk about what sorts of technologies or policies may make such a 
thing possible.  The bigger questions- and the more unknown/hazy/variable factors 
that must be addressed in order for any change to be made -- are social and political. 
Academie experts on the spectrum rarely articulate the normative daims upon which 
their propositions may or may not be based; they do not necessarily connect their 
academie curiosity and production to concrete efforts to affect change in the policy 
arena.  However, operating in parallel to this community of experts, a variety of 
community-based groups and NGOs have been working to advance goals connected 
to the idea of a spectrum commons wbile engaging their communities in the process. 
Since the introduction of Wi-Fi and the theoretical innovation of the spectrum 
commons, three interrelated community-based models for providing wireless internet 37 
connectivity have emerged.  First among them is the community wireless network. 
These groups commonly take ad van tage of Wi-Fi technology in order to provide free 
wireless internet access to local communities, largely through "hotspots" provided in 
local businesses and public spaces.  The first community wireless networks were 
started in San Francisco, Seattle, British Columbia, Champaign-Urbana (Illinois) and 
London (Middleton & Crow, 2008, p. 420).  One of the most highly developed in 
Canada is Île sans fils in Montréal.  Between 2004-2007, Île sans fils (ISF) "created a 
network of over 150 Wi-Fi hotspots; with backhaul bandwidth donated by local 
businesses and community organizations that provided free WI-Fi to people using 
laptops in publicly-accessible areas" (Powell, 2008, pp. 60- 61).  The group of people 
behind ISF developed an open-source application so other groups around the world 
could more easily start their own community wireless networks. 
15  Community 
wireless networks can be seen as the forerunners of broader wireless communication 
movements. The development of open-source software coupled with an organizational 
mode! for providing free access demonstrates that basic access to the 
telecommunications infrastructure does not necessarily need to be based on 
commercial transactions. 
Mesh networks are the second mode! to emerge from the melding of commons-based 
theory and technical creation.  Different from the previous model, mesh networks 
(sometimes referred to as free networks) attempt to attain the same leve! of internet 
connectivity (in other words, market penetration) as commercial telecommunications 
companies.  The strategy relies on individuals to share their personal internet 
connections with their neighbours in order to create a larger shared network.  One of 
the most successful, FunkFeuer Free Net in Vienna, Austria, covers the entire 
15  Wifidog. http://www.wifidog.org 38 
metropolitan area (2.2 million people) and is active in three other cities.
16  Another, 
Guifi.net, covers 6,000 kilometers of Catalonia, Spain and provides free internet 
access to more than 16,000 locations.
17  To my knowledge, a viable mesh network of 
this scale has not yet been implemented successfully in North America.  One project, 
Wireless Nomad, attempted to develop a similar organization in Toronto, Ontario but 
failed due technical and market-oriented difficulties (Wong, 2008).
1 8  Large-scale 
mesh networks carry the work of community wireless networks to the logical next 
step: shared or free access to wireless internet in one's home rather than simply 
around town. 
While community wireless networks and mesh networks work at the local leve] to 
change the dominant corporation-customer model of telecommunications, their 
efforts are largely limited to internet access.  The third spectrum-focused movement 
that has emerged in recent years proposes a new paradigm for managing use of the 
entire radio spectrum - a mode] referred to as open spectrum management.  Emerging 
from the same theoretical and technical work on the spectrum commons as described 
above, advocates of open spectrum management aim to extend this approach to 
wireless telecommunications.  As with much of the work on the concept of a 
spectrum commons, advocates of open spectrum management tend to put the onus on 
technology to negotiate how to cooperatively use the spectrum most efficiently. 
Granting such primacy to technology, though, further displaces the politics of the 
spectrum as the standards according to which technology functions are created by 
either elite professional bodies, such as the Institute of Electrical and Eleçtronics 
Engineers (IEEE) (responsible for the Wi-Fi standard among others), and industry 
16  FunkenFeuer.  http://www.funkfeuer.at/index.php?id=42&L=1 
17  Guifi. http://guifi.net/en 
18  Wireless Nomad. http://wirelessnomad.blogspot.com/ 
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consortia, such as the International Wireless Industry Consortium (Mansell & 
Silverstone, 1996).
19 20  Thus, the rules by which technologies function do not 
necessarily have any democratie relationship with the people who use them. 
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Potential for sharing both the spectrum and the power of policy-making and 
regulation lies in the extension of rule-making to the very communities using the 
technology.  In this sense, the scale of the community involved in sharing the 
spectrum is variable - it may be One Laptop Per Child computers (OLPCs),  a 
community-owned cellular phone network, or a network of community-owned 
cellular phone networks.
21  With the exception of the above models of wireless 
community networking, open spectrum management today remains a fringe 
proposition seemingly originating in academia in a manner not unlike Hazlett and 
Coase's market-based proposai.  The advocates of this new approach, though, are not 
economists of a more socialist stripe.  In addition to the legal scholars noted earlier, 
they include David P. Reed, one of the original architects of the internet, and 
philosopher David Weinberger, for whom the spectrum is much more than sim ply 
electromagnetic waves: it is our primary connection with the greater technological, 
social, political and economie world.
22  23  As such, we should all have equal access to 
it. 
Sorne analysts of this approach fear that unmanaged or unlicensed use of the spectrum 
willlead to a "tragedy of the commons" whereby certain users would be able to take 
19  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. http://www.ieee.org 
20  International Wireless Industry Consortium. http://www.iwpc.org/ 
21  The One Laptop Per Child program is aimed at providing children in developing countries and 
their school systems with laptops.  The laptops communicate through one another in arder to share 
a limited number of internet connections. Uruguay is the only country that has tully deployed 
laptops and wireless networking to ail of its primary schools. 
22  http ://www.reed.com/dpr/?sel =OpenS pectrum/ 
23  http://www.greaterdemocracy.org/framing_openspectrum.html 40 
and use however much they wanted to the detriment of others (Hatfield, 2003, pp. 9-
10).  As I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation, however, such criticism 
appears to exist in a social and political vacuum, ignoring the fact that everyday 
people can and do care about the spectrum and how they may or may not use it.  A 
commons of any sort is not innately a commons.  To define something as a commons 
is a political act by a community of peers that creates specifie rules to en sure equal 
and cooperative everlasting use of something.  It is not the absence of rules but rather 
rules made in a certain way by a community, whether this be a village, a 
neighbourhood, a city, nation or the global community.  To constitute something as a 
commons is also an inherently legal act by which a framework of inclusive property 
rights is created as opposed to the exclusive property rights framework manifest in 
spectrum auctions (Werbach, 2011, p. 8). 
Well established open spectrum advocacy organizations exist in the United States and 
Europe where they have each had a palpable impact on policy-making. The Open 
Spectrum Alliance is a group of individuals, companies and organizations that 
organize around and influence open spectrum policy issues in the European Union.
24 
In the United States, the New America Foundation's Open Technology Initiative has 
been equally active.25  One important issue that both of these organizations have 
helped ad vance is an experimental opening of a portion of the spectrum used for over-
the-air television broadcasting.  Commonly referred to as "white spaces," this portion 
of unused spectrum is located between the spaces used by television channels "or 
broadcast auxiliary services like wireless microphones" (Meinrath & Calabrese, 2008, 
p. 497).  Historically, broadcasting (both television and radio) was a fairly inaccurate 
technology.  A transmitter would use the space of several frequencies and send signais 
24  Open Spectrum Alliance. http://www.openspectrum.eu 
25  Open Technology Initiative. http://oti.newamerica.net 41 
at high power to a general location where receivers, if tuned to the same frequency 
range, would capture these signais.  In order to avoid interference between signais, a 
"buffer" space was set aside between frequency ranges (Werbach, 2011, p. 9).  For 
example, if channel 6 is licensed for use in a certain place then channels 5 and 7 will 
be left vacant.  This is also the reason why one will find radio stations broadcasting 
on the FM dial at, for instance, 90.3 and 90.5 but not at 90.4.  Broadcasting and 
receiving technologies have become more accurate since this approach was put into 
practice.  Recognizing the accuracy of new technology, it has been proposed that this 
"buffer space" (now commonly referred to as "white space") be reserved for 
unlicensed use.  This means it could be used for a variety of unlicensed 
communication deviees to interact with one another and thus with the larger network 
of the internet, just as a laptop connects to a router which connects to a network.  An 
important and problematic (due to the current dominant paradigm) characteristic of 
this proposition is that it could potentially enable truly independent wireless 
communication without the need of a corporate intermediary or regulatory Iicense 
(Meinrath &  Calabrese, 2008). 
Between 2008 and 2010, the FCC in the United States approved the unlicensed use of 
white space and issued a set of rules to which white space communication technology 
would have to adhere (Federal Communication Commission, 2010).  Not long after, 
the European Union adopted new rules supporting shared and unlicensed use of the 
spectrum and "next-generation Wi-Fi" (La Quadrature du Net, 2011).  In Canada, no 
advocacy groups currently organize around open spectrum and Canadian regulators 
are waiting to see what develops in the United States and Europe before taking any 
steps of their own in po  licy or technological experimentation and development 
(Industry Canada, 2010b ).  On a more global scale, the Association for Progressive 42 
Communication (APC), an international NGO that works on themes of social justice 
and technology, launched its "Open spectrum for development" project in 2010.
26  A 
multi-year research project, it aims to determine regulatory, political, economie, and 
social spaces in Africa, Asia and Latin America where open spectrum management 
frameworks can be introduced (Light, 2010). 
A final important factor in understanding the current regulatory climate is what is 
often referred to as digital television transition, whereby all member countries of the 
ITU will migrate their national television systems from analogue to digital broadcast 
technology.  Because the new technology is much more accurate, even more "white 
space" will be opened up th an currently exists (Werbach, 2011, p.  Il).  Countries in 
the industrialized world and others considered by the ITU to have the necessary 
tech ni cal capacity are required by the ITU to complete this transition by  17 June 2015 
while developing countries have been given until 17 June 2020 (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2010b, p. i).  The ITU provides extensive guidelines on 
how to make the transition.  However, the details of the types of technology to use, 
how to encourage actual migration (it will require significant investment both on the 
part of broadcasters and people watching over-the-air television), and what to do with 
the spectrum space which will suddenly be available, are left undefined.  Perhaps 
encouraged by this apparent neutrality on the part of the ITU, the debate over whether 
"white space" can be utilized as a commons has gradually become a debate over 
whether it is proper to introduce market tools into the management of this commons. 
Similar to Coase and Herzel's earlier academie proposition, two academie researchers 
published works specifically proposing the application of market economies as a 
management strategy for the spectrum commons before such an idea was proposed as 
26  Open spectrum for development. Online: http://www.apc.org/en/node/10445/ 43 
legislation and policy (Hazlett, 2008; Noam, 1997).  In summary, self-regulating 
market efficiencies would better manage a spectrum commons than a bunch of 
deviees figuring things out amongst themselves.  Recently, this academie proposition 
evolved into a draft proposai on spectrum auction rules, currently under development 
in the U.S. Congress (Republican Party, 2011 ).  The original proposa] of unlicensed 
use of "white space" was one that aimed to incorporate neither regulatory control nor 
market economies, hoping to recreate the effect that the introduction of Wi-Fi had by 
providing unregulated spectrum with which people could experiment and create 
(Werbach, 2011, pp. 12-15).  The appropriation of the original white space proposai 
demonstrates that nothing is immune from reinterpretation.  It also shows us that 
demarcations between advocates for a commons approach and a private property 
approach to spectrum regulation are not easily made nor maintained. 
As with the other distinct periods in the development of thinking around the radio 
spectrum, the new commons era is marked by an ongoing discussion about command 
and control, with a number of related subjects relegated to the margins.  For instance, 
who gave governments the ability to regulate the spectrum anyway (Noam, 1997)? 
What does ail of this mean for citizens and their communities and what role do they 
play in these discussions and decision-making processes?  Proponents of a spectrum 
commons 1 open spectrum management approach exist largely in contrast with free 
· market spectrum auction supporters.  However, the majority of the discourse 
developed around these issues refuses to address the problem of administrative 
decision-making in communications policy.  Whether a spectrum commons is 
facilitated by "smart" technology or private property frameworks driven by auctions, 
it is still the role of experts - with their exclusive technical, regulatory, and political 
knowledge- to decide.  The second half of this dissertation aims to analyse this 44 
problematic through a comparative study of spectrum policy-making in Canada and 
Uruguay.  I will attempt to demonstrate that the potential for a viable spectrum 
commons is directly linked to the possibility of democratie, non-elite and non-
technocratie policy-making and regulatory design.  Before heading there, I will 
further interrogate the current state of spectrum-related technology and policy, as weil 
as its evolution/future trajectories.  I will then examine the limitations of our "spectral 
epistemology" and propose that one of the most profound obstacles to nurturing a 
meaningful social relationship with the spectrum bas to do with our frameworks for 
thinking aboutit and creating knowledge around it. 
1.3 The Opportunity of Convergence 
For policy wonks, policy analysts and policy observers, either with time on their 
bands to think about it, or technology in their hands to play with it, convergence is 
rising.  For the telecommunications and media companies at its epicentre, 
convergence is now.  This is the "information society," the mythical future world 
where we are built of bits.  Our communicative utterances, brought forth from sorne 
great synaptic happening within us and pulsed into a telephone, microphone, 
computer undergoes an increasingly unavoidable transition and the nature of our 
sounds, words, movements changes form, like water to ice.  Bits.  Thanks to this 
transformation of our technologically-mediated communicative actions from narrow 
and exclusive analogue systems to interoperable digital ones, the data and information 
~hich embody our communication can easily bounce around multiple networks and 
be available to other people (and to ourselves) in myriad ways (European 
Commission, 1997, p. ii-iii).  Communication technology is central to the functioning 
of the post-industrial service economy of the Information Society where great 
political and economie value is instilled in forms of information and data 45 
(Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006, pp. 115- 120).  The cycle of convergence we are 
experiencing today may appear new and revolutionary because it is often presented as 
the result of current and ongoing technological change.  This change in the way we 
communicate and organize our communicative behaviour, though, is the result of 
decades of social, economie, political and scientific evolution. 
This section will briefly map the historical development of this most recent cycle of 
convergence in Canada while situating it globally.  The technologies central to this 
transition - digital broadcasting, internet and cellular telephony - are sometimes 
conflated as simple pieces of the same puzzle.  It is important to understand how and 
to what extent they fit together in order to fully comprehend the current cycle of 
convergence, its potential pitfalls and opportunities.  I refer to "cycles" of 
convergence to emphasize the historical relationship of this current occurrence with 
previous instances. 
Convergence is often presented as a merging of multiple technologies or their uses 
into one singular sort of technology or technological use.  The first convergence of 
electronic media occurred with the melding of the telegraph and newspaper 
businesses in the early 1900s, leading to the creation of a new form of transnational 
media made possible by high-speed long-distance communication (Winseck, 1998, 
pp. 85-86).  A second cycle of convergence began in the early 1960s with the 
development of communications satellites and their integration into 
telecommunications and media systems.  In 1962, the Alouette was launched and 
Canada became the third country in the world with an orbiting satellite (after the 
USSR and U.S).  Then, in  1964 Teleglobe, the Crown corporation for overseas 46 
telecommunications, launched Canada's first communications satellite - the Anik.
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During the entirety of this period, the majority of the communications technology 
being used was analogue and thus data was difficult and inefficient to process and 
manage.  From this point onward, the transition from analogue to digital technology 
would be a driving force in subsequent cycles of convergence.  This transition began 
in earnest with a third and crucial cycle of convergence taking place in  the early 1970s . 
when telecommunications corporations began to buy computing companies, 
integrating them into their businesses and setting the foundation for the digital future 
(Winseck, 1998, p.  187).  The current cycle of convergence, accompanied and enabled 
by an  almost complete delivery system changeover (analogue to digital) has been in 
the works since the early 1980s.  While the previous cycle- the merging of 
computing and telecommunications -- occurred almost entirely outside the purview of 
the State (Winseck, 1998, p.  187), the current cycle has been under development, in 
concert with the State, for sorne time. 
The rhetoric of convergence has a long history in Canada.  Instant World, a federal 
report on telecommunications in Canada, was released in  1971, explaining the history 
of telecommunications and predicting that the ensuing "marriage of computers and 
communications" would radically alter Canadian society (Government of Canada, 
1971).  In 1992, the Communications Research Centre, then part of the Canadian 
Department of Communications, released a report ·entitled "The Changing Face of 
Broadcasting: Research Proposais for New Services" (Phillips et al., 1992).
28  A 
largely exp_loratory document authored by a group that included "psychologists, 
engineers and research scientists (there were no economists)" (CRTC, 2010d), it 
27  Teleglobe was privatized in 1987.  In 2012 it was the property of the Indian multi-national 
corporation, Tata Group. 
28  The Communications Research Centre is currently part of Industry Canada. 47 
examines available data and observes that "broadcasting, computing, 
telecommunications, and publishing were merging."  It then sets out to consider how 
the Department of Communications may help broadcasters prepare for the future 
(Phillips et al., 1992).  Written before the World Wide Web, the document's authors 
dream of cobbling together sorne sort of system that would combine computing and 
radio technology and enable citizens to be in two-way contact with one another or 
with various others at one time.  Soon after, the World Wide Web and consumer-
priced high-speed internet would be introduced, bringing about a massive new 
communication system not necessarily based upon the public interest orientation that 
had heavily influenced Canadian communication development since the early days of 
radio.  Well analyzed elsewhere, Canada's implementation of high-speed internet 
provision was heavily dominated by corporate telecommunications companies (Darin 
David Barney, 2005, pp. 37-62).  Similar to the effects of the differing regulatory 
treatment of spectrum for broadcasting and spectrum for telecommunications 
discussed earlier, the initial regulatory treatment of internet provision has had an 
enduring effect on the future regulation of this medium.  Developed outside of public 
purview and with limited avenues for public participation in its policy design and 
implementation, internet provision was defined early on as a service uniquely within 
the realm of the telecommunications industry. 
While the previous convergence cycle marked a change in the ways ·information in 
the communication delivery system was processed and distributed (from analogue to 
digital), the current cycle may-result in the wholesale replacement of the system itself. 
It is melding portable wireless communication, wired communication technology and 
remaining analogue communication systems (mainly radio and television through the 
indirect effects of changing communications and economie policy).  Previous cycles 48 
of convergence sin ce the 1  920s al ways retained two separate yet complimentary 
communication systems - one broadly defined as telecommunications, and one 
broadly defined as broadcasting.  Eventually both evolved to utilize a mix of analogue 
and digital technology.  The current convergence cycle is progressively moulding one 
interconnected, singular system by transitioning broadcasting to new digital platforms 
(either through digital transition or by forcing it to the internet).  High-speed internet 
provision through cellular telephony is at the heart of the transition process.  The rate 
at which it incorporates individuals, communities and entire nations previously not 
included or partially included in  the global communication system is an important 
aspect of this convergence cycle.  In 1998, Jess than 10% of the world population had 
a cellular telephone subscription.  By 2009 this had increased to an estimated 67% 
(International Telecommunication Union, 2010a, p.  195).  lt has been predicted that 
by 2015 more people will be accessing the internet through cellular phones than by 
wired means (Meeker, Devitt, & Wu, 2010).  This drastic and comprehensive 
realignment of our communication system, relying importantly upon the spectrum, 
has been recognized as requiring comprehensive policy responses (CRTC, 2011 d). 
Through such responses, there is great opportunity to re-create our methods of policy-
making and regulation and to found them on the basis of democracy and inclusion. 
One opportunity that has drawn enormous attention is what is known as the "digital 
dividend" and refers to the spectrum currently utilized by analogue broadcasting that · 
will be liberated once broadcasters, listeners, and viewers have migrated to digital 
broadcasting systems.  In Canada, there were_oHce plans to move both analogue over-
the-air television and radio broadcasting to digital.  The digital radio transition has 
proved to be problematic (Industry Canada, 2010b; O'Neill, 2007) but plans for 
digital television have moved ahead rapidly.  On 31  August 2011, over-the-air ~----
television broadcasting became exclusively digital in the majority of the country 
(Canadian Heritage, 2011 b  ).  The Canadian government is planning to auction, in 
2013, the portion of the spectrum that is was previously used for over-the-air 
television (Theckedath & Thomas, 2012). 
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Digital broadcasting can mean a number of different things depending on the 
technology implemented and the way this new broadcasting system is designed.  The 
rule of thumb is that the space currently utilized by one analogue broadcaster will 
permit a potential six broadcasters in its place.  However, this rule of thumb is purely 
theoretical.  The decision of how this system works is the result of a decision-making 
process that is inherently political.  As Gregory Taylor has shawn, the transitioning of 
Canada's television broadcasting system was largely left in the bands of the industry 
itself, undermining the "public interest" pillar in Canadian broadcasting regulation 
(2009).  Canada's choice of digital broadcasting standard and the manner in which it 
was implemented allowed "established analogue broadcasters and distributors (  ...  ) to 
present their own plan for transition - a luxury not afforded to new players" (Taylor, 
2009, p. 271), thus largely maintaining the pre-existing structure.  That said, how the 
spectrum that has been liberated by this transition is still up for debate and influence. 
Like the spectrum itself, the possibilities presented by this latest convergence cycle 
are determined more by politics than by technology.  Canadian communications 
policy-making and policy research are deeply rooted in history and tradition.  While 
the knowledge that accompanies these practices is useful for reçognizing historical 
patterns and policy cycles, there also exists a reflex to adhere to these pre-existing 
patterns and dominant cycles.  Part of this is due to the fact that Canadian 
communication policy scholars work within a field that is still under development and 50 
thus there is an impetus to create a historical record (Wagman, 2010).  This reflex to 
create history, though, leaves us unprepared to grapple with the massive changes 
taking place in our communication system.  Even the most progressive commentators 
default to the public interest tradition in Canadian broadcasting policy to provide a 
model for the digital and wireless age.  It is a model that is consultative but ultimately 
technocratie; publicly interested and regulated, but privately dominated.  However, 
what if convergence presents the opportunity to radically depart from this tradition in 
a far more democratie direction?  What if instead of defaulting to old models based on 
old assumptions we begin to think about spectrum in  a new way altogether- a way 
that opens onto the possibility of a truly, radically democratie corn mons? 
1.4 Breaking from old habits: the tool of water 
The first section in this chapter traces the historical development of our understanding 
of the spectrum, the relationship this understanding and its uses, and the various 
wireless technologies we employ in engaging in this relationship.  The history of our 
purposeful interaction with the spectrum is peppered with the illustrative use of 
similes.  One after another, comparisons have been manufactured as humankind 
attempts to make sense of this thing that is but isn't.  In this way, we create structures 
for understanding and creating knowledge about the spectrum that are compatible 
with the dominant frameworks that structure our society.  Quite incredibly (because 
otherwise a generalization of this degree is difficult thing to make) this generalization 
can be accurately applied to the way the spectrum is treated everywhere in the world. 
We do not speak of the spectrum itself having any cultural value; instead we speaK of 
industries, economies, societies built upon its use.  Y  et before Hertz developed a way 
of measuring the length of electromagnetic waves, the spectrum existed all the same. 
Learning how to think about the spectrum differently demands curiosity and with curiosity the will to suspend disbelief and to ask what is the spectrum is in and of 
itself, outside our own cultural and political preconceptions. 
1.4.1 Water 
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Our everyday relationship with water is not dissimilar to our relationship with the 
spectrum.  Equally hard to define apart from its idyllically simple molecular 
representation as H20  (which would be water were it pure, free of contaminants of 
any sort), we associate closely with water uses and infrastructures, but also the thing 
itself.  Water is understood to be an easily identified thing, yet it and our relationships 
toit are actually quite complex.  For instance: put down this pile of paper and draw a 
picture of water.  Not a lake, river, stream, ocean, raindrop, puddle.  Water.  It is the 
fundament of human life.  However, is it water that gives form to our bodies and 
environments or do our bodies and environments give form to it? 
From our basic biological reliance upon water have flowed systems and practices that 
reflect and enable our use of it.  Water is thus infused with a certain moral 
significance (Saunders & Wenig, 2007, p.  121) th at en sures (one might think) its 
maintenance and availability.  Like the electromagnetic spectrum,  it is difficult to 
reference water without referring to a physical, technical or socio-political structure 
that bares it.  Similar too, is their multifarious nature; both are media that carry much 
more than their simple form.  These are two things that, on molecular, social, 
economie, and politicallevels tie together our bodies and societies.  In doing so, they 
are inevitably connected with a variety of issues with which they are not often 
associated in their everyday use: social justice, social inclusion, social class.  ls it 
possible to ex tend our everyday general social understanding of these things so that 
they become more than assumed knowledge tied to immediate satisfaction, instead 52 
becoming actionable knowledge tied to broader social goals?  How do we gain an 
awareness, a relationship with these things, so central to our existence as they are, in a 
manner more profound than their presumed immediate use? 
In recent years, water has become an object of social mobilization around the world. 
Following the privatization of water systems in  the 1990s and earl y 2000s, popular 
movements grew out of networks of unions, community activism, and local and 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  This dissertation draws part 
of its inspiration from the water movement in Uruguay, initiated by the workers' union 
of the federal water and sewage corporation (Funcionarios de Obras Sanitarias del 
Estado or FFOSE) which has grown into a national movement.  The architects of the 
movement went through a process whereby an initial labour-led reaction to attempts at 
water and sanitation privatization was converted into a movement for the human right 
to water th at crossed ali poli ti cal and social bounds (Marquisio, 201 0).  Ultimately, a 
citizen-initiated referendum created a constitutional article enshrining the human 
right to water provided by the State with the active participation of its citizens (Santos 
& Villareal, 2005). 
The articulation of the human right to water in Uruguay and the broader development 
of this concept in Latin America (La Iniciativa MERCOSUR, 2007) is important and 
telling in its clarity.  While in sorne cases, private water companies have taken 
advantage of human rights discourse to present themselves as the best actors to 
provide this right to citizens (Bakker, 2008), this is distinctly not the case here. 
Individuals are granted the human right to water- access to use water as they wish 
without regulation or limitation.  This acknowledgement to the fondamental right to 
water insists that citizens be involved in the decision-making processes involved in managing the country's water resources while acknowledging that the provision of 
dean water costs money and requires administration (Genta, 2010; Ponce de Leon, 
2010).  The recognition of water as a human right in Uruguay has provided that 
country's population with much more than access to water.  It ha  re-structured 
citizens' relationship with water in such a way that they- rather than the politico-
regulatory system - create and enact the politics of water. 
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Since the 1970s, communication has been framed as a fundamental human right.  The 
origins of this proposition, though, have largely been political and academie, rather 
than emerging from grassroots organizing.  Flowing from the World Summit on the 
Communication Society, the Communication Rights in  the Information Society 
campaign (CRIS) attemptdc to bring this proposition to a larger audience and 
garnered the support of various NGOs around the world.  However,  it did not coalesce 
into a popular movement.
29  An important contribution of this campaign has been a 
framework for evaluating communication rights within a national context (CRIS 
Campaign, 2005) that has been used extensively to illustrate the great complexity 
inherent in  the "right to communicate" (Raboy & Shtern, 2010).  It is perhaps this 
complexity and the multi-pronged nature of evaluating communication rights that 
makes it a difficult thing to articulate outside of academie and legal contexts. 
However, if we were to narrow our focus to a singular medium (the spectrum), which, 
due to its essential form as a building block for communication,  these issues 
themselves could/might grow forth naturally as a logical condition of our relationship 
with this medjrnn. 
Restructuring our social relationship with the spectrum is not necessarily any more 
29  http://www.crisinfo.org/ 54 
difficult than what has occurred with water in Uruguay.  In 2006, British human 
rights organization Article 19 published an analysis on "the legitimacy of license 
requirements for the use of wireless communications deviees" (Article 19, 2006). 
Their analysis, based upon the right to freedom of expression as articulated in  the 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Office of the United Nations High 
Commission for Human Rights, 1976), questions the legitimacy of limiting an 
individual's use of the spectrum.  A step in the right direction, this document remains 
stuck within narrowly defined legal and social structures.  It has not been made for 
mass consumption, but it does open the door to a dramatically different discussion on 
the electromagnetic spectrum than have occurred thus far.  The remainder of this 
dissertation will be dedicated to examining the extent to which discussions 
concerning the nature of the spectrum and the place of the citizen within politico-
regulatory systems may occur in Canada and Uruguay and how they may be brought 
about. 55 
2. Theoretical Foundations 
In Chapter One, I traced the history of humankind's technologically-mediated 
relationship with the radio spectrum; the origins of various technologies used to 
interact with the spectrum and the regulations that govem their use; and the 
opportunity that presents itself today in the stormy waters of economie, political, and 
technological uncertainty and change.  Finally, I illustrated epistemological 
limitations of past academie treatments of the spectrum and provided a strategy for 
thinking about the spectrum in a manner by which its social importance can be fully 
valourized in a decidedly non-monetary fashion.  The current chapter concerns itself 
with operationalizing strategies for revising our relationship with the spectrum.  First, 
I revisit and fortify the his tory presented earlier, demonstrating the util ity and 
limitations of a political economy approach to communications research and analysis. 
In this way, I trace the origins of dominant value discourses relating to value and the 
structures that define and reinforce them.  I then re-examine this history, bringing to 
the forefront communication practices often left on the margins in order to build a 
grounded framework for valourizing the spectrum in different ways.  In the second 
half of this section, I build a conceptual tool I refer to as "life-media" which proposes 
that certain things in our world - such as the spectrum - are so central to our 
existence that their govemance must be as transparent, democratie and participatory 
as possible. 
2.1 Evolving Political Economy 
The political economy approach to research and-aiialysis has been used to interrogate 
questions of communication, media and technology since the 1920s when Harold 
Laswell and Edward Bernays made their initial forays into the domain (Graham, 2007, 
pp. 5-6).  Importantly, these early communication scholars oriented their approach 56 
around the economie and/or institutional structures that mediate or govern 
valourization - the act of assigning value or import.  The political economy of 
communication  has evolved through a number of stages and research traditions, 
largely as a tool for understanding the effects of commercial enterprise on freedom of 
expression and, in conjunction, the diversity of opinions seen and heard in the 
communication and media system (McChesney, 2007, pp. 37-98; Mosco, 2009, pp. 
37-97).  During its rise (and what sorne have termed its fall  (McChesney, 2007)), this 
approach has become primarily concerned with a narrowly  monetary consideration of 
value complimented by an equally narrow focus upon monopoly capitalism, this 
embodied in  "the seeming monolilh of 'The Media"' (Graham, 2007, p.  1  5).  Graham 
has noted that a number of scholars who focus on social  histories of technology such 
as Lynne White Jr  (1940), Lewis Mumford (1961 , 1967), Langdon Winner (1986) and 
David F.  Noble (1997) should be included in a broad discussion of the constitution of 
the political economy of communication.  However, the concerns mobilized in these 
works -- the communicative dimension of technologies and the fact that technologies 
play an important role in political economie formations -- have largely been 
overshadowed by the "mainstream" of the field (Graham, 2007, p.  14).  Starting with 
the work of Herbert Schiller in the 1970s (H. I. Schiller, 1971, 1976) and continuing to 
the present, most work in the political economy of communication focuses on 
corporate monopolies and the effects of this ownership phenomena on society 
(Bagdikian, 1983; Centre d'études sur les médias, 2011 ; Garnham, 1990; Mansell, 
2004; McChesney, 1993a; McChesney, Wood, & Poster, 1998).  Methodologically, the 
authors tend to utilize quantitative methods to illustrate trends in ownership while 
qualitatively demonstrating what, for example, this means to democracy.  Certain 
other authors have attempted to fortify this approach by introducing the concept of 
agency embodied in social and labour movements (Mosco, 2009, pp. 185-210) and extending analysis to the leve! of transnational corporations and global media 
governance (Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006). 
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The "mainstream" political economy of communication approach serves weil for 
understanding and presenting the manner in which the most visible and dominant 
parts of the communication and media systems function.  As such, research generated 
by this approach has a tendency to focus upon.large targets -- corporations and 
regulatory institutions -- which are typically characterized as  unchanging or slowly 
evolving beasts and are often the target of critical analysis.  It is thus a useful tool for 
illustrating current and historie arrangement of these forces.  Wh ile this approach 
offers thorough critiques of the totalizing system of monopoly capitalism, the political 
economy of communication itself has become totalized, dedicated to the 
comprehension and dissection of what it aims to critique while offering little in  the 
way of alternative visions of the world that may provoke change.  Research in  this 
vein tends be conducted at the exclusion of individuals both within and outside of 
these structures, constructing an irrefutable problem in which citizens and the public 
are central actors yet offering them no evident role in its resolution. 
Political economie analysis seeks to understand the ways in which things are 
attributed value through a process of valourization.  Valourization can be described as 
both the process and the outcome of assigning value or deriving value from 
something that is otherwise deemed value-Jess.  The sort of value assigned need not 
be monetary - it can also be related to the use of the thing, for instance, how access to 
the spectrum enables political or social engagement.  It is because of its social natur~ 
that its value can be changed.  Value is not static; it is indicative of the relationships 
of power that exist amongst interested actors.  While the body of work that has 
emerged from the political economy tradition of communication research may be 58 
critical and often aimed at describing factors and systems of injustice and  imbalance, 
the adherence to a monetary notion of value impedes the creation of functional 
alternatives by excluding concepts of value th at have been constructed outside the 
dominant frameworks and processes of valourization. 
The following section will provide, in part, a classic political economie analysis of the 
history recounted in Chapter One in order to construct half of a historical framework 
that will be utilized in building an integral and critical political economy of the 
spectrum.  It particular, it focuses upon the early history of wireless communication 
regulation in Canada and internationally and the alignment of political and economie 
forces during this period.  In Canada, there is a tendency among communication 
researchers to focus on what has occurred since the first Royal Commission on Radio 
Broadcasting (the Aird report) in  1929 and the subsequent founding of Canada's 
public broadcaster, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), in  1932.  Very 
little attention has been paid to the use of the airwaves before this period, although it 
was during this very time that the political, social and economie structures underlying 
our contemporary communications and media systems were formed (Vipond, 1992, p. 
xiv-xiii).  The second half of this section will again mine the previous chapter, 
showing a variety of communications initiatives undertaken over the past 100 years 
that demonstrate notions of value often omitted in spectrum policy discussions. 
2.1.1 The Structures that Dominate 
The history of wireless communication technology since the end of the 19
1
h century is 
replete with political and economie structures fabricated for the purpose of 
controlling the use of the radio spectrum.  The purpose of this section is to provide 
detailed historical context for the structures that dominate spectrum-oriented 59 
discourse today, whether they be found in policy-making, research, technological 
innovation or activism.  The telecommunications corporation, the domestic 
communications and telecommunications regulator, and international 
communications and telecommunications regulators/coordinators have long histories 
that are closely intertwined.  Revisiting the history presented in the previous chapter, I 
will show the origins of these now dominant structures and the ways in  which they 
valourize the spectrum. 
International regulation of telecommunications-often viewed as coordination or 
cooperation between sovereign nations -- has been an important and influential factor 
in the development of telecommunication networks.  A brief historical overview is 
therefore necessary in order to adequately illustrate the various political and economie 
forces already at play when wireless telegraphy emerged from the laboratory and onto 
the world stage.  The International Telegraph Union (today the International 
Telecommunications Union or ITU) has played a central role in coordinating domestic 
communication policy among numerous countries since it's inception in  1865.  At the 
time of its founding, telegraph technology had already been in use since the 1830s 
and was governed domestically (Wheen, 2011, pp. 3-17).  Numerous attempts had 
been made to lay transmission cables between the United States and Europe to 
varying degrees of success (Wheen, 2011, pp. 19- 29).  Founded for the purpose of 
coordinating standardization and development of an international wired telegraph 
network formalized in the Telegraph Convention, ail  20 of the ITU's original 
members were from continental Europe.
30  An important common point between ail 
members is that their telegraph networks were state-owned; in fact, the United 
Kingdom was specifically not invited to the initial ITU conference because its 
30  Signed in 1865, the Telegraph Convention was the initial agreement that governed the use of 
telegraph networks both within and between the signatory countries. 60 
telegraph system was privately owned (International Telecommunication Union, 
2010c; International Telegraph Union, 1865).  In  1868, the United Kingdom was 
invited to join and, through the governments of member states, the jurisdiction of the 
Telegraph Convention was extended to apply to ali publicly and privately owned 
telegraph companies in each nation (International Telegraph Union, 1868, pp. 32-33). 
The International Telegraph Conference of 1871-72 was a turning point for the 
collective development of the first international telecommunications network and the 
role of corporations in this development.  Considering that the majority of the world's 
telegraph lines were privately owned and operated, it was decided that the companies 
involved should be invited to participate as members in the ITU (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2010d).  In terms of sheer numbers, the influence of these 
companies can be seen immediate1y.  Of the parties involved at this ti me, 19 were 
national governments and 16 were private companies.  Among the companies 
involved, seven were submarine cable companies and four were conventional 
telegraph companies.  North American private interests began to make in-roads with 
the Anglo-American Telegraph Company, active in both Canada and the United States 
(Glover, 2010), participating even before the Canadian and American governments 
themselves (International Telegraph Union, 1872b  ).  Increasingly, governments and 
private companies in Latin America took part, with Argen tina joining in  1890 
(International Telegraph Union, 1891) followed by Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela in 1896 (International Telegraph Union, 1897).  Uruguay would join in 
1903 (International Telegraph Union, 1903).  The United States finally attended its 
first ITU conference that same year - the Preliminary Conference Concerning 
Wireless Telegraphy - as an observer, not a full member.  It would finally attend as a 
full member in 1906 (International Telegraph Union, 1906).  Canada did not join un til 
1912 (International Telegraph Union, 1913).  Thus, through sustained participation in 61 
the ITU during the era preceding wireless telegraphy, North America's private 
telecommunication companies became important actors in international policy-
making while their home governments did not participate at ali.  This did not mean 
that the domestic telegraph carriers involved in the ITU could not engage in 
international telegraph communications with non-ITU members (rules in the 
Convention permitted such .business transactions), rather the citizens of these 
countries- through their elected governments- were not represented in the policy-
making concerning this system.  Other than by expressing themselves through their 
respective governments, citizens were unable to access any debate or decision-making 
processes. 
While wire-line telegraph networks were setting the stage for international policy-
making and the international commerce of telecommunications, nu merous inventors 
around the world were attempting to create a wireless form of telegraphy.  As with the 
wired telegraph, wireless developers worked with a mix of private and public funding 
(Aitken, 1976; Wheen, 2011, pp. 3-17).  This period of regulatory and technological 
growth in the field of communications was equally one of flux and development in 
the field of intellectual property rights, their definition and administration.  The 
concepts of copyright and patent- mechanisms for rewarding monopoly ownership to 
the creator of a unique work- had been formalized in the UK Copyright Act of  1709 
(also known as the Statute of  Anne) (Shemanski, 2010) and in the Constitution of the 
United States in 1787 (Boldrin & Levine, 2008, p. 9).  Patents had since been granted 
in each country through direct application to Parliament or Congress.  Eventually, the 
first international intellectual property rights treaty, the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, was signed in 1883 as a result of the refusai of 
foreign exhibitors to attend the International Exhibition of Inventions in Vienna in 
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1873 for fear that their works wou1d be stolen and commercially exploited elsewhere 
(World Intellectual Property Organization, n.d.).
31  Thus, when Guglielmo Marconi 
filed a patent in the UK in 1896, he could have expected a minimum of international 
recognition and enforcement.  There is much debate over whether Marconi or a 
number of other inventors of the period invented radio -- the debate itself Jar·gely 
resting on the publication of scientific results and patent applications.  Boldrin and 
Levine have argued that Marconi's most important contribution was the decision to 
ground the radio transmitter and receiver (2008, pp. 202-204).  Marconi built his 
mode] utilizing the work of Sir Oliver Lodge, who demonstrated long-distance 
wireless telegraph transmission in  J  894, and Nikola Tesla, wh ose transmission 
system, documented and published in 1893, Marconi has been shown to have 
emulated (Boldrin & Levine, 2008, pp. 202-205; Cheney, 1981, p. 69).  While 
Marconi was granted a wireless telegraph patent in the UK, Tesla obtained one in the 
U.S ..  In 1897, which was eventually overturned and granted to Marconi in  1903 for 
largely unexplained reasons (Boldrin & Levine, 2008, p. 205).  Thus, while severa! 
individuals had worked towards the creation of wireless technology, Marconi was 
even tu ally granted a monopoly on wireless technology by way of these patents. 
Marconi's patents and those of other inventors around the world put in place an 
international legal framework which nicely dovetailed the international coordination 
efforts of the Paris Convention.  This period also marks an important moment in the 
early global governance in communication technology and its use.  Within the first 
decade of the 20
1
h century, governments around the world were actively collaborating 
on the use of wired telegraphy, wireless telegraphy and the recognition and 
31  On a related note, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary works was 
signed in 1886.  This was the first international framework for protecting and enforcing copyright. 
The Paris Convention and Berne Convention gradually became the World Intellectual Property 
Organization in 1974 and is a specialized agency of the United Nations (World Intellectual 
Property Organization, n.d.) enforcement of intellectual property rights frameworks in the form of patents and 
copyright. 
At the turn of the 20
111  century, when radio-telegraphy was the only way in which 
citizens could gain access to the radio spectrum, the patenting of radio technology 
was a daim to exclusive access where private corporations and state governments 
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acted as gatekeepers of the spectrum.  Occurring well before any effort to create 
another sort of legal framework by which radio technology could operate, the 
patenting of radio transmission technology oriented the political and economie 
playing fields in such a way that governments would have to make their regulatory 
power known, while at the same time integrating this new technology into their state 
infrastructure.  At this privileged point, radio was guided by to two underlying 
premises: 1) it is the exclusive role of private corporations to develop and provide 
radio communication technology and; 2) the motivation to develop, improve, 
innovate, and provide a radio communication infrastructure is primarily monetary. 
To understand the position of the Canadian government in the midst of these 
developments, I turn to debates on the nationallaws respecting wireless telegraphy in 
Canada and the United Kingdom between 1903-1913.  These debates, combined with 
the growth of the ITU discussed above, provide an initial orientation of domestic and 
international spectrum policy with regards to the roles of both private enterprise and 
the citizen.  New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom were the first nations to 
pass legislation on wireless communication Y  Examination of the debates from this 
time will demonstrate the ways in which wireless communication was considered 
politically and will provide insight into the relationship between the state and private 
32  1 have unfortunately been unable to locate New Zealand parliamentary debates from  this period 
and thus they are not included in the current analysis. 64 
industry.  The intricacies of the British Commonwealth should also be taken into 
account, as much debate in the British Parliament at the time involves the extension of 
wireless telegraphy to British colonies and domains (Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, 1903; Winseck & Pike, 2007).  Analysis of ITU conference documents 
from this period also shows numerous British colonies and areas of the British 
domain participating actively in wireless policy-making at the international leve! 
(International Telegraph Union, 1903, 1906, 1913).  The following summary breaks 
down Parliamentary debates and related events in Canada and the United Kingdom 
between 1903 (the first point of debate) and 1913 (the year that a substantially revised 
act on wireless telegraphy was introduced in Canada)Y 
The beginning of legislation 
By 1903, public and private companies had developed an extensive international 
wired telegraph network and private companies had begun to develop wireless 
networks transmitting between Jand-based stations as weil as stations transmission 
stations at sea.  The earliest debates in British Parliament show initial concerns with 
1) the ability of the public, through state-owned transmission facilities, to utilize 
wireless telegraphy for international communication and, 2) the commercial and 
strategie (military) future of the country.  There is extensive debate on the use of 
wireless telegraphy by the military, extension of its use to various colonies and its 
installation and use in lighthouses and on ships.  (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
1903). 
The private development and use of wireless te1egraphy took place in advance of 
govemmental policy design and implementation.  This is a cycle that, as seen in 
33  The existing UK legislation was carried over as were a variety of other expiring laws. 65 
Chapter One, occurs consistently throughout the history of electronic communications 
technology.  Indeed, policymakers can often be seen trying to keep up with advances 
in both the creation and use of communications technology, at tï'mes implementing 
regulatory limitations on "the unknown" in advance of their decisions.  One early 
example can be seen in  1904.  While the UK had not yet implemented regulation 
concerning wireless telegraphy, it was intent on maintaining control of wireless 
telegraph use.  This is expressed through concern over the use of "a Marconi 
instrument" for the distribution of horse racing results- an  innovative (and later to be 
deemed either licensed or unauthorized) use taking place mere months before the 
creation of a regulatory framework (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1904b). 
Three months after this transmission event, the second reading of the Wireless 
Telegraphy Bill (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1904a) took place.  Debate 
focused largely on concern that, as noted by the Postmaster-General, "we should not 
allow a big monopoly to grow up which, at sorne time, the State might have to 
purchase" (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1904c).
34  The bill was studied further 
in committee where it was decided that ali wireless telegraph operators would need to 
be licensed by the Postmaster-General who is given authority to fine, or confiscate the 
telegraphy equipment of any parties who operate in breach of regulation (Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, 1904d).
35  Finally, the bill was debated a third ti me, causing 
numerous concerns to surface, sorne of which reappear throughout the history of 
wireless communication and regulation.  In particular, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
the Lord of Selborne, pressed that wireless telegraphy must be strictly controlled 
because otherwise "üs-whole utility may be negatived and nothing but chaos 
supervene" (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1904e).  Thus, control of the 
34  Following adoption of this bill, the Postmaster-General became the minister charged with 
regulating wireless telegraphy. 
35  At the time, British and Canadian parliaments often studied legislation "in a committee of the 
whole" as opposed to within specialized Standing committees. 66 
spectrum was established in unison with the enduring argument that without strict 
state regulation of the spectrum, chaos will reign.  Declaring that "for the proper 
civilised use of the invention control is essential" (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
1904e), the UK established centralized federal regulation as the dominant mode! for 
regulating the spectrum. 
The British Wireless Telegraphy Bill was initially given a limited two year term.  In 
the related debates, the reason given for this li mit was to permit for controlled 
experimentation and development of the technology.  During debate on its extension 
in  1906, the Postmaster-General (now one Mr. Sydney Buxton) stated that the bill was 
"passed two years ago in consequence of new companies springing up" and urged its 
swift extension as the licensing processes put in place were functioning effectively 
(Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1906b).  Thus, it appears that the regulation 
provided for in  the initial bill was weil established in  maintaining control of the use of 
wireless technology before private companies (or anybody else) could develop it 
outside the strict controls of the state.  Ultimately, the bill was extended indefinitely 
with no alterations (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1906a). 
Enter Canada 
Canada's foray into spectrum regulation began in 1905 with the Wireless Telegraphy 
Act which was, coincidentally, given royal assent the same day as an act providing the 
Fessenden Wireless Telegraph Company of Canada a charter to _opera  te (Parliament of 
Canada, 1905a, 1905b).  Presenting the Wireless Telegraphy Act to Parliament, 
Raymond Préfontaine, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, stated th at "this bill is 
almost an exact copy of a Bill passed by the British parliament last year for the 67 
regulation of wireless telegraphy in Great Britain."
36  Préfontaine continued to say 
that this bill "was forwarded to the Department of Marine and Fisheries in the mon th 
of August last with the suggestion that a similar law be passed for the Dominion of 
Canada" (Parliament of Canada, 1905c).  Armstrong has proposed that the passage of 
the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1905 in Canada was a demonstration of Canadian 
independence from the United Kingdom (R. Armstrong, 2010, pp. 20-21  ).  However, 
the Canadian legislation was in fact introduced at the prompting of the British 
Colonial Office on the basis that allowing private industry to develop without an 
orderly licensing regime would result in a dysfunctional communication system 
(Vipond, 1992, p. 7).  Indeed, the suggestion that Canada do so was made within mere 
days of adoption of this law by the British parliament and soon after "the Wireless 
Telegraphy Branch (later called the Radiotelegraph or Radio Branch) was setup 
within the Department of Marine and Fisheries" (Vi pond, 1992, p. 8). 
From the Canadian and British parliamentary debates between 1903-1905, a 
discernible tension can be observed between a state that desires strong centralized 
control while attempting to stimulate a new market.  Eager to prevent private 
monopolization by certain companies, it also needed to contract these same 
companies to build transmission stations for government use. 
37  Contrary to the 
British desire to control wireless telegraphy, debates in Canada framed the Act as one 
based on controlling "wireless telegraphy in such a manner as to ensure the greatest 
efficiency, and to obtain the greatest benefit to the public interest" (Parliament of 
Canada, 1905c).  The "public interest", however, was nQt explicitly defined.  That 
said, the notion of the public interest is alluded to in earlier British parliamentary 
36  While the Postmaster-General was responsible for wireless regulation in the UK, in Canada it was 
the Minister of Marine and Fisheries. 
37  The UK and Canadian governments both contracted Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company to 
build, operate and maintain State-operated wireless telegraph stations. 68 
debates as the ability of citizens to access privately-owned communication services, a 
fact that could not have been !ost on Canadian law-makers given their emulation of 
British wireless policy.  Through these early debates and policy-making processes, 
three distinct sorts of value creation begin to come into focus:  the creation of 
monetary value; the value inherent in state control in the name of the public interest; 
and the value of state control in the interest of the state itself. 
Formalizing Global Spectrum Governance 
Following the initial frenzy of domestic legislative development, wireless telegraph 
law-making became highly coordinated at the international leve!.  The 1912 
International Telegraph Conference recognized the principle of the freedom of 
interconnection, meaning that telegraph companies had the right, if not the obligation, 
to accept transmissions from other operators and to pass them on.38  While the UK 
summarily extended its wireless telegraph act along with a large number of other 
expiring laws (Parliament of United Kingdom, 1913), the Canadian parliament 
presented and adopted a new act aimed at incorporating standards developed at the 
leve! of the ITU (Parliament of Canada, 1912a, 1913b).  Quite importantly, this 
legislation gives power over telecommunications to the Governor in Council 
(Parliament of Canada, 1912a), something that continues to be a factor in 
contemporary Canadian policy-making.
39  While the legislation only envisioned 
wireless telegraph transmission, a last-minute, hand-written change added 
radiotelephony (what would later be called "radio") to the bill because wireless 
transmissions of any sort could potentially interfere with one another (Vipond, 1992, 
38  Later referred to as the common carriage principle, this concept has been central to the growth of 
telecommunications networks of ali sorts, culminating with the internet. 
39  It is this early decision that today provides for the ability of the Governor in Council (also known 
as the Cabinet) to overrule decisions made by the CRTC, for instance. 69 
p.  10).  This was the first legislation in the world to recognize regulation of the entire 
radio spectrum under one umbrella.  It remained Canada's only radio transmission 
legislation until 1932 by which timea thriving private radio broadcasting industry had 
created itself and its broad audience while working within the constraints of an 
underdeveloped regulatory framework (Vipond, 1992). 
From the period predating the development and spread of wireless telegraphy and 
continuing into its early years of use, two models of telecommunications corporations 
evolved.  In North America, the privately-owned mode! was not only dominant but 
singular- the only thing in town.  In Europe, what began as an organization within 
the ITU organized on the basis of state-run telecommunications companies was 
quickly expanded to include the private wired telegraph sector and again to include 
private companies developing wireless tech nol ogy.  Th  us, the earl y implication of the 
private sector in international communications policy-making established 
telecommunications companies- both those developing technology and those using it 
-as recognized experts invited to co-develop regulation with governments.  In 
addition, the establishment of the common carrier principle as a rule in international 
governance of telecommunication networks assured th at messages sent over privately-
owned networks could not be excluded from state-owned networks.  The public and 
the private would co-exist.  In the case of the UK, the Post Office was both wireless 
regulator and wireless provider, at once regulating, collaborating with and competing 
against developing commercial telecommunications companies. 
The structures that today dominate spectrum policy-making- the telecommunications 
corporation, the domestic regulator, and the international regulator/coordinator- were 
born long ago.  In the case of Canada and the UK, there is no evidence this took place ,------- - ---·- --
70 
with the input of the public.
40  While regulation or legislation in  the public interest 
was established early on, the notion of the public interest was defined in the UK --
and alluded to in Canada -- as the ability of the public to access privately owned and 
operated communication networks.  Lacking public input, the public interest was 
defined not by the public but by experts - in this case the legislators who crafted 
Canada's earliest wireless telecommunications laws.  Therefore, at the moment of 
regulatory inception, the exclusion of the pub! ic from fundamental discussions and 
decision-making concerning the use of the spectrum for communication is evident. 
2.1.2 Self-perpetuation and the control of value creation 
Three types of of valourization emerge from the early history of spectrum-based 
communication in Canada: the creation of monetary value; the value of state control 
in the name of the public interest; and the value of state control in  the interest of the 
state itself.  Each continues to be a central factor in  what could be termed the 
dominant political economy of the spectrum and is organized around the interests of 
dominant political and economie entities, namely the corporation and the state. 
The place of private enterprise in the making of technology and the creation of 
wireless communication networks has been a central factor in the construction of the 
enduring relationship between technologically-mediated communication and 
monetary value.  From Marconi's first patent in  1896 through the recognition of 
audiences as target markets for the sale of advertising and technology in the 1920s 
(Vipond, 1992, pp. 27-50), it is evident that the task of creating communications 
40  Nowhere in Parliamentary debates or in the Parliamentary Committee in Canada and the UK from 
this period is there reference to any sort of consultation with the general public nor mention of the 
perceptions or beliefs of the various constituents (Parliament of Canada, 1905c, 1905d, 1912a, 
1912b; Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1903, 1904b, 1904c, 1904d, 1904e). 71 
technology and introducing it in Canada was left exclusively to the private sector. 
Point-to-point wireless communications were introduced by companies such as 
Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company and the Fessenden Wireless Telegraphy 
Company through both state-commissioned networks and consumer or business-
oriented communication platforms.  Radio broadcasting for the sake of entertainment 
developed within a permissive regulatory framework enforced by a federal department 
structured around the use of wireless transmission for the navigation of oceanic rather 
than cultural waters.  Thus, similar to what was occurring at the ITU, technical 
expertise accumulated in the private sector and was unmatched by state regulation or 
expertise, allowing it to, for the most part, build the communications and media 
system as it saw fit.  While it could perhaps be assumed that the policy processes at 
the time were dominated by private interests, these early legal frameworks in fact 
provided no such processes whatsoever.  What the legal frameworks did make clear, 
however, was that wireless communication regulation was to be the exclusive domain 
of the federal government and that economie criteria would take precedence in 
decision-making.
41  The dominance of the private sector can be explicitly observed in 
the Parliamentary debates in Canada and the UK as explored above.  Citizens and the 
state are identified as actors with vested interests, but both are considered as 
consumers of the physical goods, services and expertise provided by a small number 
of companies.  It was through this initial orientation of actors that the use of the 
spectrum as a means for communication- whether point-to-point in  the case of 
wireless telegraphy, or broadcasting as in the case of radio - became closely bound to 
the creation and accumulation of monetary value.  This, in turn, has contributed to a 
contemporary (and historie) econocentric understanding of the spectrum, one which 
41  lt should be noted that during this period, the Canadian federal government was engaged in a 
jurisdictional dispute with severa! provinces in western Canada,  who had the right to regulate wired 
telephone networks (C. Armstrong, 1986, pp. 141-186) 
(C. Armstrong, 1986, pp. 141-186). 72 
"tends to reify everything in sight, reducing complex social relationships between 
people ... into objects that individual actors can then seek to acquire" (Graeber, 2001, 
p. 46).  And so today it is a normal thing to auction an airwave. 
Regulation is today a loaded word, one which brings to mind various sorts of 
tribunals, commissions, regulatory bodies and industry groups.  In the democratie 
sense that regulation should occur transparently and without bias, a regulator or 
official decision-maker is supposed to be an objective arbiter.  For many individuals 
who play such a role in society (such as judges) strict comportmental limitations 
restrict their behaviour to assure a state of objectivity.  However, at the inception of 
wireless regulation, the state played multiple roles as consumer, user and sometimes 
service provider of wireless technology, and the ultimate regulator of the industry.  It 
was thus far from an objective arbiter in the matter of wireless communications. 
Regulation during the birth of wireless communication meant, fundamentally, control 
of the use of wireless telegraphy by the state.  First mobilized in the introduction of 
wireless communications legislation in  1905 (Parliament of Canada, 1905c), 
regulation in the public interest is a concept that has proved durable in Canada and is 
often depicted to be central to the nation's broadcasting system (R. Armstrong, 2010, 
pp. 112-115). 
Regulation in the public interest demonstrates a tendency of the state to be not simply 
accessible to citizens but representative of their interests and concerns.  In the British 
parliamentary debates conceming initial wireless legislation, it was repeatedly stated 
that wireless communication must be strictly regulated to assure that monopolies do 
not develop (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1904c).  Canadian Parliament, while 
mirroring British legislation, did not rationalize regulation through the reference to 73 
monopolies.  Instead, it demonstrated, more in discourse than actual policy, a concern 
that the public be served by a competitive marketplace, thus balancing public 
concerns of accessibility with private concerns for profit.  Gauging and defining the 
public interest relative to communications policy is tricky business even today with a 
host of policy consultation tools available.  In the first 25 years of wireless 
communication, however, I have found no evidence of a public consultation of any 
sort.
42  Thus, at the beginning of its use for communication, the spectrum - through 
wireless telegraphy- was valued not according to the self-expressed interests of the 
public, but according to how these interests were characterized by the state. 
As discussed earlier, the introduction of wireless legislation in Canada can be seen as 
part of a larger strategy of British colonial control at the beginning of the 20
1
h century. 
This strate  gy saw legislation rolled out to domains under British influence or control 
in  a coordinated fashion, something that would logically ease international 
coordination at the ITU.  In Canada and the UK, domestic legislation was couched in 
terms of public safety at sea following the sinking of the Titanic as weil as concern 
for the public interest.  In essence, the legislation established, with little debate and no 
mechanism for public participation in the decision-making process, the state as the 
central controller of both the spectrum and the ability of people to communicate 
wirelessly. 
2.1.3 Is uncontrolled communication a subversive act? 
The structures explored above dominate more than economie, political and social 
relationships; they also tend to dominate historical analyses of these relationships.  In 
42  This conclusion is based upon analysis of relevant Canadian parliamentary debates and standing 
committee reports between 1905-1915.  The legislation passed during this period would stay in 
force until the 1930s. ------------------
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the field of history, scholars have undertaken the task of authoring magisterial works 
examining the histories of non-dominant or marginalized actors, such as Eduardo 
Galeano's Las venas abiertas de América Latina (Galeano, 2000), Howard Zinn's A 
People's History of  the United States (Zinn, 2003) and Richard Gott's recent Britain's 
Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revoit (Gott, 2011 ).  In the field of 
communication studies, similar work has been done, focusing on non-dominant actors 
and known by a great variety of names: alternative media, independent media, tactical 
media, citizens' media, community media, and radical media to name but the most 
prominent.  Within this domain, the history of movements that are organized around 
spectrum-based media and resist or otherwise challenge dominant notions of use and 
governance finds its greatest depth in literature about radio broadcasting which 
consistently traces the origins of citizen appropriation of the FM dial to the 1940s and 
1950s.  Literature on the appropriation of telecommunications for non-monetary 
pursuits, however, tends to frame the phenomena of social organizing around 
communication technology as something quite recent and as something inextricably 
bound to an internet accessible to consumers, thus skipping over decades of relevant 
history.  Often, the creation of the Indymedia online self-publication movement 
during the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle in  1999 is used as a 
reference point for framing contemporary communication-focused activist movements 
(Bennett, 2003; Kahn & Kellner, 2004).  The tendency to focus upon activist 
movements within easily accessible historical contexts, however, is misleading and 
obstructs important steps in the evolution of contemporary movements related to the 
use of technologyin facilitating free expression.  Online activism did not begin with 
Seattle; rather thousands of people around the world were operating their own 
independent electronic communities and computer networks in the 1980s and 1990s 75 
outside regulatory frameworks.
43  Similarly, citizen appropriation of the airwaves and 
the sets of values that accompany such appropriation began earlier than the easily 
accessible and oft-repeated histories of community radio in the mid-20
1
h century.  In 
formulating a comprehensive political economy of the spectrum it is important to 
include the movements of spectrum-related activism that are most present, but also 
those that remain absent from even alternative histories.  Building and integrating the 
history of these movements into thinking about the spectrum is important not only in 
terms of learning from past experiences and understanding the origins of these social 
movements, but also because they help to construct an understanding of value within 
multiple time periods.  Such an understanding of value with regard to the spectrum is 
a vital tool for interpreting the history of wireless communication and in 
demonstrating that non-dominant concepts of value concerning the spectrum are as 
old as the structures that dominant the governance, use of, and academie research on 
wireless communication today. 
Throughout the history of wireless communication and regulation, control of the 
spectrum has been a primary focal point for most actors concerned (for non-dominant 
or marginalized actors just as much as for dominant actors).  Dominant actors-
embodied in various state and private bodies - aim to control the spectrum centrally 
and singularly through expert-driven processes of technological production and 
decision-making.  From the initial proposai of Canadian wireless legislation in 1905 
to the present day, it has continuously been argued that access to the spectrum must 
be strictly controlled in order for licensed wireless communications to function 
properly.  For over 100 years it has been illegal, upon threat of fine, imprisonment 
43  Electronic bulletin board systems (BBSs) were independently operated digital communities. Many 
people, myself included, took part in operating communication networks of international scope. 
The history of this movement is largely absent from academie discussions of online or electronic 
activism. 76 
and/or confiscation of equipment, to transmit unauthorized signais over the air.  For 
nearly an equal amount of time, a diverse range of individuals, communities and 
social movements has challenged the technical and sociopolitical foundations 
underlying this regulatory approach.  In so doing, they have attributed a set of values 
to the spectrum that challenges the structures dominating its use and governance. 
Revisiting a number of these examples of alternative spectrum valourization, I aim to 
construct a new and critical political economy of the spectrum to counterbalance the 
dominant one. 
Unauthorized use of the spectrum implies the existence of a legal framework 
governing the spectrum.  Thus it could be said that any wireless transmission 
predating the first legal frameworks on wireless telegraphy would have operated in 
perfect Jegality.  The first instance of unlicensed transmission that I've encountered, 
mentioned previously in discussion on early regulation in the UK, was the case of "a 
Marconi instrument" (wireless telegraph transmitter) that had been setup at the 
Newmarket race track in order to diffuse race results (Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, 1904b).  In response to concern, the Postmaster-General, to be charged in 
three months time with regulating the spectrum, replied that he was "in 
communication with the persons concerned".  While I have found no documentation 
of what ensued, the fact that this legal and innovative use of wireless technology 
warranted both discussion in Parliament and the direct intervention of a government 
minister demands reflection.  If this act of wireless transmission was legal because it 
existed out.side of any regulatory framework, why did it attract this sort of attention? 
Was the British Parliament, even before introducing legislation, attempting to 
establish regulatory control? 77 
The first example of everyday citizens building and utilizing wireless communication 
technology for the simple sake of communication without monetary return is found in 
the shortwave radio movement of the United States and Canada following World War 
I.  Preceding the war, a community of self-taught enthusiasts had formed around the 
pursuit of technical experimentation: amateurs wanted to see how far they could push 
the existing technology (Berg, 1999, p. 7).  Working collaboratively in an 
environment where "the development of radio technology was monopolized by the 
military and the big corporations", tens of thousands of citizens be gan to parti ci pate 
in shortwave broadcasting in North America, eventually establishing the American 
Radio Relay League which, in turn, provided a public face for amateur radio and 
published a magazine that circulated broadcast schedules and schematics for building 
equipment (Berg, 1999, pp.  12-13).  During World War I, however, ali amateur use of 
the airwaves was banned in Canada and the United States, leaving this large 
community of amateur radio broadcasters "chomping at the bit" to operate again 
(Leinwoll, 1979, p.  105; Vi pond, 1992, p.  12).  After the ban was lifted in each 
country, amateur radio users returned to the airwaves, apparently in an organized 
fashion, recognizing that in order to successfully pursue their craft and to have their 
signais successfully received, licensing of operators and the use of certain frequencies 
would be of logical importance.  In 1923, radio amateurs successfully communicated 
between the United States and Europe for the first time, demonstrating that the means 
for international wireless communication were within reach of citizens, albeit citizens 
with a high degree oftechnical knowledge (Leinwoll, 1979, pp. 110-115).  Rather than 
keep this knowledge secret, it was published and circulated widely (Leinwoll, 1979, p. 
115).  In Canada, the amateur radio community has maintained representation within 
the policy system since the founding of its first organizing body, the American Radio 
Relay League Canadian Division in 1920 (Radio Amateurs of Canada, 2011a).  It 78 
should be noted that the policy system they engage with is purely technical and 
administrative; simple demonstration of technical proficiency is rewarded with a 
license.  Largely self-regulating (Radio Amateurs of Canada, 2011 b), the spectrum 
that is reserved for its use has been referred to as a "park" that is not necessarily open 
to the en tire public but pla  ys a conservation role (Industry Canada, 201 Ob ).
44  With a 
minimum of rules associated with its use, one must pass an examination in order to 
receive a license, callletters and thus legal access to the spectrum.  Sorne "hams" or 
"DXers" compare this to the national park system in the United States (Miccolis, 
2010).  Today, the users of this "park" have grown to 56,000 licensed individuals in 
Canada al one (Radio Amateurs of Canada, 20 Il  c  ). 
The history of shortwave radio provides an important example of how a social 
movement oriented around wireless communication has been able to define itself as a 
group of technical experts who have retained a large portion of the radio spectrum for 
use among a relatively small number of individuals.  While it has been used 
extensively by governments for broadcasting into foreign territory, especially during 
World War II and the Cold War (Berg, 1999, pp. 203-248), shortwave radio users are 
largely individuals engaged in a hobby, communicating for the sake of being able to 
communicate freely with whoever is willing to listen (Radio Amateurs of Canada, 
2011c).  Two important themes emerge from the story of shortwave and amateur 
radio; the first a strategy for attaining the second.
45  Early in their history, shortwave 
radio users defined themselves as experts and coincidentally refined an expertise 
44  Radio amateurs coordinate amongst themselves the sharing of frequencies that have been allocated 
for this use.  Should a radio amateur overstep these community-defined bounds, however, licensed 
users can lodge a complaint with Industry Canada (Radio Amateurs of Canada, 2011b). 
45  A distinction is often made between the two. Shortwave radio refers to the way in which signais 
are broadcast whlle amateur radio is the use of this broadcasting technique for communication 
among individual users. 79 
desired by the state in order to better understand and regulate the spectrum (Leinwoll, 
1979, p.  137).  The expertise of this community has allowed them to continue to 
practice a specifie art of radio communication valuing the ability to freely and 
independently communicate while adhering to a minimum of regulatory oversight or 
intervention. 
Establishment of wireless regulation is sometimes accompanied by a battle or various 
battles over the right to be represented within the regulatory system as stakeholders or 
decision-makers, the right to be represented throughout the communications and 
media system as a whole, and claims to the legitimacy of the regulatory system itself. 
At these points and similar junctures, when individuals or communities have not been 
integrated into the regulated communication and media system to the extent they 
desire, or when they dispute the legitimacy of the state to control use of the spectrum, 
there is a historical tendency for people to take things into their own hands by 
engaging in unauthorized/unlicensed/pirate broadcasting.  Canada experienced two 
such junctures in the early 20th century, the first coinciding with a policy revision in 
1922 that divided licenses into the categories of broadcasting and receiving, thereby 
mandating everybody owning a radio receiver or transmitter to pay a yearly fee 
(MacLennan, 2010, p. 37).  The second juncture coincided with the introduction of 
Canada's first legislation specifically dedicated to the use of radio transmission for 
entertainment and information diffusion - what we commonly refer to today as 
"radio."  MacLennan and Vi  pond have also shown that this form of broadcasting was 
undertaken at a time in which the licensed broadcasting system  was lm·gely dominated 
by commercial interests such as newspapers, radio equipment manufacturers and 
railroads (MacLennan, 2010, pp. 37-38; Vipond, 1992, pp. 26-54).  Within this 
setting, unlicensed stations were founded in order to broadcast material not 80 
considered financially profitable and therefore absent from the airwaves: namely 
religious, multilingual, and political programming.  Many such stations also tended to 
serve smaller communities not otherwise served by media of any sort (MacLennan, 
2010, pp. 41-42). 
By 1930, there were close to 300,000 licensed radio receivers in the country, yet many 
believed that radio should be free of monetary cost, particularly because the majority 
of the population lived close enough to the U.S. boarder to receive American radio 
signais (MacLennan, 2010, p. 41).  The Broadcasting Act of 1932, established radio as 
something to be regulated, and that it would be regulated by the Canadian Radio 
Broadcasting Commission.  The Act also increased radio license fees ($50 for 
broadcasters, $2 for listeners), sparking a movement of "pirate listeners."  While 
MacLennan has determined that Canadian regulators generally tolerated early 
unlicensed or "pirate" broadcasting, she has equally shown that these same bodies 
closed down numerous such stations that were causing interference or broadcasting 
"obscene" programming (MacLennan, 2010, p. 45). 
Canadian "pirate" radio today exists in multiple forms.  It is used as a mobile 
communication tool for activist organizing (Langlois & King, 201 0), a means to make 
audio art that demands that the audience think about the airwaves (Létourneau, 2010), 
and a means of raising awareness on the subjects of power, control and authority 
(Sakolsky, 2010).  The motivations behind this intentional use of the spectrum outside 
the bounds of regulatory norms, however, continue to demonstrate the desire of _ -
individuals to communicate on their own terms without the need to submit to an 
authority other than that found in their immediate community or audience.  Through 
these acts, participants engage in processes of value creation by making themselves 81 
and their intentional acts of regulatory disobedience visible to one another, to the 
greater society and, at times, to the state.  In this way, the spectrum is valued as a 
medium of public communication, one central to the act of publicity by which actors 
identify themselves as actors.  The fact that this occurs not simply outside the 
authority of the state but in opposition to it, means that "pirates" (also known as 
citizens) claim regulatory power for themselves. 
While "pirate" users of the spectrum operate in opposition to the regulatory 
frameworks of the state, community media groups - embodied in community radio, 
community television and community wireless networks --have grown within these 
frameworks.  Of the three, community radio is the most highly developed in  terms of 
the number of licensed stations, leve! of integration into regulatory frameworks, and 
domestic and international organization.  While they differ in form and function, there 
are important commonalities to be found between them.  In Canada, community radio 
and television have each been subject to federal regulation since the 1970s.  They exist 
across the country and have been subject to a variety of academie treatments 
(Fairchild, 2001, 2001; Girard, 1992; Lewis, 1990; Stiles, 1988) and extensive cyclical 
regu1atory reviews (CRTC, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2010b).  Community television is 
largely restricted to operating on cable networks and has a long and contested history 
that has been addressed elsewhere (Hardin, 1985).  Currently, four community 
television stations broadcast over the analogue airwaves but these have been largely 
overlooked in the recent digital-to-analogue television broadcasting migration as well 
as academie analyses of this process (Taylor, 2009).  As with community radio, 
television stations of this sort exist primarily to give voice to immediate geographie 
communities and to the diverse perspectives found in these communities (Lithgow, 
2010).  Indeed, this mandate is a regulatory requirement of both community radio and 82 
television (CRTC, 2000, 2010c).  Contrary to "pirate" broadcasting, these types of 
media seek legitimization through a public and regularized integration with the 
communications and media system and with the greater community.  Through 
processes of integration, community radio stations have developed a movement of 
over 150 Iicensed stations across Canada that facilitate broad community ownership 
of communication and media resources.  With these material and knowledge  . 
resources, citizens are able to engage in self-representation within the larger media 
system and provide a counterbalance to dominant media voices.  Another form of 
value emerges: the use value of the spectrum as a medium for engaging with society 
on a broad scale while democratizing resources and access to the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge. 
The current relationships between spectrum users who engage in radio and television 
broadcasting are necessarily complicated by the fact that the portions of the spectrum 
used by these technologies are strictly regulated and have been so for decades.  The 
rationale for this regulation, as noted in the previous chapter, is a response to 
spectrum scarcity, itself the result of outmoded regulatory and technological 
practices.  To the contrary, community wireless networks have been constructed out 
of a portion of the spectrum that has historically been shared by a variety of 
communication deviees including garage door openers, remote controls and cordless 
phones.  The construction of these community-based communication networks has 
thus occurred on largely uncontested space and demonstrates the potential for 
independent, uncontrolled and cooperative wireless communication.  Users of other 
forms of radio communication, due to the nature of technology and regulation, must 
continually engage in strategie combat with one another, and with the regulatory 
system, in order to exist on the air.  This can be seen, for instance, in multiple 83 
applications, by multiple community organizations, to use a single available 
frequency in metropolitan Toronto (CRTC, 2011 e).  Mining the value of the "junk 
bands", the creators of community wireless networks have opened physical and 
technical spaces where distinct processes of valourization, which in other contexts 
would be considered radical or contrary to accepted practice, are fundamental to the 
very architecture of the network.
46  Eschewing the potential for creating monetary 
value from something originally considered worthless, the emergence of these 
networks allows for values based on 1) the ability of individuals to communicate 
wirelessly, and 2) the ability of individuals and groups of individuals to create and 
share the technology required to do so.  As with early shortwave radio broadcasters, 
the expertise of these groups has helped establish a social and political space oriented 
around the free use of the airwaves for the sake of communicating. 
The emergence of cellular telephone technology and the subsequent convergence of 
this with Wi-Fi as a variable form of wireless communication (through the advent and 
spread of smartphones which may use either form of communication) brings two 
conflicted approaches to spectrum valourization into close contact.  Cellular phones 
function on the basis of absolute control: a contractual agreement with a private 
service provider gives one the ability to use the spectrum according to the terms of 
that provider.  Wi-Fi hardware operates according to a standard communicational 
protocol (referred to as IEEE 802.11) developed by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
47  Projects such as community wireless networks, mesh 
networks and OpenBTS (which makes it possible to create one's own cellphone 
46  Frequency ranges reserved for unlicensed consumer use are commonly referred to as "junk 
bands". 
47  The IEEE is a non-profit organization of around 400,000 engineers from around the world. Among 
other things, they design, approve and promote the standards according to which wireless internet 
deviees function. Online: http://www.ieee.org 
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network) push at the limits of the regula tory control that dominates much wireless 
communication, bringing into the open questions that have been central to 
communicational use of the spectrum since Marconi: who controls the spectrum?
48 
How and to what end?  This latest wave of innovative use challenging traditional 
regulatory limits builds upon other non-monetary methods for valourizing the 
spectrum.  It demonstrates that citizens and technical experts may be one in the same 
and that this expertise can be used as a tool to build systems for free and independent, 
self-governed communication.  Through demonstration of technical and 
organizational expertise, the use of the spectrum for communication (as opposed to 
monetary gain)  has become something pervasive, not simply accepted but ubiquitous. 
How, then, can this complex system of value based on acts of free communication be 
integrated into a system of communication governance today grounded in acts of 
control and the abstraction of communication as  a product or service? 
2.1.4 Political economy as a tool of social change 
Trawling the history of wireless communication technology, it is easy enough (if one 
adopts such a lens) to present a picture of extreme inequality in  which citizens are not 
simply dispossessed by a regulatory system dominated by private interests but were 
never fully integrated into it begin with.  However, an equally long history of citizens 
undertaking the task of building and making accessible the means of independent, 
uncontrolled or self-governed forms of wireless communication shows us that these 
marginal non-commercial uses of the spectrum are persistent.  Their continued 
presence points to an alternative possibility that could perhaps be activated more 
broadly.  Building a critical political economy of the spectrum means interrogating 
the entirety of the processes that make wireless communication what it is today. 
48  OpenBTS: http://openbts.blogspot.com/ 85 
Employing political economy as a tool of social change and not simply a means of 
analysis means recognizing systemic inequality as the starting point for analysis rather 
than its final illustrative product.  It is in this dual sense that the political economy 
approach to understanding communication will be employed throughout the current 
study, fostering critique with the long-term goal of systemic change.  As put forward 
in the previous chapter, changing the system is contingent on reconstructing 
governance processes in a new perspective in addition to epistemic change-changing 
the way we think about the spectrum to begin with. 
2.2 Advancing spectral visions 1 integrating spectral politics 
The spectrum exists in neither solid, liquid nor gaseous form.  Endlessly ethereal, it is 
a thing which has been valued for its use rather than its essence.  Perhaps because of 
this, our perception of the spectrum is shaped primarily by a tacit and unquestioned 
belief that we can only experience it through our use of it; therefore, the spectrum 
must be used.  What, then, is the "essence" of the spectrum and how can it become a 
discernible piece of the vocabulary we use to talk about it?  Is it possible to think 
about the spectrum without considering its uses and is it possible to think about its 
uses without ultimately and practically founding them on a system of monetary value? 
I pose these questions broadly.  While meant to guide theoretical enquiry, they are 
also meant to be grounded in reallife experience.  As such, the answers to these 
questions may vary depending on the actors implicated in their response. 
At the beginning of the previous chapter, I explained Lewis Hyde's illustration of the 
changes in English society's relationship with land and noted that he omitted the 
period before which land was used and controlled by humans.  According to Hyde, 
English society's relationship with land began during the Saxon age when people 86 
lived in villages and worked the land cooperatively (Hyde, 2010, p. 29).  It may be 
difficult to imagine a time before we dominated the natural world, but that is not to 
say that we did not have a relationship with it before this relationship was codified in 
sorne set of social norms.  When English society's relationship with land changed due 
to the introduction of new laws centralizing land ownership around elite individuals, 
the relationship between people and land became increasingly organized around not 
simply use but also the exchange of value.  Crops were grown and land was worked 
not just for survival, but because people need to pay landowners for the use of land. 
The land itself then gained a value that was beyond mere sustenance.  Our drive to 
understand the spectrum is necessarily structured around use because it is our use of it 
that gives it form.  In practice, the use of the spectrum generates different sorts of 
value (monetary, social, political) through the facilitation of communication.  The 
regulation that formalizes our use-based relationship with the spectrum is founded on 
a preconception that it must be used and controlled just as land should not lie fallow 
or unclaimed.  Indeed, in Canada, just as there is no such thing as unclaimed land, 
there is no such thing as unclaimed spectrum - the state and its legal frameworks for 
ownership, private or public, underpin it ali. 
Thinkers have often attempted to describe the spectrum in sorne physical sense, 
ignoring the politics that underlie our social relationship with it.  The use of 
geographie similes is common throughout the history of spectrum use and debate over 
its regulation.  Consistently repeated and, in certain cases, officialized in policy, these 
ways of thinking about the spectrum have become basic concepts in the vocabulary 
used to talk about it.  These comparisons have been used widely and repeatedly not so 
much because they are valid, but because they are easy to understand and provide a 
sort of imaginary familiar physical form for something that distinctly lacks such form. 87 
As a preface to proposing a new way of thinking about the spectrum, it worth looking 
at these ideas, how they relate to the spectrum and how they have shaped our ability 
to talk about it and to question dominant notions of what the spectrum is and how we 
may relate to it otherwise. 
2.2.1 Ether 
Two inter-connected early structures placed atop the spectrum are the ether and the 
wave, both of which continue to be strongly associated with the spectrum today. 
"Ether" refers to the space-empty yet constituted of something or other- through 
which energy travels.  In the l8
1
h century, Issac Newton hypothesized that light 
propagated through a medium other than air and "early cosmological theory 
speculated that ali interstices between matter were filled with an  invisible fluid called 
ether" (Sandvig, 2006, p. 3).  This idea of ether has been perpetuated ever since, 
accompanied by the notion that the spectrum is a fixed, known and measurable entity 
and that radio waves - energy - pass through this singular, continuous, measurable 
thing (Werbach, 2009, p.  883).  This fixedness lives on in radio technology, creating 
spaces of exclusive use and ownership.  Socialized as we are to the age-old radio dial, 
the spectrum is seen as a thing that is fixed and limited, composed of only radio 
waves of man-made origin while the physical form attributed to it in ether and wave 
serve to distract us from understanding the actual poli  ti cal underpinnings of the 
spectrum and its use.  The ether is but a smokescreen. 
2.2.2 Scarcity 
The beginning of spectrum regulation in the early 1900s (spurred on by the Titanic 
disaster in 1912, which sank, in part, because of poor or non-existent coordination of 
radio frequencies (Lessig, 2002, p. 73)) introduced another concept that continues to 88 
have an important effect on our understanding of the spectrum: scarcity.  The logic of 
scarcity posits that the spectrum is a limited yet infinitely renewable resource.  Due to 
its physicallimitations as a resource, only a given number of users or deviees can 
access it in a given location at a given time.  Scarcity is central to the general 
approach to spectrum regulation today.  On a scientific basis, it has been shown that 
the spectrum is not an innately scarce resource and that instead the limitations lie in 
our technical and political abilities to make use of it and to create ways of organizing 
its maximal use (regulation) (Werbach, 2009, 2011, pp. 40-43).  Dominant spectrum 
technology and regulation have been designed with exclusivity in mind, avoiding a 
number of practices that allow for the sharing and cooperative use of this space 
(Werbach, 2009, pp. 887-898).  As with the notions of ether and wave, scarcity has 
been historically presented and mobilized as a widely accepted truth.  In this way, the 
spectrum is seen as something that is objectively scarce, not the result of political 
process or technical design, it is simply the fault of nature. 
The idea of spectrum scarcity has led to a search for mechanisms by which to justly 
and efficiently allocate the spectrum as weil as ways to talk about this process.  While 
water has been employed at times to illustrate the propagation patterns of radio waves 
(Sandvig, 2006, pp. 4-5), this illustration has not been accompanied by coinciding 
legal and economie frameworks.  Instead it is the simile of land and the legal and 
economie frameworks that apply to land management which have been subtly adapted 
to the special non-territoriality of the spectrum.  As noted earlier, the idea of a 
property rights regime for the spectrum was proposed in the 1950s as a solution to 
seemingly arbitrary and inefficient methods for attributing radio licenses.  Under such 
a management scheme, the spectrum is divided into distinct plots (frequency ranges), 
each limited in size so as to accommodate a limited number of users.  Each plot is then typically designated for a particular use, limiting the field while increasing 
market competition.  While the spectrum is not land, this metaphor has resonated 
widely. 
2.2.3 Land and location 
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The conceptual framework of land continues to be dominant in  more recent proposais 
of how to envision the spectrum within the limits of a regulatory framework based on 
exclusive ownership.  In contrast, the spectrum commons proposai attempts to take its 
inspiration from a fabled time when shepherds shared grazing lands and, out of 
collective interest, assured that grazing lands could be used collectively while not 
being exhausted by the overuse of any one individual.  Before the imposition of 
private property, agricultural societies shared the land together- "in common."  Basic 
rules were devised by the collective whereby land was shared to the benefit of all. 
The works 1 have encountered on the commons and spectrum, however, tend to make 
general claims and avoid developing comparisons with specifie historical examples. 
Proposais to create a spectrum commons (Benkler, 1997; Lessig, 2002; Werbach, 
2001, 2003, 2009, 2011) argue th at we should use a mi x of cooperative po  licy and 
cooperative or "smart" technology to create a framework similar to that applied to 
earlier earth-borne fields.  A spectrum commons approach does not necessarily 
exclude the notion of scarcity.  After ali, if we had unlimited access to land or 
spectrum, why would there be any need to share?  While it makes a number of 
important proposais, even the idea ofthe spectrum commons remains bound by the 
land management systems from which it draws inspiration, relying on concepts of 
scarcity and allocation as much as any private property rights advocate.  Grafting 
land-based politics onto the spectrum, the proposai of a spectrum commons diverts 
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focus from the real underlying poli tics of the spectrum instead of helping to bring 
them into focus.  Thus, debate continues between experts advocating a "progressive" 
spectrum commons and experts advocating a "free market friendly" private property 
framework wh ile questions of equal access, justice and inequality remain very much 
on the fringe. 
Sorne recent attempts to think about the spectrum in a new way focus upon notions of 
location and situatedness as tools for opening spaces for discussion on technology, 
territory, and spectrum use.  Operating more in the domain of active resistance and 
artistic practice than of adapting land management practices, these provocateurs 
employ a diversity of radio technologies.  "Tactical" uses of radio technology tend to 
employ everyday broadcasting equipment to mount small-scale radio stations in 
response to certain events.  For example, one such station broadcasting in Vancouver 
during the 2010 Olympics was used as a method for disseminating critical 
perspectives on the Olympics, while drawing public attention to their act of spectral 
appropriation (Murray, 2010).  Projects like this one are often temporary, challenging 
regulation or taking advantage of regulatory loopholes (Joyce, 2008, p.  173). 
Locative media seeks to claim radio technologies in a different manner, relying 
largely on GPS technology in order to create location-sensitive works of art or other 
sorts of creation which are interpreted (beard, viewed, consumed, used) generally 
through GPS-enabled advanced cellular phones (smartphones).  It has been posited 
that both tactical anà locative media challenge the constitution of the spectrum into 
allocated blocks (Joyce, 2008, pp. 172-190)  However, these media exist and can be 
consumed largely because of the allocated blocks of spectrum and communication 
deviees that transmit and receive signais according to technical standards.  While 
Joyce notes that a limitation in the thinking related to both these forms of spectrum 91 
use is their "emphasis on technology" (Joyce, 2008, p.  185), I'd like to propose that 
this obstacle presents itself in every discussion concerning the spectrum, what it is, 
and how we relate toit.  It's fair to say that for most people, the spectrum does not 
exist.  Frequencies, wireless communications technologies, and the radio dial - and 
the social, political and economie uses that emerge from them - are the real palpable 
stuff that matters. 
2.2.4 Life-media 
The spectrum, as the potential of space (the space in  which we and our greater 
environment exist) to transmit energy, is also a constituent part of the environment in 
which we exist.  Our relationship with the spectrum, though, is primarily structured 
through our use of communication technologies, which rely upon the spectrum.  By 
taking part in acts of wireless communication, we are essentially deriving use-value 
from the spectrum.  This process is similar to the extraction of natural resources such 
as minerais and wood in that the thing which is extracted is valued in relation toits 
potential uses, be they practical or symbolic, not because it is innately imbued with 
value.
49  The value of the spectrum (and of these other things) is ultimately 
determined by political, economie and social processes that underlie its use. 
There exists today no comprehensive agreement on what the spectrum is.  In the 
history of its exploration, rarely are the political processes underpinning the spectrum 
evaluated alongside attempts to graft physical descriptors onto its non-physicality. 
Rarer still are attempts to create an integrated poli  tics of the spectrum thàt at once 
recognizes its centrality in modern communicative society and the need for people to 
49  To refer to something as a "natural resource" implies that one plans to use it.  Such things do not 
exist as resources due to their nature, but rather due to ours. 92 
play a defining role in these politics.  As an attempt to fill these absences, I propose a 
novel and integrated approach to envisioning the spectrum, under the moniker  "lite-
media".  The concept of life-media is based on an understanding that sorne 
constitutive elements of our natural environments are so vital to the ways we exist as 
political, social and economie beings that they necessitate the highest level of 
participatory, transparent and democratie governance possible.  This concept proposes 
that the politics around things cannot be separated from the things themselves, much 
as Langdon Winner sees technologies as being inseparable from concomitant political 
patterns (1979, p. 77).  I will build this concept based primarily on the experiences of 
two Latin American social movements that provide substantial theoretical and 
practical examples of similar undertakings- the seringueiro or rubber-tapper 
movement in Brazil and the Uruguayan water movement.  The seringueiro movement 
provides an example of how a community of people came to understand their direct 
physical environment as something that provided them with vital forms of sustenance. 
So central was this environment to their social, political and economie existence that 
the community argued they must be directly implicated in ali facets of its 
management and use.  These theoretical ideas of participa  tory governance then 
translated into social action and concrete political structures.  The Uruguayan water 
movement serves as an example of how water- embodied in  its natural forms but also 
in terms of water and sanitation services - became a broad social issue and a national 
movement crossing political and social barriers and culminated in the creation of the 
human right to water provided by the state.  While the Brazilian example is limited to 
a singular community and geographie place, the Uruguayan example demonstrates a 
similar process taking place on a national scale. 
Rubber extraction and the exportation of latex has been a significant industry in the 93 
Amazon since the 1830s, in Brazil, Peru and Bolivia.  Given the longevity of this 
industrial activity and its specifie territoriality, communities have developed identities 
closely tied to this particular sort of industrial labour as well as the totality of their 
physical environment -la  selva (the rainforest).  (Porto-Gonçalves, 2006, pp. 81-91 ). 
Beginning at the end of the 19
1
h century, pressures from the industrial system that 
relied upon latex as a raw material for manufacturing drastically changed the 
relationship between seringuiero communities and their natural environment. 
Whereas before this point, latex was valued for its potential uses on a small scale, the 
quickly-growing industrial system attributed value to the derivative uses made 
possible by manufacturing and the subsequent sale and use of latex-derived objects. 
With the intrusion of industrial and capital-intensive practices, the seringuieros and 
their extensive territorial knowledge acquired a new purpose and identity - that of 
simple manual labour specializing in the extraction of materia prima  (Porto-
Gonçalves, 2006, pp. 91-97).  The ensuing story surrounding this community is 
extensive and has been treated elsewhere in great detail (Porto-Gonçalves, 2006).  For 
the sake of the current work, I will focus on the process of construction of collective 
identity organized around the community's environment and the political possibilities 
that accompanied and were produced through this process. 
The organization of the seringuieros as a political entity revolves around the figure of 
Francisco Alves Mendes Filho (Chico Mendes).  Born into the seringuiero 
community in the 1940s, he co-founded the first rural workers union in the city of 
Brasiléia in 1975.  In 1976, Mendes and other union organizers introduced the concept 
of "Empates" - community meetings with forest workers and their families organized 
around the preservation of their habitat, then being heavily deforested by commercial 
interests.  The "Empates" played an important role in the consolidation of seringuiero 94 
identity and this act of resistance attracted interest from other labourers around Brazil 
(Porto-Gonçalves, 2009, pp. 188-190).  These meetings also set an example for 
subsequent political actions.  Centring debate around the immediate community and 
their needs in loosely organized spaces, understandings of commonality and identity 
were iterated and given voice, defined and given structural formas a locally-defined 
and locally-oriented politics emerged, defined by the community itself. 
The seringuiero movement gained force in the 1980s, adopting a discourse that 
affirmed the vitallink between territory and identity, and established the politics of 
the movement in clear terms.  "No hay defensa de la selva sin la defensa de los 
pueblos de la selva". "There can be no defence of the rainforest without equal defence 
of the people of the rainforest"  (Porto-Gonçalves, 2009, p. 191 ).  To assure the 
seringuiero community would play an important role in  the governance of their 
environment, the movement developed and proposed a mode! (the Reserva Extravista 
or Extractive Reserve) for governing the complicated relationship between the 
rainforest, the seringuiero community, and the state.  Taking inspiration from the 
creation of indigenous reserves in Brazil, the seringuieros insisted that their 
relationship was something more profound than "ownership" and should be formally 
recognized as such (Porto-Gonçalves, 2009, p.  192).  The process for creating this 
model was structured around a series of open consultations that solidified the identity 
of the seringuieros and formalized their relationship with their physical environment 
(Porto-Gonçalves, 2006, pp. 249-278).
50  By building a governance mode] around the 
experiences of the communities most directly concerned, the model was centred on 
the needs of these communities rather than the even tuai uses of the fruits of their 
50  Until this point, the seringuieros were without legal standing on their lands, no matter the amount 
of time they have occupied them.  Brazil had recently passed legislation creating reserves for 
indigenous tribes and this madel was adapted by the seringuiero movement. 95 
labour.  As such, it demonstrates a connection between the environmental (both the 
rainforest and the broader space of the environment in which we exist), the social-
the individuals that makeup these communities (Porto-Gonçalves, 2006, p. 262), and 
the political as embodied in the ability of the seringuieros to bring about the creation 
of Extractive Reserves. 
The experience of the seringuieros introduces nu merous inter-connected elements that 
nourish the concept of life-media.  The first is that the importance of life-media is not 
primarily based on exchange value, monetary or otherwise.  While sorne things 
constituted as life-media may, in a certain political-economic space, be acquired 
through exchange or have exchange value attributed to them, this status is the result of 
specifie political, economie or social processes.  Secondly, life-media are inherently 
political in that they privilege acts that support political and social !ife over monetary 
attribution or accumulation.  Not only are they considered vital to a determined sort 
of human existence, but they are central to the ability of people to define the 
conditions of their own existence.  As with the commons, the condition of "}ife-
media" is not a natural one but astate prescribed in a "politics of possibility" 
(Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. xxiv-xxvii), the result of conscious decision-making by a 
group of people.  Finally, !ife-media, like the creation and manifestation of a true 
commons, rely upon the opening of new political spaces, as well as the infiltration or 
appropriation of traditional political spaces, by previously absent or subordinate 
act  ors. 
Water, like the spectrum, does not respect political boundaries, such as national 
borders, of its own accord (except, of course, rivers and lakes that do not cross 
international boundaries).  An integral part of the way we live, water "is indispensable 96 
stuff for hu man bodies, but also for the social fabric" (Swyngedouw, 2004, p.  1  ). 
That said, it is also the object of complicated sets of power relations that ultimately 
decide, in part, what sort of environment we live in (Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 23).  In 
further developing the concept of !ife-media and grounding this concept in human 
action, I turn to the history of water governance in Uruguay where this complicated 
set of power relations recent! y experienced a dramatic reconstruction resulting in the 
creation of new political spaces for both debate and governance. 
In Uruguay, water has long been culturally regarded as a common good, a status that 
has been attributed to the creation of the federal water company OSE in 1952 
(Achkar, 2010; Ponce de Leôn, 2010; Taks, 2008, p.  18).  By the latter part of the 20
1
h 
century, this centralized state enterprise had succeeded in extending water 
infrastructure to more than 95% of the population and sewage services to between 
50%-60%.  Given this high rate of accessible, clean water, "the general population 
considered that Uruguay had no water problems. It was a natural good, accessible, 
weil organized and weil administered" (Achkar, 2010).  Therefore, access to clean 
drinking water was taken for granted.  In 1992, Uruguay encountered the wave of 
neoliberal policies sweeping Latin America, and an attempt was made to privatize 
most state services.  A popular referendum managed to counteract this, making 
Uruguay "the only country in the world that was consulted on full-scale privatization 
and which has rejected the possibility by referendum" (Barrett, Chavez, & Rodriguez-
Garavito, 2008, p.  101).  However,  private discussions on graduai privatization of the 
water system began ali the same and in the late 1990s water services were privatized 
in a small area of Maldonado called Manantiales and sold to the French multinational 
Suez Lyonnaise (Santos & Villareal, 2005, pp. 173- 174).
51  An attempt to resist 
51  Maldonado is the second most populous province or departemento in Uruguay. privatization was made by public workers but, crucially, they were unable to 
formulate an argument that transcended their rights as unionized workers (Achkar, 
2010).  A further concession was made in 2000, effectively granting a 30-year 
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con tract for water services in the department of Maldonado to Spanish multinational 
Aguas de Bilbao Vizcaya (Marquisio, 2010). 
The year 2001  brought new examples of privatization as neighbouring Argentina 
further sold off state services as a strategy for dealing with financial crisis by 
maintaining its borrowing relationship with the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Achkar, 2010; Olleta, 2007).  The following year, privatization 
of water services became a growing topic of debate in various sectors of Uruguayan 
society as the sale of the Guarani aquifer was proposed and private water priees rose, 
in sorne cases, by  1000% (Achkar, 2010).
52  In 2001, the government signed a letter of 
intent with the IMF which further advanced the proposition of extending water and 
sewage privatization to other regions of the country (Marquisio, 2010; Santos & 
Villareal, 2005, pp. 173-174).  Finally, in 2002, a confluence of actors from the water 
company union (FFOSE) and various social organizations began to gain interest in the 
issue, ultimately creating the Comisi6n Nacional en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida 
(the CNDAV or National Commission for the Defense of Water and Li fe) (Achkar, 
2010; Marquisio, 2010; Ortiz, 2010). 
The water movement in Uruguay was one of severa! getting under way in Latin 
America, initially with no coordination between them.  Eventually, through the World 
Social Forum in Brazil, members of the various national water movements came to 
understand that their governments were engaging in similar water privatization tactics 
52  The Guaranî aquifer is one of the largest freshwater aquifers in the world and is situated beneath 
Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay. 98 
and attempting to enact similar legislation (Marquisio, 2010).  Such coordination on 
the part of governments would suggest that similar cooperation could be undertaken 
by civil society groups opposing their actions.  Unlike the case of the seringuieros 
where a movement developed under very unique conditions, the water movement was 
characterized by a mix of discursive and political tools developed at an  international 
level, modified for their particular countries and contexts. The mos.t important tool to 
emerge from this international space is the notion of the human right to water.  At the 
heart of the proposition th at water be considered a hu man right is an interpretation of 
the 1976 United Nations International Covenant on Economie, Social and Cultural 
Rights (La Iniciativa MERCOSUR, 2007, pp. 5-6; Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 1976) by the United Nations' own Committee on 
Economie, Social and Cultural Rights known as General Comment 15.  A non-
binding interpretation of the Covenant, General Comment 15 lays out numerous legal 
arguments for believing that the human right to water exists according to both the 
Covenant and various other human rights declarations and treaties (La Iniciativa 
MERCOSUR, 2007, p. 6; United Nations, Economie and Social Council, Committee 
on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights, 2002).  With this weighty tool in band, 
local movements would be able to initiate conversations at the grassroots leve!. 
The initial members of the CNDAV in Uruguay were parties already interested and 
involved in activism around water rights.  Learning from the earlier failure of 
unionized workers to involve a broader public in their resistance to privatization, an 
invitation was sent to ali political sectors, social movements and social organizations 
in the country (Achkar, 2010).  The coalition embarked on a campaign that aimed to 
eut through partisan poli tics and to create a multiplicity of spaces for debate and 
popular education.  The ultimate goal was to collect 250,000 signatures in order to 99 
hold a popular referendum on a constitutional amendment that would create the 
human right to water provided for by the state.  The question would be posed during 
electoral voting in the October 2004 election.  There was at !east one member of OSE 
union (FFOSE) in every city, town and village in the country, which proved to be a 
significant organizational strength.  Their tactics were diverse and creative.  Teachers 
opened up their classrooms to water company workers and campaigns were built up . 
around World Water Day and Earth Day.  One group of activists "rode for 23 days on 
horseback through the middle of the countryside" to spread the word to remote 
communities.  They held plenaries in town squares, workshops in the streets and at 
weekly outdoor markets, and went door-to-door (Marquisio, 2010; Ortiz, 2010).  A 
final step in the campaign was to create "Casas del Agua" or "Water Houses" 
whereby individuals would open up their homes to be used as neighbourhood 
organizational centres for distributing information and working with the national 
coalition.  Each Casa del Agua was completely autonomous and able to take 
ownership of its own campaign, enabling them to engage with their neighbours as 
fellow citizens.  Through this process the public gained ownership of the campaign 
and also came to understand its ultimate goal: guaranteeing the human right to water 
through popular ownership of the requisite political and regulatory processes (Achkar, 
2010; Ortiz, 2010).  Ultimately, 300,000 signatures were collected (Marquisio, 2010) 
and 65% of the population voted in favour of enshrining the human right to water as 
an article in the national constitution (Santos & Villareal, 2005, p.  173). 
The proçess of collectively recognizing water as a human right which cannot be 
provided by private means created a number of new public political spaces.  During 
the campaign, spaces emerged where this idea was debated, strengthened and rebuilt 
in the local context.  Following the successful referendum, other political spaces 100 
emerged that were designed to regulate and ensure continuous public participation in 
water govemance.  The passage of the referendum immediately mandated the creation 
of the National Directorate of Water and Sewage (DINASA, now called DINAGUA) 
and planted the seeds of another body - the Assessorial Commission on Water and 
Sewage (COASAS).  DINAGUA is the federal body charged with overseeing the use 
of water policy, water resources and sewage infrastructure in Uruguay (Genta, 2010). 
Following the referendum, Jaw-makers and civil society groups spent five years 
collaboratively developing new environmentallegislation which includes the national 
water policy (Achkar, 2010).  Adopted unanimously by ali political parties, the law 
created COASAS, which provides an official venue through which civil society can 
ostensibly take part in the oversight, design and  implementation of water policy.
53 
In the case of the seringuieros, a narrowly-defined community with a high level of 
commonality undertook and successfully completed a process by which they took 
collective control of their social, political and economie environment by reorienting 
the manner in which this environment- the rainforest- and their activities in it were 
valued.  Ultimately the seringuieros became powerful actors by creating new political 
spaces for designing and implementing their ideas.  The phenomena of the Uruguayan 
water movement advanced the seringuieros' madel by undertaking a similar task at a 
nationallevel and appealing so successfully to the general population that traditional 
barriers of ali sorts - religious, ideological, political - were broken down (Marquisio, 
2010).  In place of these barriers, the movement built organizational and ideological 
links based on "solidarity. the free exchange of ideas, reciprocity, and non-monetary 
value" (Marquisio, 2010).  Water, previously taken for granted, had become 
53  These systems for public participation are far from perfect and civil society participation in water 
governance has been slow to develop (Genta, 2010; Marquisio, 2010).  My goal here, however, is 
not to be critical but to tell the beginning of a story that is in continuous development. 1 
1 
i 
1 
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something of profound social and cultural value upon which ali individuals depend, 
no matter their vocation, economie status or political stripe.  The ability to preserve 
water as a common good is directly linked to the ability of Uruguayan society- the 
community- to exercise real ownership of the political spaces, institutions and 
processes connected to it.  In both examples cited here, popular reclamation of the 
political was triggered by an attempt to submit the thing in question- water and the 
rainforest- to a strictly monetary system of valourization. 
2.2.5 Sustainable spectrum 
The proposition of life-media posits that sorne things in our world are so central to 
our existence that they should be explicitly valourized to a higher degree than, orto 
the exclusion of monetary forms of valourization.  It proposes that said things should 
be subject to transparent and participatory forms of governance and that these 
processes of valourization and governance cannat be separated from one another.  As 
argued in Chapter One, the ubiquity of wireless communications in modern society 
and its extension into political, cultural and economie life is such that the spectrum -
in that it is both the environment in which we exist and the foundation of ali  wireless 
communication- can be constituted as a form of life-media.  The spectrum is a basic 
human need central to our ability to take part in public life and therefore the manner 
in which we organize infrastructures for accessing and using the spectrum is morally, 
ethically and politically significant.  It is important, then, to equally ensure that these 
infrastructures, the limits of which have been demonstrated and will become more 
defined through the case studies that follow, become and remain sustainable. 
Sustainability is a common motive found in the seringuiero movement, the Uruguayan 
and international water movements, and perhaps a future spectrum-oriented social ~- -
1 
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movement.  By sustainability, I mean the integration of natural systems with human 
patterns so that each endures without detrimental effect to either (Early, 1993).  In 
each case presented here, the use of nature for sustaining society had been weil 
accepted and a systemic relationship created and maintained.  However, this 
relationship was interrupted and the sustainable existence of both the immediate 
communities and the natural resources was threatened when the prime motive for use 
(or exploitation) became the generation of monetary profit.  The current cycle of 
communication infrastructure convergence, presented in Section 1.2, presents a 
similar critical juncture with regards to the future of the spectrum and our social 
relationship with it.  Given the ways in which we use and manage the spectrum today, 
there is a naturallimit to its use.  This can be seen, for instance, in the rush to "open 
up" new spectrum space for telecommunications use through digital television 
transition, a process that began in the 1990s.  That said, recognizing the naturallimit 
of the spectrum and designing strategies to better work within this limit for a short 
period of time is not the same as eliminating the limit by changing practices of use 
and regulation.  Changing this limit is not necessarily an easy thing to do given that it 
benefits the forces that control the majority of the spectrum today by allowing them to 
consolidate this vital communicational resource and thus its concomitant social, 
economie and political power.  Citizens, in that they are communicative social beings, 
have a vested interest in seeing that the future of the spectrum is a sustainable one. 
What, then, impedes the ability of citizens to substantively debate the place of the 
spectrum in their lives and to perhaps undertake a reappropriation of the poli tics of 
the spectrum?  This question will drive the enquiry undertakefl in the following three 
chapters.  In detailing impediments, I also seek to show inherent opportunities. 3. Methodology 
Most communication studies research concerning spectrum policy limits itself to one 
well-defined field of spectrum use, be it radio broadcasting (McChesney, 1992; 
Raboy, 1990b); the telecommunications industry (Babe, 1990; Winseck, 1998); the 
enlarging of telecommunications and computing into what has been cal led 
"information" (Braman, 2006, 2004; D. Schiller, 2007); and the new frontiers brought 
about by innovations such community wireless networks (Community Wireless 
Infrastructure Project, n.d.; Powell, 2008; Powell & Shade, 2006), open spectrum 
(Werbach, 2001 ), or white space (Meinrath & Calabrese, 2008).  Much of this work 
draws on common theoretical foundations and deals directly with communications 
policy systems.  Together, the objects of this research compose the infrastructure and 
content of our broad communications environment.  Very quickly these disparate 
parts are converging into a singular communications and media system with policy 
development and change cautiously following behind.  Academie research has 
proceeded with equal caution, noting that technological and policy convergence is  an 
important thing to address yet making few methodological or theoretical changes in 
its own practice in order to do so.  My goal here - in  the execution of this research 
project and in  its methodological design- is to evaluate the processes by which the 
concept of the spectrum is constructed, the extent to which citizens can take part in 
these processes, and the extent to which there exist social and political spaces to 
debate- and th us to. challenge and perhaps modify- dominant notions of what the 
spectrum is and how it is used.  The comparison focuses not so much on "best 
practices" but rather how two countries at different stages in the development of their 
regulatory systems approach spectrum policy in light of ongoing and impending 
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This dissertation focuses on an extensive comparative case study of spectrum policy 
in Canada and Uruguay.  The previous chapters have presented the rationale for such a 
study while the current one will detail the research design, data sources, collection 
and analysis techniques and propose a methodological innovation: inverse 
international development research.  It will conclude by noting potential limitations of 
the methodology in order to anticipate and address any issues that may surface. 
3.1 Justification of sites 
International comparative research has a long history accompanied by a variety of 
definitions and strategies (Hantrais, 2009).  This methodological strategy can be used 
for a number of purposes, such as creating a "best practices" standard based on the 
analysis of severa] national contexts (AMARC-ALC, 2008; G6mez, 2007); 
developing broad-reaching theories through the analysis of different nations 
undergoing political transition (Priee, Rozumilowicz, &  Verhulst, 2002); exploring 
decision-making processes across different countries and cultures (Bessette, 2006); 
and examining multiple nations of similar governmental structure in order to tease out 
critical differences (Bernard Jr, 2008).  Comparative research of this sort can be 
particularly useful for developing a critical perspective on models, concepts or objects 
that are often characterized as universally accepted or highly regarded examples of 
policy practice.  Two such concepts examined in this dissertation are the notions of 
governance and government- in particular, governance of the spectrum and the 
structuring of government around this task.  Good governance and good government 
are often presented as universal standards that should be applied worldwide, even 
more soin countries that are  "developing" (Andrews, 2010, pp. 7-8).  However, 
methods of government and governance that have developed within different 
sociopolitical traditions or have been made possible by certain sociopolitical 105 
particularities, while not symmetrical to "best-practices" models, may still be "good". 
In this dissertation, I assert that they may even be better than accepted practices or 
models that have become universally accepted and promoted. 
I have selected Canada and Uruguay as research sites according to four key factors 
that will be evaluated and compared according to the analytical methodology denoted 
in the following sections.  The cumulative analysis of these factors will allow for a 
detailed analysis of access to the spectrum-oriented policy systems of each country. 
Factor 1:  Coinciding flux in po  licy 
Both Canada and Uruguay are at crucial turning points in the development and 
application of communications governance in general and spectrum governance in 
particular.  In Canada, the general approach of the State to spectrum and 
communications governance is in a state of extreme flux as demonstrated by the 
recent over-ruling of the CRTC by the Minister of Industry in matters of 
telecommunications governance regarding the cellular phone industry (CRTC, n.d.; 
Government of Canada, Privy Council, 2009); Parliamentary review of a CRTC 
decision concerning internet traffic management (Von Finkenstein, 2011 ); and an 
expressed desire by the chairman of the CRTC for a new unified communications act 
(CRTC, 2011 d).  Even more recently, in August 2011  the CRTC issued a report on 
convergence (updating one issued a year earlier) stating that: 
As the digital economy becomes more sophisticated, policy, legislation 
and regulation must adapt. Areas that can be further deregulated-or in 
which new approaches may be required-are critically important to 
address. These areas include: 
•  ensuring fair and non-discriminatory access to networks 
•  increasing spectrum resources to meet Canadian demands 
•  creating new regulatory approaches to support innovation, access to affordable services and the creation and promotion of 
high-quality Canadian content, and 
•  addressing consumer concerns.  (Government of Canada, 
2011 b) 
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In addition, since the last major spectrum auction in 2008, there has been increasing 
debate on opening the country's telecommunications sector up to foreign ownership 
(Garneau, 2010) that would potentially permit foreign ownership of spectrum that, 
according to regulatory delimitations, resides in Canada and  is essentially the 
common property of Canadian citizens.  Canada's communication policy system, it 
appears, is quickly being opened up to regulatory change on multiple fronts, affording 
the possibility of either more centralized or more democratized control. 
Uruguay's communications regulator, URSEC, was created in 2001.
54  URSEC is 
chief! y responsible for regulating postal services and the use of the radio spectrum for 
radio, television and telecommunications.  Radio and television broadcast licenses, 
however, are, and always have been, granted directly by the President.  Community 
radio was legalized in 2008 yet the country still Jacks a telecommunications act and 
has no policy whatsoever pertaining to the commercial broadcasting sector (Light, 
2011).  Throughout 2010-2011, a broad-reaching audiovisual services law was 
developed by a committee representing a diversity of actors (Comité Técnico 
Consultivo, 2010) but has not yet been enacted.  Since coming into power in 2005, the 
current government has enacted substantial new pieces of communication and media-
related legislation such as the legalization of community broadcasting (Parlamento del 
Uruguay, 2007) and an access to information law (Government of Uruguay, 2008).  It 
54  Unidad Reguladora de Servicios de Comunicaciones or Communications Services Regulatory 
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recently introduced policy on digital television broadcasting (Government of 
Uruguay, 2012) and plans to develop new broadcasting and telecommunications 
legislation (G6mez, 2010).  In August 2011, it was announced that Gustavo G6mez, 
national director of telecommunication and the key figure in  the ongoing re-
development of Uruguay's communication policy system, would be losing his job in 
October 2011  (Uval, 2011 ). 
Factor 2:  Contrasting political traditions 
The Canadian system is organized around provincial and federal government powers 
and the rule of law.  Wh  ile citizens are encouraged to be active at local and provincial 
levels of government, citizen participation at the federal leve! in a non-electoral 
manner is difficult (Smith, 2004, pp. 92-93).  Constitutional change is only possible 
as a result of negotiations between the provincial and federal governments (Smith, 
2004, pp. 58-59).  While treating the spectrum differently would not necessarily 
require constitutional change in Canada, such a strategy could be adopted in Uruguay. 
The Canadian political system contrasts greatly with the republicanism of Uruguay in 
which the individual is highly regarded as a participatory political actor.  Changes to 
the constitution and federal law can be undertaken by popular referendum and have 
occurred severa! times in the country's history on issues such as support for the 
military dictatorship (Gonzalez, 1991, p. 53), amnesty for participants in the military 
dictatorship (Gallardo, 2006, p. 462), privatization of state services (Barrett et al., 
2008, p.  101), and the human right to water (Grosse, Thimmel, & Taks, 2004).  While 
it is possible to analyze each political system to the exclusion of the other, a 
comparative analysis will permit for a deeper evaluation of policy and governance 
practices by providing counterpoints tied to social and political systems as opposed to 
generalized standards. 108 
Factor 3:  Complexity and fixedness of policy and legislative systems 
Canada's broadcasting law was first introduced in  1932 and has been modified many 
times since.  Its Teleconununications Act came into effect in 1993 and has also been 
modified many times.  The history of both acts and previous laws governing 
telecommunications (i.e. Telegraph acts), as weil as the bodies that take part in their 
administration have contributed to the establishment of a communications policy 
system based on decades of procedural precedence which influences the 
interpretation and creation of further policy and legislation.  Additionally, the 
connections that have developed between institutions and individuals involved in 
communication industries and regulation is an important factor that should not be 
underestimated in determining the potential for changing the regulatory system 
(Raboy, 1995a; Winseck, 2011 ).  The longevity of Canada's communications 
regulator, the CRTC, may be seen as a sign of stability but has also been identified as 
a prime object of regulatory capture whereby the regulator "either lost, or never had 
the independence to make professional decisions on their merits because of undue 
influence either from po1iticians, politically driven Ministries, or the regulated 
monopolies" (Melody, 1997, p.  195).  Additionally, lndustry Canada and its 
predecessors have been involved in Cabinet-leve! over-rulings of the CRTC severa! 
times since the 1980s (Winseck, 1998, p.  199).  Today, lndustry Canada is the most 
heavily lobbied section of the federal government, having engaged in 1604 registered 
meetings with lobbyists over the course of 2011  (Office of the Commissioner of 
Lobbying of Canada, 2011 ).  The existence of established lobbying practices and of 
public forums has led to a scenario whereby the private sector finds lobbying a more 
effective practice for advancing their policy priorities than public forums while public 
interest groups put a lot of faith in public forums (Raboy, 1995a, p. 23). 109 
Uruguay, wh ile it has a high level of cellphone penetration (140.2% in 2011) (URSEC, 
2011 ), has no telecommunications legislation to speak of and very little 
telecommunications policy outside of the attribution of frequencies.  Similarly,  the 
office of the President has licensed 279 commercial radio broadcasters (Unidad 
Reguladora de Servicios de Comunicaciones, 2010), yet there is no policy pertaining 
to their operation.  While there is evidence that commercjaJ broadcasters have 
considerable political power (licenses are granted by the president and are eternal), 
civil society has demonstrated a high capacity for policy-making of its own as shown 
in recent design, implementation and active use of access-to-information legislation 
(Asociaci6n de la prensa uruguaya &  CAinfo, 2011; Lanza, 2010).
55  The counterpoint 
provided between the Uruguayan and Canadian legislative and policy systems allows 
for an analysis of civil society capacity for policy development, state capacity for 
policy development and the extent to which each system facilitates broad participation 
in policy-making. 
Factor 4:  Civil society roles 
Spectrum-oriented civil society groups in Canada and Uruguay serve different 
purposes and organize in different ways and in varying proximity to government and 
regulators.  In my persona}  experience as a community radio advocate, Canada's large 
civil society groups tend to organize around specifie media and react to the actions of 
regulators rather than engaging in proactive policy development.  Community radio 
and television organizations are organized and funded to varying degrees and tend to 
group together individual broadcasters into national-level advocacy groups in order to 
attain and/or maintain a collective voice in the policy system.  There is no active 
55  In November 2011, a Uruguayan coalition organizing around access to information won a court 
challenge to force URSEC, the communications regulator, to reveal the subscriber statistics of 
private television companies (Asociaci6n de la prensa uruguaya & CAinfo, 2011). 
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collaboration between these groups and spectrum-oriented civil society organizations 
such as community wireless networks, nor does there appear to be any active policy 
collaboration between the broadcasting movements and other technology and 
communication-related civil society organizations that organize around themes such 
as access to information and privacy.
56  Advocacy undertaken by organized civil 
society falls into two main categories: representation within policy processes and 
lobbying within the policy system. 
Spectrum-oriented civil society organizations in Uruguay have grown out of the 
community broadcasting, freedom of expression and human rights movements.  Thus, 
while community broadcasting has only recently become legitimized within the 
policy system, certain individuals have been active in the freedom of expression and 
human rights movements for a longer period and have brought their legal expertise to 
this new domain.
57  These civil society organizations generally undertake three 
distinct activities: organizing community radio stations; developing and proposing 
communications legislation and policy; and actively participating as decision-makers 
and policy-makers within the policy system. 
3.2 Research questions and analytical grid 
While I do seek to make claims as to how the spectrum should be utilized, I want 
equally to determine the way that debate of this sort can be nourished and how 
decision-making can occur on a broad social scale.  Thus, I aim to interrogate the 
- factors that impede and enable such activity.  The ability of citizens to participate in 
56  In 2009, 1 was asked to broker a meeting between Île sans fils and AMARC to explore the 
possibility of community wireless networks and the international community radio movement 
making official links.  While supporting one another's work, they saw no benefit to collaboration. 
57  A number of my interview subjects are university professors and/or legal experts who have been 
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policy-making is not a given, even in the most democratie of political systems where 
participation and democracy are given lip-service while regulators provide a friendly 
face for an ultimately inaccessible regime.  Young has noted that "inequalities in 
power and resources frequently lead to outcomes such as these, where sorne citizens 
with formally equal rights have little or no real access to the fora and procedures 
through which they might influence decisions" (2000, p. 54).  The following 
questions will guide my analysis in order to account for different sorts of inequality in 
access to spectrum policy-making, and enumerate factors, models or other 
phenomena that may be employed to counteract such inequality.  In the systemic 
analysis detailed below, each of these research questions will be applied to a discrete 
focal point in the communications policy system (see analytical grid below). 
A.  How can a system of value based on acts of free communication be integrated 
into current systems of communication governance? 
B.  What obstacles impede the ability of citizens to substantively debate the place 
of wireless communication and of the spectrum in  their lives? 
C.  What factors enable the substantive intervention of citizens in wireless 
communication governance? 
,------
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3.3 Passive structural analysis 
Research on communications policy is often undertaken in the tradition of the 
political economy of communication and tends to focus on institutional structures, but 
not necessarily the power relationships between various actors that constitute these 
institutions nor the relationships with individual citizens or non-professional actors 
inside and outside of the policy system.  Such an approach is useful for accu ratel y 
illustrating system design and demonstrating how the processes within the system 
should work, but is otherwise limited.  In order to exercise the usefulness of a 
political economie approach to analysis while correcting for its identified limitations, 
case study analysis will be conducted in two steps.  The first analysis will treat the 
policy structure as it exists and is presented as a system, identifying the various fora 
within it and the actors that participate in them.  The second analysis will test the 
capacity of the system to permit for citizen participation against the experiences of 
various key informants.  The corpus designated for the first analysis consists of the 
following elements: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Ail federal legislation in Canada and Uruguay that underlie the spectrum-
related communications systems in each country; 
Submissions to Industry Canada concerning spectrum auctions and other sorts 
of spectrum allocation (there is no Uruguayan equivalent); 
Standing committee hearings pertaining to studies, legislation or policy fora or 
instances related to spectrum use and allocation; 
Documentation of ad-hoc committees related to  sp~ctrum governance; 
Documentation of task forces related to spectrum governance; 
Documentation of official review panels related to spectrum governance; 
National ITU consultation mechanisms concerning spectrum policy  . 113 
3.4 Active structural analysis 
The first analysis is used to demonstrate the boundaries of the policy system, identify 
actors within this system, and to identify  pre-existing venues for discussion and 
debate on spectrum policy.  Through an active analysis of this structure, I will 
determine the extent to which citizens and civil society organizations can and do 
parti  ci  pate in spectrum po  licy decisions and wh at obstacles or enablers may exist. 
Through the use of semi-structured interviews with key informants as weil as 
participant observation of certain processes and events, I will further probe the system 
laid out in the first analysis.  These interviews will also be used to identify what kinds 
of conceptualizations of the spectrum exist among these actors and attempt to discern 
the origins of their knowledge.  While a certain amount of analysis can be pursued 
with the use of publicly available data, the experiences of these various informants 
provide critical insight into a system that is sparsely documented.  Pursuant to ethical 
guidelines presented to and approved by the Comité institutionel d'éthique de la 
recherche avec des êtres humains of the Université du Québec à Montréal, ail 
informants were given the right to anonymity as weil as choice of interview location 
and interview language.58  Interviews were conducted in English, French and Spanish. 
Interview subjects come from the following communities: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Broadcasting &  telecommunications regulators; 
Spectrum regulators; 
Spectrum-oriented civil society organizations; 
International Telecommunications Union; -
Elected officiais who oversee spectrum-related legislation; 
Independent experts on spectrum and water policy; 
58  A copy of the ethics certificate is included in Annex 1. 114 
•  The Uruguayan water movement; 
A former executive officer of Bell Canada; 
•  Current and former government ministers overseeing spectrum legislation; 
•  Representatives of the Uruguayan water and sanitation corporation, and water 
regulator. 
In carrying out my research, I attempted to maintain a balance between the various 
stakeholders I interviewed, striking a balance among political parties, regulatory 
bodies, the private sector and civil society organizations.  A full list of interviews as 
well as attempted interviews can be found in Annex B. 
Additionally, a certain amount of quantitative analysis is performed on publicly 
available data.  The first quantitative analysis examines participation in five recent 
spectrum policy fora:  the Technical Advisory Committee on Broadcasting (B-TAC), 
the Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television, the Task Force on the 
Implementation of Digital Radio, and the Digital Radio Co-ordinating Group.  The 
second quantitative analysis examines a sampling of communications lobbying 
activity in Canada with the use of the federal Registry of Lobbyists.  Unfortunately, 
no such registry exists in Uruguay. 
3.5 Discursive analysis 
In the first two chapters of this thesis, I focused extensively on the ways in which the 
spectrum has been conceptualized through regulatory processes and various practices 
related to the creation of its use-value.  In the second half of this project, founded 
largely on independently collected primary data, I will, in part, continue this practice 
by seeking to determine the variable conceptualizations of the spectrum according to 115 
my different research subjects.  Understanding such intricacies will help in 
determining "the role of social relationships in the minds of social actors" (van Dijk, 
1993, p. 251 ), the social relationships here characterized by th ose related to the 
provision or creation of wireless communication and th ose that are constructed 
through wireless communication.  Where does civil society knowledge of the 
spectrum originate and how is it reproduced?  Are interview responses from 
regulatory representatives, for instance, consistent with the dominant political 
economy of the spectrum oris there room for conceptual debate within the policy 
system itself?  Our communication and media system is, essentially, a social  and 
political system - one defined by humans rather than technology.  Based on responses 
of individuals within the regulatory system, I aim to determine potential channels for 
opening debate and discussion on spectrum policy. 
3.6 Data and its sources 
Data collected for the analysis described above cornes from various points of origin. 
Severa! of these have not yet been documented in academie work and th us warrant 
special attention. 
Technical Advisory Committee on Broadcasting (B-TAC) 
The B-TAC is an ad-hoc committee coordinated by Industry Canada.  It deals with ali 
manner of broadcasting policy and has existed since 1966, predating both the CRTC 
and the Ministry of Communications.  It's membership is open and it meets every six 
months.  A limited set of minutes are available online (2004-2009).  Key informants -
at Industry Canada put me in contact with the B-TAC secretary who provided me with 
all available missing minutes (2004-2006).
59 
59  B-TAC: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf05460.html Reports on Convergence 
1 examine three reports on convergence in Canada, one published by the 
Communications Research Centre in 1992 (Phillips et al., 1992) and the other two 
issued by the CRTC in 2010 and 2011  (CRTC, 2010a, 2011 a).  While there is an 
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official record of the first, it is not easily accessible and I discovered it among a cache 
of documents hosted anonymously at National Capitol Freenet.
60  The second 
document, while issued by the CRTC, is highly unusual in its design.  While it 
appears to be a formai analysis of the future of converging technologies and 
economies, it was, in fact, prepared and issued by CRTC staff rather than by the 
Commission as a body (CRTC, 201 Od).  The third report updates the first and was 
issued as an official report of the CRTC.  It notes that the trends identified in the 
report of the previous year have accelerated more quickly than predicted. 
The ITU and domestic consultation on spectrum policy 
Over the course of a semi-structured interview with three lndustry Canada staff 
members, it was explained tome that every member state of the ITU carries out a 
domestic policy consultation which then feeds into official governmental positions 
concerning various policy discussions internationally (Industry Canada, 2010b). 
Having determined that all Canadian members of this process were either government 
staff, professional consultants or corporate executives, I decided to attempt to join the 
Canadian National Organization (CNO), the ongoing Canadian consultation group. 
From the beginning of this process, 1 identified myself as a researcher interested in 
understanding how the system works.  I was informed that the best way for me to 
become involved would be to join one of 14 National Study Groups.  Finding nothing 
60  National Capital Freenet is an independent internet service provider in Ottawa that has been 
operating since 1992. Online: http://www.ncf.ca 117 
remotely related to the social aspects of technology, I decided to join the Future 
Networks National Study Group.  While this activity would normally be classed as 
"participant observation", the group (an email list) has been almost entirely silent. 
Before being granted membership, I was interviewed and briefed (by telephone) by 
the chair of this National Working Group, Joe Zebarth, who explained tome what 
sorts of information I would have access to and what sort of decision-making powers I 
would have as a non-member of the ITU.  Industry Canada provided me with 
extensive documentation on this process as well. 
Lobbyist data 
Canada's Lobbyists Registration Act came into effect in  1989 (Government of Canada, 
2008) and its online Registry of Lobbyists was created in 2005 (Office of the 
Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, 2010).  Registration by lobbyists is both 
mandatory and voluntary.  Today, the Registry holds data on ali  registered lobbying 
activity in Canada.  While I was able to collect data, the search functionality of the 
Registry is very limited.  I requested and was furnished with a spreadsheet consisting 
of alllobbying that has been registered from the beginning of online collection in 
2005 until April 2011.  Uruguay has no such legislation or registration system. 
Participant observation 
While conducting field research in Uruguay, I was invited to observe and participate 
in two activities strongly related to my research.  The first was a two day workshop 
with members of Su tel, the union of workers at An  tel, Uruguay's state 
telecommunications corporation.  The focus of the event was to discuss how to 
change the discourse on telecommunications in order to frame it in social terms.  The 
second event was a meeting of the board of directors of ECOS, one of Uruguay's 118 
community radio associations.  In each case, I presented myself as a researcher and 
observer and participated when asked to do so. 
3.7 Inverse international development research 
In recent years, researchers, citizens and politicians have sporadically begun to 
observe and·  appropriate unique practices undertaken in the "developing world". 
Participatory budgeting is perhaps the best known example.  First developed in  Porto 
Alegre in  1989 (Chavez & Braathen, 2006, p.  1), it has been introduced and adapted 
in cities around the world.  In Canada, participatory budgeting has been introduced in 
different forms in Montréal, Vancouver, Toronto, and Guelph (Chavez & Braathen, 
2006).  Similarly, urban agriculture has been highly developed in cities of the global 
South and has been the object of extensive research in the North since at ]east the 
1990s.
61  While North America's ability to cultivate food in close proximity to living 
quarters has decreased incredibly since World War II, this practice has not 
disappeared in the developing world.  Rather than "reinvent the wheel" it is 
worthwhile to examine the state of the art elsewhere and determine if the practices of 
others can be adapted here (Duchemin, 2011 ).  Therefore, one can say that there is an 
established multidisciplinary pattern of looking outside of North America and Europe 
for models of social, political, economie practice with the goal of adapting these 
models domestically.  I would like to suggest that this pattern is not simply a matter of 
isolated research techniques or instances, but an orientation that warrants denotation 
as a methodological approach distinct from much other international comparative 
research carried out in universities and international development organizations. 
61  For instance, a search of IDRC's project database on 17 August 2011 showed 217 funded projects 
since 1998. 119 
When preliminary work on this research project began, I had not adopted such a 
methodological stance; community radio was stiJl illegal in Uruguay, no matter that a 
government advocating its legalization had been in power for two years.  When this 
form of media was legalized in 2008, it appeared that perhaps a new mode! of 
participatory communications governance was emerging.  As with the popular 
recognition of water as a human right, this did not occur due to the imposition or 
adoption of a "Northern" or best-practices mode! of governance.  To the contrary, 
these things happened due to a number of unique factors including, but not at ail 
limited to, state policy-making capacity, development of political discourse, and the 
autonomy of civil society (Light, 2012a, pp. 63-64; Marquisio, 2010; Ortiz, 2010; 
Santos & Villareal, 2005).  By recognizing that policy change is  tied to social and 
political systems one can determine what factors make such change possible. 
Examining the Canadian situation, one can then attempt to determine the extent to 
which our social and political systems are integrated with the policy system and the 
potential for advancing policy change in a similar fashion. 
3.8 Limitations of my methods 
This research project brings together thoughts and data from many different places. 
Potential criticisms of the methodological framework employed include: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the use of multiple data sets of different sorts; 
the analysis of a large variety of policy venues; 
introducing the unproven methodological innovation of inverse international 
development research; 
the difficulty or impossibility of accurately documenting the spectrum policy 
systems of two countries; 
assuring analytical continuity of data in three languages (English, French, 120 
Spanish); 
•  my subjectivity as an interlocutor within the policy systems I am analyzing  . 
This research project, by definition, casts a broad net and aims to touch every policy 
process that concerns the use and/or allocation of the spectrum for communication 
and to determine the extent to which citizens can take part in them.  As a citizen, I 
believe that I have (and everybody else has) the right to understand exactly how the 
systems that govern our society (and by extension our communication systems) 
operate.  While the policy systems of Uruguay and Canada do not necessarily mirror 
one another, much can be gleaned from their differences and the experiences of 
individuals working within (and outside or on the fringes of) each system. 
Quantitative analysis is utilized both to illustrate unavoidable inequality in access to 
policy venues and as an attempt to begin making connections between lobbying 
activity and communication policy in  Canada. 
Concerning the assurance of continuity in my analysis of data that exists in English, 
French and Spanish, I can attest to fluency in ali three.  Ali interviews were conducted 
in the interview subject's language of choice.  Transcription was performed by 
contracted third parties, each working in their first language. 
Research methodologies can be incredibly useful tools for organizing thought and 
action.  Having recognized a pattern of research being conducted for similar reasons 
in a variety of fields, it is important for me to distinguish inverse international 
development research as something distinct. 
A potentially more serious criticism, and one which is perhaps the hardest to correct 121 
in  the eyes of others, is the subjectivity of a researcher's perspective, which is 
informed by their persona! experience.  While sorne researchers may become doser to 
their research subjects as time advances, my experience has been quite the opposite. 
Since the beginning of my doctoral studies, I have purposely limited my activities as 
an activist and advocate, taking the distance 1 believe necessary to adequately and 
critically assess ali of my research subjects.  At the same time, my background and 
identity as an activist and as a policy advocate has helped me gain access to and the 
trust of many of my key informants.  That said, ali interviews were conducted 
according to strict ethical guidelines including the signing of consent forms by both 
parties.  This work aims to critically analyze all parties that fall within its scope. 
After ali, a good doctor should be able to tell his best friend he has cancer. 4. Case Study: Canada 
Canada's communication policy system is complex, consisting of multiple policy 
venues residing within government ministries, an "arm's length" regulator, and 
Parliamentary committees.  In addition to these fairly public venues, two other 
components of the communication policy system exist that are perhaps as important 
to the reguiation of the communications and media system as they are obscure: 
Canada's formai relationship with the ITU and the domestic consultative structure that 
informs this relationship, and the federal spectrum lobbying environment.  The 
following case study of Canada's communication policy system foc uses, above ali, on 
policy related to the radio spectrum.  ln doing so, it investigates the differing 
treatment of the spectrum according to type of use and differing opportunities for 
access that are provided (or not) to the public in policy-making processes and venues. 
The goal here is to provide a comprehensive mapping of Canada's spectrum-related 
communication policy system from law-making to policy-making and  policy 
enforcement, and to analyze the extent to which the participation of the public -
embodied either in individual citizens or in organized civil society- is enabled or 
obstructed.  The analysis relies heavily upon interviews with law-makers, policy-
makers and civil society representatives, and publicly-available information on 
participation in policy venues.  Ali but one attempt to gain similar insight from the 
private sector were unsuccessful. 
1 
4.1 The state of the spectrum in Canada 
Often, general assessments of the state of spectrum _ use and the organization-of 
1  Interviews were requested with the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) and the Canadian 
Wireless Telecommunications Association (CWTA). A successful interview was conducted with 
Lawson Hunter, a prominent Canadian telecommunications lawyer and former executive vice-
president and chief corporate officer of Bell Canada from 2003-2008. 123 
spectrum licensing describe a delimited space referred to as "the market", a space th at 
is evoked as something at once geographie, economie and political.  "The market" in 
this sense is geographie because spectrum licenses are organized according to specifie 
geographie areas of relatively small size.  For instance cellular carriers will have 
severa] licenses to provide cellular coverage across a province as opposed to having 
one license for the entire province.  Similarly, the CRTC, Canada's broadcast 
regulator, considers economie viability in the context of competition for advertising 
revenue when evaluating radio and television broadcast applications.  "The market" is 
economie in that, in this case, it refers to a delimited geographie area where the 
regulator determines that a certain number of business undertakings are economically 
feasible given the potential for revenue generation.  Finally, "the market" is political 
in that it is not a naturally occurring phenomena but is rather created and structured 
by the politics of the spectrum.  As this chapter will demonstrate, the composition of 
actors with access to the poli tics of the spectrum in Canada mirrors,  to a large extent, 
the composition of actors with access to the spectrum itself.  This, I will show, is 
problematic. 
In terms of radio policy, the term "market" refers to measurement parameters 
determined by the Bureau of Broadcast Measurement (BBM), a private entity th at 
tracks the listeners of radio stations that pay for this service.  "Market" is a term so 
fondamental to the regulatory understanding of radio broadcasting it is found in the 
Radio Regulations that provide the basic legal structure for Canada's radio stations 
(CRTC, 1986).  In telecommunications, however, "the market" is defined not so much 
as a discrete and broadly applicable standard of measurement but as an approach to 
the delivery of services one needs to communicate.  Evolving from telegraph services 
to today include wire-line and cellular telephony, wire-line and wireless internet, and 124 
satellite provision of telephony, internet, radio and television, the landscape of 
telecommunications in Canada changed rapidly over the last 30 years.  Until the 
1980s, telecommunications regulation was highly decentralized and the federal 
government's jurisdiction included only Quebec and Ontario (Schultz, 2003, p.  111 ). 
Ali other provinces operated provincially-owned telecommunications companies at 
this time which meant that on a national leve!, telecommunications was about more 
than the business of capital accumulation.  Instead, provincial governments were able 
to develop telecommunications as a means for supporting local development.  In the 
1980s and 1990s, provincially-operated telecommunications companies were 
gradually privatized under the guidance of the federal government.  During this time, 
the Telecommunications Act was reoriented towards the interests of private enterprise 
(Winseck, 1998, pp. 228-234) while expanding the reach of the regulator by 
appealing to the courts as opposed to engaging in legislative reform (Schultz, 2003, 
pp. 130-131).  Once diverse, Canada is today faced with what Dwayne Winseck has 
described as "one of the most concentrated set of TMI (Telecom-Media-Internet) 
industries among the developed capitalist economies" (Winseck, 2012).  SaskTel is 
the only remaining provincially-operated telecommunication company.  In place of 
the others are the market-driven giants Rogers, Bell, Telus (who ali operate in a 
number of provinces), MTS (former! y Manitoba Telephone System, privatized in 
1996) and Quebecor, the dominant media company in Quebec which has also recently 
become a cellular and wire-line telephone provider with spectrum holdings 
throughout the country.  While the almost absolute market-oriented focus of 
telecommunications in Canada is fairly reeent, it has been made possible by ongoing 
and long-term collaboration between business and government to the general 
exclusion of citizens.  This chapter, in part, details the extent of this collaboration in 
the making of the legislation governing Canada's spectrum. 
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4.1.1 Orientation 
It seems practically inevitable to talk about markets in a serious and comprehensive 
discussion of the radio spectrum, its regulation and its uses.  Assuming that markets 
are the cornerstone for a discussion about wireless communication, though, ignores 
the processes that have resulted in such an orientation.  Ultimately, the award of a 
license to use the spectrum for whatever purpose is the result of a successful  interface 
with a regulatory process and it is important that these processes be understood and 
their results quantified.  I will take a step back to examine the various processes 
underlying the spectrum policy system, presenting the state of the Canadian spectrum 
as the sum of a series of successful interactions with the spectrum policy system.  To 
this end, I have analyzed over 2,400 currently-valid wireless licenses granted by 
Industry Canada as weil as the 1,208 licensed Canadian radio and audio services, and 
142 Iicensed over-the-air television stations.
63  While this method is not a perfect 
illustration of spectrum allocation in that it does not quantify the "amount" of 
spectrum reserved for each license holder, I believe it does accurately represent the 
ultimate success of actors to engage with the policy system.  Wireless licenses granted 
by Industry Canada are largely limited (in this study) to cellular telephony and 
wireless broadband access, these Iicenses allocated by either simple application and 
payment for use or by auction.  Radio and audio services licenses include FM, AM 
and satellite radio and applicants are granted licenses upon successful  application to 
the CRTC to operate as a broadcaster and to Industry Canada as a spectrum user. 
Television broadcast licenses work similarly. 
63  Industry Canada's SpectrumDirect application permits viewing of al! currently valid wireless 
licenses, not including radio, television or satellite.  Data was collected April 2, 2012.  Radio and 
audio services data cornes from the CRTC's 2011 Communications Monitoring Report and is thus 
valid for 2010, the last year for which they present data.  This data has been amended to include 7 
over-the-air community television stations that, while licensed, were omitted from the CRTC 
report. -- --- - ----- - --------
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4.1.2 Wireless spectrum 
"Wireless spectrum" refers to portions of the spectrum used for wireless 
communication.  This includes a large range of possible technologies such as 2-way 
radios, persona] pagers, wireless broadband, and cellular telephony.  For the purposes 
of the current study, I have limited my analysis to currently val  id  li censes granted for 
wireless broadband or cellular telephony, data which is publicly available through the 
lndustry Canada website.  Spectrum of this sort is granted in  two ways, simple 
application and payment, and auction.  To apply for wireless broadband or Persona! 
Communications Service (PCS -an early cellular telephone standard) licenses, 
anybody from a private individual to large corporation can create an  account online, 
submit the frequency desired, the requisite technical and geographie details and the 
period of ti me for which the license is desired.  Fees are charged according to a 
complicated rule-set that takes into consideration the use, frequency and geographie 
area  (lndustry Canada, 2003).  For spectrum that has been designated for Advanced 
Wireless Services (AWS, the current standard for cellular telephony), spectrum is 
auctioned according to rules set by lndustry Canada.  These processes have resulted in 
the spectrum licenses that I will detail below.  I have filtered out licenses that have 
been granted to companies for internai communications use as well as licenses held 
by municipalities for internai use, focusing the analysis on the use of the spectrum to 
provide a public communications infrastructure.
64  That said, almost alllicensees are 
private corporations. 
64  For instance, sorne large engineering firms and severa! energy companies have purchased licenses 
for use in remote locations, presumably to provide their workers with a communications 
infrastructure where no other is available. At the time of data collection, there were 50 such 
licenses registered. 127 
4.1.3 Attribution of license through simple application and payment 
A journey through Industry Canada's database of spectrum li censes provides an initial 
portrait of spectrum allocation that is revelatory in that it appears to present a case of 
substantial diversity that discounts popular notions of concentration of 
telecommunications ownership.65  For instance, civil society organization OpenMedia 
recently noted, with atone of troubled urgency, that Rogers, Bell and Tel us together 
control 94% of the cellular telephone market in Canada (Dampier, 2012).  How 
refreshing, then, to learn that 84 small to medium-sized private corporations have 
purchased 307 wireless broadband and PCS cellular telephony licenses for an  average 
3.65 licenses per entity.  The vast majority of these companies own between 1-3 
licenses and serve a limited geographie range in rural Canada not necessarily served 
by incumbents.  One quickly expanding company offering rural wireless broadband, 
Xplorenet, owns 48 Iicenses of this sort.  Bell and Rogers are the only incumbent 
companies active in this licensing space, Bell with 73 Iicenses and Rogers holding 14. 
That said, Inukshuk Wireless, a company co-owned by Bell and Rogers, owns 85 
broadband wireless licenses across Canada, meaning incumbents, in fact, own an 
average of 87.5 wireless licenses of this sort.  Wireless broadband licenses are granted 
for annual terms that may be renewed while PCS licenses are awarded for 10-year 
periods that may also be renewed.  While there is no stipulation that the spectrum 
granted through wireless broadband licenses must be put into use within a certain 
time period, PCS license holders must demonstrate that at least sorne portion of the 
spectrum granted has been put into use within five years.  There is, however, no 
vigorous monitoring system in place (Industry Canada, 2010b ).  This has opened the 
door to what is known as "spectrum hoarding" which can be seen by the fact that one 
entity, Mobile Exchange, owns 144 wireless broadband licenses but is not directly 
65  SpectrumDirect. http://sd.ic.gc.ca/pls/engdoc  anon/speclic  browser$.startup 128 
engaged in any sort of communications business.  Instead, it has purchased spectrum 
in most Canadian metropolitan cities and sublets this space to others.
66  In addition, 
Inukshuk Wireless may also possibly be categorized a "spectrum hoarder."  Its 
website has been out of service for sorne ti me and its services appear to be 
discontinued, yet it continues to exist as a corporate entity and Iicense holder of large 
amounts of wireless broadband spectrum across Canada (Dampier, 2011 ).
67  Ail of 
these licenses are granted on a "first come, first served" basis.  This is the arena of the 
fastest gun. 
4.1.4 Auctioned spectrum 
While spectrum license sales of the type described above come across as simple and 
relatively accessible administrative transactions, spectrum auctions generate billions 
of dollars in government revenue and have become increasingly mediatized events in 
recent years.  The most recent case is related to the analogue switch-over discussed in 
Chapter Two whereby television broadcasters have been forced to migrate to digital 
broadcasting in order to liberate spectrum that will be used for telecommunications 
following its subsequent auction.  Although often characterized as an event whereby a 
handful of incumbent corporations purchase large chunks of spectrum that permit 
them to expand their market reach, the fine details of auction results show a more 
complex picture.  As in the case above, though, the superficial diversity of the 
composition of license holders is deceiving.  Currently, 386 licenses have been 
awarded to a total of 77 small to medium-sized companies, again largely serving rural 
Canada, an average of 5 licenses per entity.  Two companies specializing in rural 
broadband stand out in terms of the number of licenses they hold: Xplorenet with 75 
66  http://www.mobilexchange.ca/ 
67  I have checked the Inukshuk Wireless website regularly over the past two years. The last time it 
was responsive was in early 2011. 129 
throughout the country and Yourlink with 97 licenses in Saskatchewan.  While 
Quebecor is a Quebec-focused enterprise, they hold 76 licenses across the country. 
Other companies who have entered the cellular telephony market since 2008 -
Mobilicity, Globalive, and Public Mobile- hold 45 licenses between the three of 
them. Incumbents, though, have the vast majority of auctioned licenses.  Bell holds 
79, Rogers holds 104 licenses and Telus holds 374.  Two examples of spectrum 
hoarding can be found among this set of licenses.  One entity, NextWave Wireless, 
based in the United States, holds 87 licenses and claims to "own an extensive 
portfolio of licensed spectrum in the U.S. and Canada" yetis not engaged in  the 
business of communication.
68  The second example of spectrum hoarding is (again) 
Inukshuk Wireless which holds 340 auctioned licenses.  Ali auctioned licenses are 
granted on the condition that the license holder use the spectrum for its designated 
use within 10 years, however there is no monitoring system in place and the time Iimit 
willlikely be extended to  15 years in the future in response to industry demand 
(Industry Canada, 2010b).  This minimal policy framework, combined with an 
administrative process that limits itself to purely technical details and basic economie 
logic, fosters a system that is easy to manipulate if one has the resources to be the first 
arrived and first served. 
4.1.5 Owning the spectrum 
What does one need to gain a piece of the proverbial spectrum pie?  The regulatory 
system demands, above all, financial, technical and legal resources - prerequisites that 
logically favour an approach to communications and regulation identical to that 
advocated by Herzel and Coase decades ago.  For the purposes of the current 
discussion I am not interested in how much spectrum one entity or another has been 
68  NextWave Wireless: http://www.nextwave.com/index.aspx 130 
attributed, but instead in the leve] to which certain entities dominate the system of 
attribution.
69  While there is a certain degree of wireless spectrum license ownership 
diversity, it is overshadowed by three important factors that limit this diversity of 
ownership from having any transformational effect on the fundamental understanding 
of how, and by whom, the spectrum is used for communication.  The first is that most 
spectrum Iicenses belong to large corporate enterprises.  Communicative uses of the 
spectrum in the domain of telecommunications are structured around the industrial 
provision of the means to communicate.  It is not the act of communication that is 
important but the ability to sell, on an industrial scale, the ability to communicate.  In 
turn, according to the CRTC: 
(t)he Canadian telecommunications industry is dominated by  10 large 
companies that collectively, with their affiliates, account for 95% of 
Canadian telecommunications revenues.  The vast majority of 
remaining entities are small entities with revenues of Jess than $5 
million. ( ... )In 2010, companies operating in all six markets of the 
telecommunications service industry (i.e. local and access, long 
distance, Internet, data, private line and wireless) accounted for 
approximately 91 % of Canadian telecommunications revenues. 
Companies operating in only one market sector accounted for 1% of 
revenues. (CRTC, 2011 b, p.  111) 
Secondly, while many small companies that make up this 1% of telecommunications 
services revenues are engaged in providing wireless broadband and cellular coverage 
to their communities, very few of these are community or cooperative]  y owned. 
While I do not mean to say that "all corporations are bad," I believe the regulator 
introduces severe limitations when the CRTC's very vocabulary is limited to ideas of 
"industry" and "revenue" in addressing the domain of telecommunications. 
69  While this information would be helpful and interesting, it would also demand a leve! of research 
and analysis that is unfortunately beyond the resources of the current project. ----------------------------------------
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Finally, the phenomena of spectrum hoarding introduces an approach to spectrum use 
that can be seen as either a method for strictly monetary speculation or as a method 
for impeding competition.  Spectrum speculation occurs when an entity or individual 
purchases a spectrum li cense without intending to use it for the purpose of wireless 
communication.  Instead, the spectrum is seen as an investment and can, according to 
Industry Canada policy, be re-sold either in its entirety or in parcels.  A similar act 
takes place when spectrum is hoarded for the purpose of impeding competition.  This 
can be seen in a recent case where Xplorenet, a large rural wireless internet provider 
of national scope, was outbid by Inukshuk Wireless for spectrum needed to provide 
wireless internet service in the Durham Region of Ontario.  While the municipality's 
population is widespread and includes both rural and urban areas, Inukshuk plans to 
provide service only in urban areas, but has exclusive license for both (Follert, 2012; 
Region of Durham, 2011 ).  Spectrum hoarding and speculation have also been 
demonstrated to be an issue of concern by SaskTel who, in their submission to 
Industry Canada regarding changes to spectrum policy in 2011, asked for stricter 
regulations that would require license holders to use or Jose their designated spectrum 
within five years in order to impede such practices (SaskTel, 2011). 
4.1.6 Radio and television broadcasting 
While a quantifying spectrum licensing for telecommunications use is a task 
ëomplicated, above ali, by regulators' seeming Jack of interest in compiling, analyzing 
and communicating the related data in helpful ways, the CRTC's annual 
Communication Monitoring Report presents statistics useful for understanding the 
extent to which the po  licy system is dominated by certain parties (CRTC, 2011 b, pp. 
35-58).  Television and radio broadcasters operate with, effectively, two licenses-
one granted by Industry Canada to use the spectrum and the other granted by the 132 
CRTC to operate as a broadcaster.  In 2010, radio broadcast licenses were distributed 
in the following manner: 
Type of broadcaster  Number of li censes 
Ail 
1 
----~--
1,198 
733  Private commercial 
----, 
Public (CBC/Radio 
Canada) 
Non-commercial, non-
public 
102 
% of overalllicenses 
100%  1 
61 %  ___j 
8.5% 
24% 
Other (tourist/traffic,  73  6.5% 
weather)  1 
1  ______________  L_  __________________  ~ 
Table 4.1: Radio broadcast Ii censes, Canada, 2010 
The primary measures of successful broadcasting used by the CRTC in  its annual 
report on the communication system are 1) hours of listening, and 2) revenue.  In its 
most recent report, the CRTC identified Astral Media as the dominant radio 
broadcaster in Canada in terms of both of these measures.  Bell is ranked second in 
hours of 1istening and fourth in terms of revenue (CRTC, 2011 b, pp. 35-58).  Astral 
Media currently holds 83 radio broadcast licenses, while Bell Canada currently holds 
66 such licenses across the country.
71  Recently, Bell Canada applied for regulatory 
permission to purchase Astral Media which will make it the largest broadcaster in 
Canada by a significant margin.  A total of ten companies, each owning 20 or more 
separate radio stations, collectively account for 434 licensed radio broadcasters 
representing 59% of the private broadcasting system and 36% of the en  tire radio 
70  This number amalgamates community, campus, aboriginal, and religious broadcast licenses. 
71  Alllicense data used here has retrieved from the CRTC list of licensed commercial radio stations. 
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/BroadListRad/Default-Defaut.aspx?Lang-e. Accessed 10 April 
2012. 133 
broadcasting system in  terms of successful  instances of spectrum licensing.  However, 
as already discussed, diversity of ownership can be deceiving at first glanee.  While 
there is a large number of independently owned broadcasters in Canada, many of 
these, like the independent telecommunications companies addressed above, operate 
in rural locations not otherwise served by media groups.  Commercial radio stations 
also appear to be exclusively organized around the mode! of corporate ownership, be 
it by a single individual, a group of individuals or private corporations, or through a 
publicly traded corporation as in, for instance, the case of Bell Canada.
72 
While Canada has almost 2000 radio stations, it currently has only 130 over-the-air 
television broadcasters combined between commercial, community, religious, 
educational and public broadcasters. 
Type of broadcaster  Number of licenses  Percentage of overalllicenses 
Priva te  85  65% 
-
Public  26  20% 
Community  11  8,5% 
Religious  8  6,5 
Table 4.2: Television broadcast licenses, Canada, 2010 
Bell Canada, in this case, dominates the who le of the licensing system, holding 27 
television broadcast li censes across. the country and its impending future purchase of 
Astral Media will add two more.  Bell's monopoly combined with other large 
incumbents Shaw, Rogers, Quebecor and Corus account for 72% of ali commercial 
television licenses.  As with wireless spectrum and radio licenses, the majority of 
independent television broadcasters operate in rural locations otherwise sparsely 
72  CRTC Detailed Index of Multiple Ownership Charts. 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/ownership/eng/index.htm. 134 
served by more major media entities.  Over-the-air community television seems to be 
particularly ignored by the CRTC.  While 11  stations appear on the regulator's website 
(seven full-power, four low-power), they are completely omitted from the CRTC 
an nuai Communication Monitoring Report. 
73 
4.1.7 Convergence on the horizon 
Convergence is a word that, when used outside the communications domain, 
sometimes refers to a dramatic event whereby independent entities become one. 
While it does not exclusively refer to things of great scale, convergence (to me, at 
!east) infers a collision of imposing scale with somewhat unpredictable after-effects. 
Take the convergence of glaciers, for instance.  Two massive entities brought together 
by time and chance, changing forever the landscape around them, carving new rivers, 
future channels of communication and travel. 
73  In Canada, most community television licenses belong to commercial cable companies which, in 
turn, are supposed to administer funds and make accessible the infrastructure for community 
television channels.  The history of this has been weil documented elsewhere (Hardin, 1985). 135 
Figure 5: Two glaciers converging on Axel Heiberg Island, Nunavut. 
74 
While we have experienced numerous cycles of technological convergence (as 
explored in Chapter 1  ), the Canadian communication system and communication 
policy system are currently undergoing a change as dramatic as  the one pictured 
above.  The impending merger of Bell Canada and Astral will create an entity that 
dominates the spectrum policy system in every area - wireless communication, radio, 
and television.  As with the eventual effects of these two glaciers slowly becoming 
one, the changes wrought by this merger on the underlying foundations of policy, 
politics, and the ability to freely communicate are difficult to predict.  Other large 
corporate actors- "the incumbents" as they are collectively known- are engaged in 
similar strategies.  As this chapter demonstrates, access to the spectrum in Canada is 
contingent on access to the poli tics of the spectrum.  This access itself depends on 
74  Converging Glaciers. Posted by Dawna Maclvor. 8 April2011. 
https://blogs.dal.ca/science/2011104/21/science-as-art-2012-entries/davies-glacier-sm/. 136 
both the capacity of individual actors (corporate and corporal) to engage with the 
policy system and the capacity of the policy system itself to be accessible to a 
diversity of actors in meaningful ways.  The ability of actors to engage with the policy 
system, though, is not simply a question of policy and regulation but lies 
fundamentally in their legal groundwork.  The foundational laws that give rise to the 
entirety ofour communication system function as broad-reaching ethical frameworks 
in that they set a standard for inclusion that is replicated along the policy chain of 
command.  It is to these laws, then, that I now turn. 
4.2 Legal frameworks 
Regulation of the use of the Canadian radio spectrum  is fragmented in its structure, 
with powers defined through numerous laws.  While wireless communications 
technologies are governed by the Telecommunications Act of 1993 (Department of 
Justice, 1993), the Broadcasting Act of 1991  (Department of Justice, 1991), and 
Radiocommunications Act of 1989 (Department of Justice, 1989), the spectrum itself 
is not defined, nor even mentioned, in any of these.  To the contrary, definitions of 
communication acts that take place across the radio spectrum are clearly defined, at 
!east in terms of broadcasting.  Hence, the Broadcasting Act of 1991  tells us that: 
"Broadcasting" means any transmission of programs, whether or not 
encrypted, by radio waves or other means of telecommunication for 
reception by the public by means of broadcasting receiving apparatus, 
but does not include any such transmission of programs that is made 
solely for performance or display in a public place. (Department of 
Justice, 1991, p.  1) 
Radio waves are defined as: "electromagnetic waves of frequencies lower than 3 000 
GHz that are propagated in space without artificial guide" (Department of Justice, 
1991, p. 2).  Along with defining radio waves and the act of broadcasting, the 1991 137 
Broadcasting Act lays out the general responsibilities of the CRTC as the regulator (of 
broadcasting) and the responsibilities of the CBC as a public broadcaster.  Unlike the 
broadcasting sector, the legal foundation for regulating telecommunications 
encompasses the use of electromagnetic energy for communication across any 
medium.  The Telecommunications Act of 1993 defines "telecommunications" as: 
the emission, transmission or reception of intelligence by any wire, 
cable, radio, optical or other electromagnetic system, or by any similar 
system (Department of Justice, 1993, pp. 2-3) 
and thus would seemingly regard radio and television broadcasting as fonns of 
telecommunication and recognize the inevitable nature of "convergence".75  Further, 
the Radiocommunication Act of 1989 defines "radiocommunication" or "radio" as: 
any transmission, emission or reception of signs, signais,  writing, 
images, sounds or intelligence of any nature by means of 
electromagnetic waves of frequencies lower th an  3 000 GHz 
propagated in space without artificial guide (Department of Justice, 
1989, p. 3) 
and defines broadcasting as: 
"any radiocommunication in whicb the transmissions are intended for 
direct reception by the general public" (Department of Justice, 1989, p. 1). 
While tbere appears to be a lack of continuity in  the exact definitions used, the 1989 
Radiocommunications Act, preceding the two others, provides a baseline of regulatory 
control regarding the use of any radio technology within Canadian waters or on 
Canadian land.  Responsibility for carrying out this regulation lies in the bands of the 
Minister of Industry or individuals delegated by ber.  In addition,.. this legislation gives 
the Minister the power to establish procedures for competitive bidding on the 
75  The Radiocommunications Act, examined in Parliamentary committee in 1989 and passed into law 
shortly thereafter, replaced the Radio Act of 1938. Wh  ether intentional or not, this recognition of 
convergence lends a certain timeless quality to the new act such that it would be able to endure, 
without amendment, the evolution of technology. 138 
spectrum (spectrum auctions) (Department of Justice, 1989, p. 7).  A number of 
special powers are also granted to the Governor in Council.
76  In particular, the 
Governor in Council may herself introduce any radio regulations she deems 
appropriate, prescribe the eligibility of individuals to be authorized to use radio 
technology according to their immigration status, and serve as the negotiating party to 
international treaties concerning the radio spectrum (Department of Justice, 1989, pp. 
8-9).  Finally, the Governor in Council may expropriate "any radio station and ail 
things necessary to the sufficient working of it", including its employees for any time 
period she desires (Department of Justice, 1989, p.  11). 
The Telecommunication Act of 1993 and Broadcasting Act of 1991  and the regulatory 
bodies defined therein (the Broadcasting Act creating and granting powers to the 
CRTC, the Telecommunications Act gran ting powers to the Minister of Industry and 
the CRTC) provide a public face and basic regulatory structure for Canada's 
communication and media system.  It is the 1989 Radiocommunications Act, however, 
that provides a definitive legal reference point for control of the spectrum.  The power 
relationship between the Governor in Council and civil society is demonstrated 
through the near absolu  te absence of the latter in any of this legislation.  Of the three 
acts defining our communication and media system, citizens make but one brief 
appearance.  And even then, in the Broadcasting Act of 1991, only citizens "affected 
by an order of the commission" are addressed.  Should they wish to appeal a decision 
of the CRTC they may appeal directly the CRTC within 30 days of the original 
decision (Department of Justice, 1991, p. 14).  Participation in decision-making 
processes is guaranteed to nobody.  Additionally, not only are citizens largely 
excluded from the legislative framework of their national communication and media 
76  The Governor in Council is the governor general acting on advice of the federal cabinet. 139 
system, but so too are their political representatives.  While Parliament may have 
crafted and enacted these laws, the parliamentary body is given no explicit powers of 
direction or oversight.  Power instead is exclusively concentrated in the office of the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Industry.  Therefore, much po  licy regarding the 
spectrum is not, de jure, required to be developed in public view, let al one with public 
participation.  Raboy has noted that, in the development of broadcasting policy, there 
are two points of access: one through a formai system of consultation and transparent 
decision-making, the other by appealing directly to institutional decision-makers 
themselves - an  act otherwise known as lobbying (1995a, p. 17).  In this case, we find 
a complete absence of the former and a policy-making system that is opaque. 
Further, the 1989 Radiocommunication Act, a grossly under-analyzed piece of 
legislation, gives the Minister of Industry the power to negotiate and enter into 
international treaties regarding the radio spectrum without providing any mechanism 
of public consultation.  Surprisingly, no reference to the Act, which defines the 
foundational power relationships of radio spectrum use and regulation, can be found 
anywhere in the literature on the policy and politics of Canada's broadcasting and 
telecommunications systems (Babe, 1990; Peers, 1969; Raboy, 1990b; Raboy & 
Shtern, 2010; Salter, 2008; Sénécal, 1995; Wilson, 2000). 
4.2.1 Law-making and participation 
ln 2010-2011, the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 
composed of 12 elected MPs, was a fairly regular fixture in Canada's news media. 
The CRTC had made a controversial ruling concerning the manner in which the 
country's dominant telecommunications providers could bill smaller internet service 
providers (ISPs) for wholesale purchase and use of their infrastructure.  At the behest 
of a recently formed civil society organization, OpenMedia, 502,703 Canadians then 140 
signed an online petition addressed to the CRTC, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and 
the Minister oflndustry demanding that the CRTC's decision be reversed.
77  With 
national news websites providing play-by-play coverage of the video-streamed 
hearings, this important law-making venue became a publicized media event (The 
Globe and Mail, 2011 ). 
Standing committees play a key role in developing legislation of ali sorts that passes 
through Parliament and are thus the epicentre of documented debate around the 
crafting of legislation.  Examining the functionality of the communication policy 
system by beginning at this legislative origin contributes to a comprehensive 
understanding of the system and, ultimately, the extent to which it enables or obstructs 
citizen participation.  This is important because the legislative foundation of our 
national communication policy system offers more than simple legal grounding; it 
provides an ethical reference point to which ali  administrative policy can refer.  These 
foundational laws are, in their essence and in the manner in which they have been 
developed, examples of inclusion and participation that serve as a standard for policy-
makers further down the chain of command.  In this way, they affect not only "who is 
at the table" but who "who" is to begin with.  This case study will demonstrate that in 
the Canadian spectrum policy system, standards for participation and public inclusion 
are either minimal or absent throughout every step of the spectrum policy-making 
process. 
As with ali other federal policy in Canada, spectrum policy is built upon a legislative 
foundation.  Leading up to the initial development of each law, one or more studies or 
consultations may be undertaken and numerous such processes have been conducted 
77  OpenMedia: http://openmedia.ca/meter 141 
since the early 1900s.  According to Barney,  this long history of institutionalized 
venues for public participation in deliberations regarding communication policy has 
advanced to the degree where  "democratie participation in communication processes 
has become the norm in Canada, even in the absence of formai requirements for 
consultation"  (Darin David Barney, 2005, p. 34).  One such venue often appearing in 
contemporary treatments of Canadian broadcasting policy is the Task Force on 
Canadian Broadcasting Policy.  Headed by Gerard Capian and Florian Sauvageau, it 
met in private with 165 organizations and heard from 264 public intervenors between 
1985-1990 in order to provide the government with well-researched recommendations 
for future policy (Raboy,  1995a, p. 30).  However, while these studies and 
consultations may hear from hundreds of individuals and interest groups and take 
years to complete, final recommendations are not necessarily mirrored in  the final 
version of the relevant act, and the individuals undertaking these consultations have 
no decision-rnaking power themselves (Raboy, 1995a).  Nor is there any standard 
policy stating that such studies or consultations must occur at ali. Nor is there a policy 
that assures investigatory practices are informed by or conducted according to a set of 
ethical guidelines that define, for instance, a required level of public participation. 
There is thus a distinct lack of clarity in understanding where and how one can 
intervene in law-making and the extent to which one's intervention will be taken into 
account.  To put it bluntly, it is difficult to ascertain where real power lies.  Illustrating 
this phenomena, the following analysis evaluates participation in Parliamentary law-
making processes- the 1989 Radiocommunictions Act, the 1993 Telecommunications 
Act, and the 1991 Broadcasting Act- and two studies that were undertaken regarding 
the second two Acts.  It will show that citizens and civil society organizations 
participate to a far greater extent in studies or consultations that may (or may not) 
inform the law-rnaking process than in law-making processes themselves.  When 142 
citizens and civil society organizations did gain access to these law-making processes, 
their participation was often discounted and they were generally treated Jess 
respectfully than private sector and governmental actors. 
Every Canadian federal law is enacted in a similar fashion.  Once an  initial draft of 
the bill is introduced in Parliament and passed through general debate (upon its 
second reading), it is sent to the relevant Standing Committee (Milne, 2009, pp. 55-
56) orto an ad-hoc legislative committee who then undertake their own examination, 
which may involve holding hearings and calling witnesses to provide input.  Given the 
Standing Committee's clear Parliamentary mandate (Procedural Services of the Bouse 
of Commons, 2008, p.  1) and ability to cali witnesses to inform them, this would 
appear, on the surface, to be a potentially important point by which citizens can 
access the policy-making system at the point of legislative origin. 
According to the Bouse of Commons witness guide, "committees regularly invite 
private individuals, experts, representatives of groups and organizations, lobbyists, 
public servants and Ministers of the Crown to appear before them in order to elicit 
information".  Witnesses are chosen based on two sole criteria: "the type of study and 
the amount of time available"  (Procedural Services of the Bouse of Commons, 2008, 
p. 2), although no mechanism is defined for the recruitment of witnesses.  With no 
definitive process, how does one become a witness or express the desire to testify? 
Bow do committees assure that the composition of their witness list is representative 
of the various stakeholders concerned?  To answer these questions I decided to speak 
with experienced legislators, namely Marc Garneau (Liberal MP, former astronaut, 
Liberal party critic for industry, science and technology) and Dennis Dawson (Liberal 143 
senator and chair of the Standing Committee on Transportation and 
Communication).
78  It appears that the exact mechanics of witness selection are 
difficult for even them to discern.  According to Garneau and Dawson, witnesses can 
be chosen through a variety of methods, although each was somewhat uncertain in 
their response.  According to Senator Dawson, "Basically, it's  .. through, uhhh ... the 
uh ... the library of Parliament, we look at who has intervened in the past. We will 
announce that we're doing this study and basically people that are involved will react 
and say "we want to be heard"", while individuals and groups may also directly 
appeal to members of the committee (aka. lobbying) (Dawson, 2010).  Each member 
of the committee submits to the committee clerk a list of individuals they would like 
to appear.  Ultimately, a decision is rendered according to undetermined means by the 
chair and clerk (Garneau, 2010).  Commenting further, Garneau stated that: 
I can't tell you how it's decided in terms of proportion.  I think it's 
based on, typically, in proportion to you know, who gets the biggest say 
on the number of witnesses.  It ideally should be non-partisan, we 
should have an equal number- no not an equal number- we should 
have a reasonable number on each side of the argument.  How one 
chooses the exact numbering, I don't know. 1 don't know. I've submitted 
my witness lists.  1 have to say I found it fair that I've had not every 
witness I've put in appear, but a reasonable number.  But I've also heard 
people say, "Hey, you didn't give our side of the equation enough 
time." (Garneau, 2010) 
Extensive analysis of Parliamentary committee procedures and the experiences of 
law-makers has shown that no clear guidelines exist for facilitating public 
participation (Mclnnes, 2005, pp. 33-71 ).  Ground rules for participation are unclear 
78  Interviews were requested with representatives of ali political parties. An interview with Bloc 
Québecois MP Serge Cardin did not touch on parliamentary procedure (Cardin, 2010); the New 
Democratie Party suffered a communication breakdown; and the Conservative Party refused an 
interview request with the Chair of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology. 144 
and the choice of participants is made on a partisan basis and often dominated by the 
committee chair.  Lobbying plays a key role in becoming a standing committee 
witness and one must have already gained privileged access to either the politicians 
involved or be recognized as somebody whose opinion should be considered and thus 
already "on the radar" of the committee or the parliamentary library (Mclnnes, 2005, 
pp. 38-71 ).  Such a process, Dennis Dawson alluded, leans strongly toward industry 
(as opposed to public) involvement: "It's very open. If  you don't know that there's a 
study going on, you've really got a big problem in your industry" (Dawson, 2010).
79 
One individual, highly experienced in broadcast policy and in interpreting the 
political environment (and then taking action within it), explained that more 
substantial influence on the law-making process is made outside the standing 
committee processes through the informality of closed-door meetings between MPs 
and interest groups.  For lan Morrison, spokesperson of Friends of Canadian 
Broadcasting and an active analyst of Canadian communication policy since the 
1970s, the standing committee functions as "a theatrical stage where interests lay out 
their ideas. ( ...  ) They crea  te an environment where competing interests can interact, 
so that they help observers to map interests that need to be accommodated in the 
design of public policy" (Morrison, 2010).  Indeed, venues such as this are a visible 
part of a largely private process that combines undocumented (or at least unpublicized 
or unpublished) decision..:making processes and sparingly documented instances of 
lobbying.  The referral of a law to a standing committee, however, is the best possible 
79  During the 25 years preceding his appointment to the Senate in 2005, Senator Dennis Dawson was 
a telecommunications lobbyist (Dawson, 2010). While he was unwilling to discuss his lobbying 
history, a search of the Registry of Lobbyists shows Bell Canada, Canwest Global 
Communications, Air Canada and Westjet to  be among his most active clients since the registry 
was initiated in 1996.  As the Chair of the Standing Committee on Transport and Communication, 
Dawson plays a key raie in the crafting of any federal legislation affecting these companies. 145 
scenario for individuals and organizations who invest time and energy in establishing 
relationships with their members.  Other possible routes for a proposed law  may 
include the formation of an ad-hoc committee called a "legislative committee" which 
then carries out the same work as a standing committee (Parliament of Canada, 
20l0a), or a second reading of a bill without any official forum for investigation and 
debate.  This means that it is possible,  in  the Canadian legislative system, to adopt a 
law of any sort without providing the public with a means of participating 
(individually or through elected representatives) in its debate, regardless of how it 
may affect their lives.  The 1991  Broadcasting Act and 1989 Radiocommunications 
Act discussed above were both examined by legislative committees while the 1993 
Telecommunication Act was referred to the Standing Committee on Communication 
and Culture. 
4.2.2 Parliamentary committee participation 
One of the expectations of living in a democracy is that it is possible to make one's 
voice heard concerning matters that affect you.  At the very !east, this is what I expect 
of the democracy that I live in.  1  would therefore expect that the legislative processes 
that underlie our communication and media system would provide a mechanism for 
receiving just this type of input, something th at might be fou nd in a standing 
committee, for example.  To the contrary, official Parliamentary Procedure designates 
no standard process for deciding whose voices should be heard during deliberations 
over the content of laws (Parliament of Canada, 2010a), leaving the decision 
ultimately in the hands of the Chair (who is an MP of the ruling party).  To illustrate 
qui te plainly the results of this process, the following is an analysis of participation in 
the legislative committee and standing committee hearings which led to the approval 
of the 1991 Broadcasting Act and 1993 Telecommunications Act.  In the case of the 146 
Radiocommunications Act of 1989, no witnesses appeared at the committee 
whatsoever.  In this case, however, evidence provided by committee members attests 
to an informai consultation process that took place, which parties were consulted and 
explains how this consultation affected the crafting of the law. 
4.2.3 The Radiocommunication Act of 1989 
Legislative committee hearings concerning the Radiocommunication Act of 1989, 
then known as Bill C-6, took place over the course of one single meeting, on June 6, 
1989, of an ad-hoc legislative committee struck for this express purpose.  The 
committee called no witnesses.  However, MP Jim Edwards, charged with 
coordinating the development of the bill as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
Communications, provides important details of an informai consultation process that, 
based on comments made during this meeting, took place with the knowledge and 
approval of the committee.
80  The following exchange plainly illustrates the scope of 
consultation. 
Mrs Finestone: (  ... ) You  said in your speech that since the Spectrum 
20/20 symposium had been had been (sic.) in  1987, a great deal of 
effort had been spent consulting with industry members.  Y  ou worked 
with them to develop and draft appropriate amendments to reflect the 
reality and needs of the (sic.) Spectrum management into the 2P' 
century.  I wonder if you could share with us who you consulted with. 
Was anyone left out? To your knowledge, has there been any kind of 
concern expressed about this bill? 
Mr. Edwards: To my knowledge, there has been no concern expressed 
about the bill. J  do not have the exhaustive list of those with whom 
consultations were held, Mrs. Finestone, but I am aware that all 
80  A current member of the Selection Board of the Canada Excellence Research Chairs and vice-
president and governing chair of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council 
(NSERC) Governing Council (http://www.cerc.gc.ca/selection/edwards-eng.shtml), James S. 
Edwards spent 29 years working in the broadcasting sector, inclucling establishing Edmonton's 
first FM radio station in 1964, before becoming a politician. representative industry associations and manufacturers (  ... ) were 
consulted. As well, consultations were held with the Canadian 
Standards Association. 
(House of Commons, 1989a, p.  10) 
Mr. Edwards: There are many ways of having these discussions. 1 
understand from officiais of the department, Mr. Harvard, that there is 
a constant dialogue with all radio users, but that specifically there was 
a focus brought to bear through annual meetings of associations, 
through visits to departmenta1 officiais, up to the deputy minister level. 
Among those who were consulted, and there is sorne correspondence 
that has been received, have been the Radio Advisory Board, the 
Canadian Association of Broadcasters, large commercial users of radio 
in the industrial and commercial field, other government departments, 
such as the Department of National Defence, as well as the provincial 
government. 
81 
Mr. Harvard: ln other words, support is rock solid? 
Mr. Edwards: Yes, and there appears to be no dissent anywhere, and 
that is remarkable, in my limited experience. 
(House of Commons, 1989a, p.  12) 
147 
Based on this testimony, it can be observed that the Radiocommunication Act of 1989 
was designed in exclusive consultation between the Department of Communication 
(whose powers, as a subordinate of the Minister of lndustry, are in part defined in this 
very piece of legislation) and commercial users of the radio spectrum.  This was not a 
simple consultation, however, but rather cooperation between interested actors (both 
the regulator and the regulated parties) on the design of a law th at not only defines 
their relationships with one another but ultimately the extent tQ which these 
-
relationships will shape the future of spectrum use in Canada. With a consultation of 
such design, where the public and other non-commercial users of the spectrum were 
81  The Radio Advisory Board of Canada has been a coordinating point for primarily commercial 
spectrum users, plus radio amateurs and public safety organizations since the 1940s. Contacted 
multiple times during the course of this research, they never replied to phone calls nor emails. 148 
not even marginally considered, dissent of any sort would have been surprising 
indeed.  That said, this provides us with a good starting point for understanding the 
close relationship between private industry and the technical regulation of the 
spectrum and which serves to inform the consistent exclusion of non-commercial 
interests. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were busy times for law-makers engaged in the work 
of "modernizing" Canada's legislative system to accommodate new communication 
technologies and the business models that accompanied them.  This is not to say that 
non-commercial uses of the same technology had not been developed along the way. 
Community television (Hardin, 1985) and community radio (Girard, 1992; Light, 
201 2a, 2012b) movements had developed throughout the country and gained notable 
financial support from the Quebec government.  Civil society organizations 
representing these movements were also highly active with the founding of the 
Association des radiodiffuseurs communautaires du Québec (ARCQ) in 1979, and 
l'Association mondiale des radiodiffuseurs communautaires (AMARC) in Montreal in 
1983 (AMARC, 201 2; ARCQ, 2011 ).  Nevertheless, when it came to the task of 
revisiting the Radiocommunication Act in  1989, neither of these groups nor their 
member stations were invited to testify  to the Legislative Committee undertaking its 
revision (House of Commons, 1989b). 
4.2.4 The Broadcasting Act of 1991 
Known as Bill C-40, the revised Broadcasting Act of 1991  was, like the 1989 
Radiocommunication Act that shortly preceded it, studied by a Legislative Committee. 
Among it's central members were the most vocal members of this previous committee 
and MP Jim Edwards again undertook the work of escorting the act through the 149 
process.  This time around, a number of witnesses were called.  The following table 
presents an analysis of participation according to witness type, numbers of times a 
member of each witness grouping appeared before the committee (there were no 
repetitions), and the amount of time allowed in total.  The committee, by rule, granted 
most witnesses 45 minutes during which to make a formai presentation followed by a 
period of discussion with and/or interrogation by the committee.  Laws of this 
magnitude are typically introduced by the government in power and must pass 
through committee review where they may be amended to an uncertain degree.  The 
first witness called before the Legislative Committee was the Minister of 
Communications, the individual ultimately responsible for the drafting of the law and 
its enforcement.  Given the one and a half hours of dedicated committee time, the 
Minister was able to set the tone of the hearings and answer any questions MPs had in 
advance of any other intervenors. 
Witnesses type  Number of appearances  Time allowed 
Private sector  1  11  times  8.75 hours 
Unions  i  6 times  4.5 hours 
Department of  1 time  1.5 hours 
Communication  i 
Public media  2 times  2.25 hours 
CRTC 
1  1 time  1.75 hours 
Civil society  5 times  3.75 hours 
'  Other (Nova Scotia 
1  1 time  .75 hours 
Ministry of Transportation  i  -
and Communication)  -
1 
Table 4.4: Broadcasting Act of 1991, Legislative Committee Participation 
While it would appear that the amount of "face time" granted to non-governmental 
1 
1 
1 
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bodies is almost equal among ali actors, it is ultimately the quality of this time that 
counts.  Analyzing the committee minutes (House of Commons, 1989b), I have found 
there to be an apparent and systematic difference in the treatment of different actors. 
At the beginning of each session, a member of the committee, usually the Chair, 
informed the witnesses that they had 45 minutes to use as they saw fit and throughout 
the committee hearings, the witness was reminded of their allotted time.  Nonetheless, 
two of the 11  private sector actors, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) 
and Western International Communications Ltd, were permitted to give one hour of 
testimony each.  Ali but two private sector interventions were followed by 
collaborative discussion between the committee members and intervenors.  There was 
an obvious familiarity between the private sector intervenors and members of the 
committee; one has the impression that they appreciated one another as peers.  In the 
two private sector interventions that were not met by friendly discourse, intervenors 
gave confusing presentations and appear to have been humoured for the duration of 
ti me promised them.  Unions represented the second highest number of participants 
and brought together a variety of interests: actors, technicians, producers and 
directors.  Committee reaction was Im·gely neutra! in response to ali union 
interventions with the exception of the Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and 
Radio Actors (ACTRA).  By sending familiar Canadian actors to the committee, 
rather than union bureaucrats, ACTRA attracted more attention and elicited more 
discussion from the committee with a presentation containing less content (proposed 
amendments, etc) than other unions.  Four of the five civil society organizations 
intervening asked pointed questions of the committee regarding the proposed 1991 
Broadcasting Act and how it would address, for instance, the representation of 
minorities both in the media and in the composition of regulatory bodies.  These 
groups, sorne of whom also proposed amendments to the content of the Act, were 151 
either met with disinterest or hostile !ines of questioning on the part of the committee. 
Raboy has documented the extent to which representatives of certain industry 
associations were regularly consulted regarding how legislation would affect their 
membership, with the Canadian Cable Television Association representative stating 
plainly that "the CCTA was consulted in detail at every stage of the legislation" 
(Raboy, 1995b, p. 417). 
Legislative Committees, as opposed to Standing Committees, are ad-hoc committees 
of the House of Commons given the task of studying legislation according to a strict 
timetable- it's work must be reported to the House by "the following Thursday" 
(Parliament of Canada, 2010b).
82  Given the limited mandated ti me allotted "they tend 
to limit witnesses to officiais from government departments, agencies and crown 
corporations, and to other persons that the committee deems competent to appear on 
technical matters" (Parliament of Canada, 2010b).  Why then, would the 1989 
Radiocommunication Act and 1991  Broadcasting Act- two of the three legal pillars of 
Canada's communication and media system- be treated to such limited examination? 
Raboy has noted that sorne parts of the 1991  Broadcasting Act were "the result of a 
unique process of public consultation and lobbying that mobilized dozens of civil 
society groups and severa! thousand individuals over a six-year period (1985-1991 )" 
(Raboy, 2011, p.  104).  Raboy's account in itself, though, does not indicate a 
transparent, democratie or accessible process; nor does it mean that the ability of 
these civil society groups and individuals to influence the law-making process was 
greater than or equal to that of vested interests long since engrained in the 
informalities of the system.  While the Caplan-Sauvageau report -- the public 
consultation to which Raboy refers -- is at times mentioned during the committee 
82  This rule may have changed since 1989 as the Legislative Committee in question met between 
December 20, 1989 and March 16, 1990 for a total of 14 sessions. 152 
hearings, there was no explicit mechanism for including this report and its evidence in 
the law-making process, the final product of which was ultimately produced by the 
Legislative Committee. 
4.2.5 The Telecommunications Act of 1993 
. Unlike the previous two Acts, the Telecommunications Act of 1993 was studied by a 
sub-committee of the Standing Committee on Communications and Culture. 
Hearings were undertaken over 12 days between April 21  and May 27,  1993.  During 
this period, testimony was heard from a number of intervenors and the majority of 
attention was given to the private sector. 
Witnesses type  Number of appearances  Time allowed 
----- -
CRTC  & Department of  9 times  11.75 hours 
Communications 
Private sector  13 times  12.25 hours 
1 
-
l  Unions  2 times  1.4 hours 
Consumer advocacy  2 times  55 minutes  1 
groups  45minutes~  Ministry of Transportation  1 time 
& Communication (Nova 
Scotia) 
Civil society  2 times  1.5 hours 
Table 4.5: Telecommunications Act of 1993, Standing Committee Participation 
As in the case of the 1991  Broadcasting Act, the Minister of Communications was the 
first to provide testimony, speaking for a total of 90 minutes. During this ti me, he 
presented the government's ration ale for the content of the Act and went to great 
length to reassure committee members that ail of their constituents had been 
considered.  While the committee process around the 1991 Broadcasting Act generally 
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1 153 
allotted intervenors equal time, in the current case time allocation and attention given 
to intervenors was grossly unbalanced.  Earl  y committee sessions consisted of lengthy 
private sector interventions during which  telecommunications corporations and their 
representative associations proposed numerous amendments to the Act and explained 
how such changes would affect their businesses.  Discussion was collaborative and, in 
sorne cases, private sector actors mention that they had previously met with 
government policymakers to discuss the content of the Act, a lux ury seemingly not 
afforded to non-corporate intervenors.  Three such intervening groups - the 
Telecommunications Workers' Union (TWU), the Public Interest Advocacy Centre 
(PIAC) and the Fédération nationale des associations de consumateurs du Québec -
were critical of the Act, focusing notably on the issues of universal access and the 
effects of market liberalization on working conditions.  PIAC, in particular, offered 
extensive amendments to the content of the Act.  In response, ali groups were met by 
aggressive questioning on the part of committee members and intervention time was 
eut short, sometimes severely.  Rather than the usual 45 minutes of allocated time, 
PIAC's testimony was eut short after 30 minutes and the Fédération after 25 minutes. 
The testimony of the Canadian Bar Association was particularly telling.  It 
representatives qualify the incomplete nature of their statements by explaining the 
difficulties faced by a civil society organization trying to respond to bureaucratie 
time-lines based on the capacity of government and the private sector. 
As shown earlier, the 1989 Radiocommunication Act was, in part, the product of 
collaboration between law-makers and private industry.  In that case, the collaboration 
occurred outside public view.  According to the minutes of the Standing Committee, it 
appears that a similar sort of collaboration occurred in the case of the 1993 
Telecommunications Act, this time within the framework of the committee itself.  To 154 
this end, the committee received extensive input from the private sector at the 
beginning of its examination of the Act, including several propositions to change 
content.  It then spent a number of hours in discussion with CRTC staff, going over 
the fine details of the Act and asking questions of them based on previous 
interventions.  This, mid-story, seems innocuous enough.  In the final sessions of this 
Standing Committee Sub-committee, however, the pieces come together.  Over the 
course of the final two sessions, the Department of Communications, CRTC, and 
numerous private telecommunications actors met together and negotiated 
amendments to the proposed 1993 Telecomwtunications Act.  The final content of the 
Act was then entered in the official record as the committee's final act.  Everybody at 
these meetings was, again, on-board.  There was no dissent. 
Telecommunications, like broadcasting, is at once technical, economie, cultural and 
political.  It is a thing that touches vast sectors of public and private life.  However, 
while the Caplan-Sauvageau task force on broadcasting provided a space for the 
enormous quantity and variety of actors to express themselves regarding the content 
of proposed legislation, no such process was undertaken for the 1993 
Telecommunications Act.  Thus, there are a number of glaring omissions in the 
primary data used by law-makers in their crafting of the Act.  One important 
omission, which may have contributed to a truly transformative 1993 
Telecommunications Act, is the model of non-profit provision of telecommunications 
infrastructure.  This is not because groups working to such an end did not exist.  Non-
profit telecommunications efforts in Canada had been established by the time of these 
hearings.  Community-managed networks began to come online with National Capital 
Freenet in Ottawa founded in 1992 and the Peace Region Internet Society in the 
Interior of British Columbia founded in 1993 (National Capital Freenet, 2012; Peace 155 
Region Internet Society, 201 0).  Unless future models for Parliamentary consultation 
expand the range of their consultations, future communications laws will be bound to 
be created in a similar fashion. 
In the case of the Radiocommunication Act of 1989, very few  names of the 
consultative parties were divulged.  In contrast, there is documented testimony from 
each witness concerning the 1993 Telecommunications Act and 1991  Broadcasting 
Act.  If one adopts lan Morrison's stance that these hearings serve primarily as works 
of political theatre, what then can be said of the cast and the resulting work of 
legislative art?  Examining the testimony of the Legislative Committee organized 
around the 1989 Radiocommunications Act, one could estimate that roughly the same 
set of actors participated in the crafting of the 1993 Telecommunications Act.  One 
can also see that the makeup of witnesses informing the process around the 1991 
Broadcasting Act is similar to each of these.  Regulators, individual 
telecommunications or broadcasting corporations, and associations of these 
corporations largely dominate the proceedings.
83 While the inclusion of consumer 
advocacy groups in the second two proceedings could be seen as a broadening in 
public participation, this phenomena is perhaps also indicative of the long march from 
the "Right to Communicate" to "Consumer Right of Access", considerably lowering 
the standards of debate from one about actual rights to a debate over the consumer's 
ultimate ability to consume (to the profit of others) (Moll, Shade, & Longford, 2008, 
pp. 3-4).  A market-oriented bias can be seen through the composition of participants 
in these hearings.as weil as in its end result.  In particular, Pippa Lawson notes 
(concerning the 1993 Telecommunications Act) that: 
83  Broadcasting and telecommunications in Canada are regulated by a host of regulators such as the 
Competition Bureau, Industry Canada, the Copyright Board and the CRTC. However, Industry 
Canada and the CRTC tend to dominate most Parliamentary hearings concerning this legislation. The Act retained previous rules requiring "just and reasonable rates" 
and prohibiting "unjust discrimination" (s.27), but added a significant 
new "forbearance" requirement, not just permitting the CRTC to 
deregulate, but requiring deregulation where the Commission finds as 
a question of fact that a telecommunications service or class of service 
provided by a Canadian carrier is or will be subject to competition 
sufficient to protect the interest of users. (Lawson, 2008, p.  17) 
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Communications legislation, whether it be concerned with the spectrum, 
telecommunications or broadcasting, creates a broad and suggestive framework upon 
which are built the plethora of policies that make our communication and media 
system work.  Policies are the proverbial gears of the machine.  The 1993 revision of 
the Telecommunications Act effectively altered the framework in  which these policies 
operate, imposing a deregulatory imperative and orienting the policy system and the 
telecommunications system heavily in favour of market-based approaches to 
communication (Lawson, 2008). 
4.3 Telecommunication Policy Review Panel 
Further demonstrating the ability of the federal government to both shape the policy 
system and future legislation, in 2005 the Minister of lndustry struck the 
Telecommunications Policy Review Panel (TPRP) to conduct a study on the state of 
Canada's telecommunications policy framework and to make recommendations on its 
future (Telecommunications Policy Review Panel, 2006, p.  iii) in light of increasing 
technological convergence. 
The panel's three members came d1rectly from the Canadian communications 
industry.  Chair Gerri Sinclair had been General Manager of MSN Canada, Hank 
Intven is a longtime telecommunications industry lawyer, and André Tremblay is 
CEO of satellite company Terrestar.  Somewhat similar to the Task Force that 157 
preceded (and ostensibly informed to sorne degree) the 1991  re-writing of the 
Broadcasting Act previously, the TPRP was to perform a consultation that would then 
inform recommendations on future policy and legislative design.  The report was 
issued in 2007 and "recommends amending the Telecommunications Act so as to 
replace its current "soft" deregulatory bias with a very "hard" bias against regulation" 
(Lawson, 2008).  On December 14, 2006, the Governor in Council issued a first-ever 
policy directive to the CRTC demanding that they "follow the market" when making 
telecommunications-related decisions and basing this directive on the results of the 
TPRP (Government of Canada, 2006).  Six months later, committee member Hank 
Intven and Mary Dawson - both lawyers at law firm McCartney Tétrault, published a 
model act for incorporating the reforms made by this committee.  Funded by Telus 
and Bell (Lawson, 2008), this has been described as a form of "policy laundering" 
whereby industry literally writes modellegislation that can then be used as a template 
or content for actuallegislation (Shade, 2009).  Given the demonstrated cooperative 
relationship between law-makers and the Canadian communications industries, 
however, I would say this was simply an evolutionary step in the packaging of 
legislative proposais.  More so, touted by the authors as the product of the public 
process of the Telecommunications Policy Review, such proposais could be seen to 
have more legitimacy than the informai and undocumented consultative practices of a 
decade earlier even though the content and the means by which it has been produced 
may not be substantively different.  For sale online by Intven and Dawson's law firm 
McCarthy Tétrault, 
"(t)he Mode! Act is intended to provide the Government, 
Parliamentarians, officiais and other stakeholders in 
telecommunications policy with practical suggestions on how the 
various recommendations of the TPR Report could be transformed into 
legislation" (McCarthy Tétrault, 2007). 158 
If we grant a sense of legitimacy to the TPRP based on it being the final product of a 
public process, it is then important that this process itself be investigated.  In 
particular, who participated in  the review, how, and to what end?  On June 6, 2005, 
the TPRP issued a consultation paper available only on their website.  Notice was 
issued in the Canada Gazette a week later (Canada Gazette, 2005).
84  The general 
public were given until August 15, 2005 to respond to the consultation paper and until 
September 15, 2005 to reply to these initial comments.  The following graph shows a 
breakdown of participation, amalgamating both comment periods.  Wh ile civil 
society groups participated more actively than in the other forums noted here, 
participation in those other forums was by invitation.  In addition, "a content analysis 
revealed that Aboriginal, consumer, women's and community groups represented only 
15.5% of the total submissions, versus 60.1% for industry groups" (Mollet al., 2008, 
p. 6). 
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Figure 8: Telecommunications Policy Review Panel Participation, 2006 
84  The Canada Gazette is the official newspaper of the Government of Canada. Online: 
http :/  /gazette.gc.ca. 159 
While it is possible to be critical of the TPRP process and its aftermath, I believe 
these problems are directly related to a tradition in communications policy-making 
that is qui te old and engrained into the world-view and practice of this craft.  With 
historicallaw-making practices that revolve around informai consultation practices 
and result in  legislation that does not define working standards for concepts such as 
participation, representation and inclusion by which policy should function, it would 
be surprising if the TPRP had turned out otherwise, as with every other spectrum 
policy venue analyzed here. 
4.4 The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 
The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission or CRTC 
regulates Canada's broadcasting and telecommunications systems and reports to 
Parliament through the Minister of Canadian Heritage (CRTC, 2009), although this 
arrangement is fluid as earlier noted.  The CRTC is the only piece of the 
communications regulatory system that engages in regular public consultations. 
Broadcasters must first receive technical approval from Industry Canada and can then 
apply to the CRTC for a license to operate.  Ali of these broadcast license applications 
or renewals are vetted in public hearings and notice is given online and in the Canada 
Gazette. 
According to the 1991  Broadcasting Act, the CRTC must hold public hearings in the· 
following cases: issuing, revoking or suspending a license, "establishing a 
performance criteria as a criterion for the calculation of license fees, or the making of 
a mandatory order" (CRTC, 2007).  There exist two sorts of public processes at the 
CRTC and public hearings are probably the ones most often associated with the 
Commission.  Once the CRTC issues a cali for comments, interested parties must 160 
submit comments by a determined deadline and must state whether they would like to 
appear in person or not.  Those who are deemed to potentially offer content 
substantially different than their written submission are then selected to present at the 
hearing.  These procedural details come from my persona! experience as a policy 
advocate.  There is no users' guide to the CRTC, per se, making it difficult if not 
impossible for everyday citizens to engage in these forums.  The CRTC website, likely 
their most direct method of contact with the public-at-large, does offer the basic 
logistical information needed for one to successfully submit an intervention and 
provides a link to the federal law detailing, in legal terms, the expected content of an 
intervention (CRTC, 2011 c; Department of Justice, 2011 ).  No attempt is made to 
describe in accessible, non-legal terminology what is expected of a Jay-person who 
may wish to intervene.  The CRTC provides a bare minimum of information useful 
for public intervention while making it clear that the system is most easily and 
comprehensively accessed by those with an expert knowledge of this system orthose 
with the resources to engage such expertise.  Rather than provide useful tools to 
encourage and enable substantive public participation, the tools provided enable a 
limited and elite pool of participants.  Consequently, the CRTC is often seen as 
inaccessible and dominated by well-resourced private interests by established (yet 
under-resourced) civil society groups (Bougie, 2010; Côté, 2010; Lithgow, 2010; 
Robinson, 2010; Stevenson, 2010; Zaltz, 2010). 
In addition to public hearings, administrative decision - also referred to as the "non-
appearing public hearing" -- is a practice employed when the Commission determines 
that a public hearing where witnesses appear is not necessarily needed in order for 
them to make a decision concerning a license application or policy change (CRTC, 
2007).  Often referred to as a "paper hearing", this process will occasionally (but not 161 
always) issue a cali  for comments, but provide no live public forum for feedback and 
debate.  Many sorts of applications are addressed with a non-appearing public 
hearing.  While sorne may seem insignificant, such as renewing a community 
broadcasting license in a remote location without a public hearing in order to save 
money, use of this mechanism also provides the regulator with the ability to make 
significant decisions outside public view.  2007 statistics show that 20% of the 
commissions decisions were made administratively with no cali  for comments, 40% 
were made administratively with a cali  for comments, and 40% were accompanied by 
a public hearing (CRTC, 2007). 
The ability to physically and verbally interact with policymakers is a powerful thing. 
Whereas the effect of a written submission is unpredictable and ultimately 
unobservable by the author, a public intervention at a hearing is a chance to engage in 
dialogue and debate with the Commission itself and ultimately the opportunity to 
plead one's case.  However, telling the CRTC that you would like to express yourself 
in person does not automatically mean you will be granted such a possibility - one 
must convince the Commission that there is added value to your persona! presence 
that goes beyond your written submission.  Nevertheless, there are no clear 
mechanisms for ensuring one's participation, but rather a set of rules for engagement 
that must be acquired (through trial and error, hiring professionals, or through the 
mentoring of others) and used to improve one's chance of being heard.  In the case of 
the vast majority of decisions made by the CRTC, there are no clear mechanisms for 
ensuring the public is systematically given access to direct, dialogue-based 
participation. 
For most users of the licensed radio spectrum, the CRTC is the public face of 162 
regulation, charged as it is with regulating radio and television broadcasting (both 
traditional over-the-air and satellite broadcasting ).  After ali, this is the body that 
carries out public hearings on the licensing of broadcasters, providing any Canadian 
with the opportunity to comment on a pending regulatory decision and, in sorne 
cases, to plead their case in person.  The CRTC, however, plays no direct role in the 
regulation of the spectrum, instead concerning itself only with the content 
transmitted.  Industry Canada, through the Radiocommunications Act of 1989, 
controls the actual use of the spectrum.  Power over the CRTC is centralized in the 
office of the Prime Minister and allowed to shift between ministries depending on the 
prerogative of the government in power.  The Governor-in-Council, effective! y the 
Governor General acting on recommendations of Cabinet, has the authority both to 
review CRTC decisions and to issue policy directives to the CRTC.  This relationship 
is defined in both the 1991  Broadcasting Act and 1993 Telecommunications Act but no 
reference toit can be found on the website of the CRTC.  Although they may have 
complicated and sometimes problematic relationships with the CRTC, many civil 
society groups organizing around the regulated spectrum (radio and television) 
ultimately tend to rely on the CRTC to help them participate in and understand the 
policy system (Côté, 2010; Robinson, 2010; Stevenson, 2010; Zaltz, 2010).  Denying 
these actors who possess limited resources (financial, professional, etc) a 
comprehensive explanation of the po  licy system, the CRTC has not only tilted this 
system towards those with resources, but has forced civil society to learn by more 
exhausting methods, namely trial-and-failure. 
Histories of broadcasting in Canada (Peers, 1969, 1979; Raboy, 1990b) and activism 
around citizen access to the airwaves tend to overwhelmingly focus their energies on 
the CRTC.  This is not without reason.  As an object of study, the CRTC provides 163 
open access to ongoing public hearings and to documentation of past hearings and 
decisions.  Since 2007, it has increased the resources available to community radio 
stations (NCRA, 2012) and undertook a lengthy consultation with the sector in the 
first half of 2009.  This included sending a staff member to hold in-person meetings 
with station representatives in severa! parts of the country; through telephone 
conference calls; and one in-person meeting in Ottawa with  community radio 
associations.85  According to John Harris Stevenson, a longtime community radio 
advocate with the NCRA and current board member of the Community Radio Fund 
of Canada, the somewhat successful relationship between community radio and the 
CRTC that currently exists has taken decades to develop (Stevenson, 201 0).  However, 
the ability of traditional radio broadcasters to main tain a relationship with the CRTC, 
while important, is only a small strand of the web of relationships of power that 
determine who in society  may use the spectrum today and who may use it in the 
future.  Increasingly it appears the Privy Councillies at the centre of this web.  This 
can be weil illustrated by an exchange I had with a senior Industry Canada official in 
2009, who insisted that he would be happy to reserve frequencies for community 
radio if the CRTC asked him to.  When I explained th at the Chairman of the CRTC 
had twice informed me that it was the role of Industry Canada to reserve frequencies, 
he replied: "In that case, your problem is much more political than technical or 
administrative" (Vaccani, 2009).  Accessing this sort of political power is not 
something that communications-oriented civil society organizations have yet 
attempted in Canada.  To the contrary, the private sector has a long history of 
Cabinet-leve! interaction that, as documented by Richard Schultz, recently resulted in 
a market-focused re-orientation of CRTC telecommunications policy (Schultz, 2008). 
Should the requisite political power be mobilized, the CRTC can be directed to 
85  No longer a director of the NCRA at this point, I was nonetheless invited to attend as an 
independent expert. I was not, however, allowed to make an audio recording of the meeting. 164 
conduct itself in certain ways. 
4.5 Canadian Heritage 
As noted earlier, the CRTC's decisions can, in fact, be questioned and overruled by 
the Governor-in-Council, even though they are often touted as an "arm's length 
regulator".  The Minister of Canadian Heritage is "responsible for providing the 
Governor-in-Council with advice on petitions to the Governor-in-Council regarding 
decisions made by the CRTC to issue, amend or renew a broadcasting license" 
(Canadian Heritage, 2011 a).  Canadian Heritage is another influential point of entry 
into the spectrum policy system, with the ability to affect decisions concerning its 
use.  A petition to the Governor-in-Council to issue an order-in-council is a form of 
appeal that can be used to challenge a decision made by the CRTC.  Between 1991 -
2011, 44 su ch petitions were made.  Canadian Heritage recommended on seven 
occasions that the CRTC revisit or amend their decision (Canadian Heritage, 2010). 
While severa! attempts were made to interview officiais at Canadian Heritage, I never 
received a reply to multiple phone calls and emails.  As I attempted to arrange an 
interview in-person, I was told that I could not speak to anybody at Canadian Heritage 
if I did not already have an appointment.  This was the only government body in 
Canada or Uruguay that did not respond to interview requests over the course of this 
research. 
4.6 Industry Canada 
By virtue of the Radiocommunications Act of 1989, the Minister of Industry is the 
sole administrator of the spectrum and is also responsible for coordinating Canada's 
spectrum policy with the ITU.  While its relationship with the ITU is quite formai, 
domestic policy venues tend to be quite informai.  Here, I examine decision-making 165 
frameworks concerning administration of the spectrum in Canada.  I then analyze four 
particular spectrum-related policy venues that have been either initiated or housed by 
Industry Canada or the Ministry of Communications (which preceded Industry 
Canada), and determine the extent to which these venues were participatory and 
inclusive. 
4.6.1 Industry Canada: General spectrum decisions 
Ali users of the spectrum must apply for and receive an authorization from Industry 
Canada in order to use a designated section of the spectrum.  A number of uses such 
as wireless internet (Wi-Fi), cordless telephones, garage door openers and other 
similar technologies are designated as unlicensed.  There are three methods by which 
to apply for such an authorization depending on what the spectrum will be used for. 
The primary characteristics these methods ali have in common are: 
1)  Ail methods lack of any sort of public process; 
2)  Documentation of decision-making processes, if kept, is generaliy unavailable 
to the public; 
3)  Each method demonstrates poor or non-existent methods for engaging with 
the public.  The only notification methods utilized regularly are the Industry 
Canada website and the Canada Gazette- the official newspaper of the 
Canadian government and a model of inaccessibility and poor design. 
The majority of applications for spectrum use - 95%- are granted on a first-come 
first-served basis (Industry Canada, 2010b).  In other words, decision-making in most 
cases is purely administrative.  If  forms are filled out properly and the proper sum of 
money is paid, the spectrum is yours to use.  With no venue for debate or public 
intervention of any sort, most spectrum licenses are granted outside of public view. 
Acquiring spectrum in this manner is simply a commercial transaction for which 166 
yearly license fees are paid.  The second way in  which spectrum is licensed for use is 
almost as efficient in terms of limited bureaucracy.  Broadcasters, before applying to 
the CRTC for a license to broadcast, typically hire a consultant to prepare a technical 
brief illustrating that a frequency they would like to use is free.  If  Industry Canada 
agrees with this technical finding, the broadcaster in question receives exclusive 
permission to use that frequency on the condition that their application to the CRTC 
is approved as weil.  Only broadcasters need obtain a license from the CRTC. 
The third manner by which spectrum is acquired is through public auction, a practice 
that first began in Canada in 1998, although the Minister of Communications was first 
given this power in  1989 (Department of Justice, 1989, p. 7).  The general public is 
asked to submit feedback on proposed auction rules and generally given "45-90 days" 
to reply (Industry Canada, 2007a), but there has never been a public debate on the 
merits of spectrum auctions.  Generally, Industry Canada engineers and policymakers 
designate an  unused (or soon to be vacated) segment of the radio spectrum for a 
specified future use, which is then auctioned to the general public to use in that 
specifie manner.  For instance, the 2008 auction that helped Canada's new cellphone 
providers begin operating was aimed at cellphone use while an upcoming auction 
tentatively scheduled for 2013 may be aimed at rural broadband development (Sharp, 
2011 ).  Applicants must submit a pre-application that is then judged according to 
criteria that varies with every auction (Industry Canada, 2007a).  The financial barrier 
for entry appears to depend on the potential uses and ensuing "attractiveness" of a 
certain.set of frequencies.  For instance, a 2009 auction of the 2300-3500 mHz 
section of the spectrum attracted winning bids for as little as $700 while the potential 
uses of this spectrum appear to be relatively experimental (Industry Canada, 2009c, 
2009d).  On the other band, the 2008 cellular telephone-focused spectrum received a 167 
range of successful bids spanning from $739,000 to $999,367,000 (Industry Canada, 
2008a).  Auctions can generate considerable public funds which are directed into 
general government revenue.  According to anonymous sources at Industry Canada, 
the 2008 spectrum auction generated $4.3 billion that was originally destined to fund 
rural broadband development.  Ultimately, once everybody was "on-board" at 
Industry Canada and the auction had occurred, the federal government decided to 
alter the amount provided for rural broadband development to $250 million 
distributed overfive years (2010b). 
4.6.2 Making spectrum policy 
The ways in which spectrum policy itself is made are difficult to determine and to 
document.  While there are groups inside Industry Canada dedicated to making 
policy, they have no public relations mandate and are thus difficult to make contact 
with (Industry Canada, 2010b  ).  The following is a presentation of the Industry 
Canada spectrum policy forums known to exist, their specifie mandates, and a general 
statistical analysis of the participation of different actors. 
Technical Advisory Committee on Broadcasting 
The Technical Advisory Committee on Broadcasting (B-TAC) is an ad-hoc committee 
that has been been in existence since 1966, predating both the CRTC and the Ministry 
of Communications.  Â joint government/industry committee, it ad vises Industry 
Canada  _on  technical standards, regulations and policy (lndustry Canada, 2009e). 
However, until quite recently basic record-keeping procedures, such as the 
conservation, publishing and archiving of minutes, were not employed.  According to 
the current secretary of the committee, this was because: 
B-TAC meetings used to be very small in attendance. Formai minutes were not always produced, or saved.  Once the B-TAC ideas became 
integrated into the BPRs, the minutes were no longer needed. That is a 
prime source for you. Any IC (Industry Canada) policy ideas would be 
built into the Broadcast Procedures and Rules (BPRs). These are 
available on the IC website.  (MacMillan, 2010) 
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It would then seem that the influence of this committee on broadcasting-related 
spectrum policy has been substantial as the Broadcasting Policies and Procedures 
fundamentally define the technical conditions under which ali communication over 
the spectrum can legally occur in Canada.  This includes "AM, FM, TV, digital radio 
broadcasting (DRB), multipoint distribution television broadcasting (MDS), digital 
television (DTV), broadcasting receiving (cable TV) and terrestrial S-DARS (satellite 
radio)" (lndustry Canada, 2009a).  Minutes and participation records are entirely 
unavailable from 1966-2004.  Previously, only those from 2007-2010 were available 
online and minutes from 2004-2006 were provided by the secretary of the committee. 
These were added to the online archive shortly after I enquired about them. The 
following graphie presents the participation of various actors at the B-TAC from 
2004-2010.
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86  1 attended a 2008 workshop on spectrum policy given by Paul Vaccani, director of broadcast 
engineering at lndustry Canada.  Upon learning of the B-TAC in this workshop, 1 suggested to the 
National Campus and Community Radio Association (NCRA) that they should attend. Civil 
society groups had never participated before this point. 169 
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Qui te a bit of information can be found in the minutes of this ad-hoc committee, 
including discussion of the possibility digital radio migration, the development of 
digital television standards, reports on technological developments in the United 
States, and how these developments may affect the future of broadcasting in Canada 
(Industry Canada, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 
2007b, 2008c, 2009b, 2009f, 2010a).  Sorne insight can also be gained into the 
usefulness of this forum toits private actors.  At the second B-TAC meeting of 2005, 
seven days after Canada's lobbying legislation was fortified (Commissioner of 
Lobbying of Canada, 2010), the chair advised the committee that: 
(A)lthough the Act would require lobbyists who may influence governmental policies and regulation through lobbying to register, he 
believed that B-TAC was an open forum with published minutes for 
public access and therefore would not fall under the requirement of the 
Act. However, he strongly recommended that any outside members 
who had regular dealings with the Department to register for the sake 
of certainty.  (Industry Canada, 2005b, p. 7) 
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As I examine other spectrum policy venues, I will show that the inclusion of- if not 
guidance by- industry in spectrum-related policy forums and the exclusion of civil 
society appears to be a general rule.  Recent involvement of civil society in the B-TAC 
is, if anything, an anomaly not of any particular use to newly included parties. 
Indeed, the lack of technical knowledge prevents civil society from engaging in this 
venue in an any concrete manner (Industry Canada, 2010a; Robinson, 2010) and sorne 
appear happy just to be included (Zaltz, 2010). 
Digital broadcasting 
Digital broadcasting is a form of broadcasting that uses the radio spectrum in a more 
efficient manner than traditional analogue broadcasting.  For this reason, 
internationally coordinated plans have been in development since the 1990s to 
transition both radio and television from analogue to digital broadcasting (Light, 
2010).  In  1995, Industry Canada formed a Task Force on the Implementation of 
Digital Television.  However, "funding for the research and writing of the report was 
provided by the private-sector membership" (Taylor, 2009, p. 242).  If one .examines 
the composition of the task force, it is qui te easy to see that almost every member was 
industry-based and there was no single civil society representative of any sort, despite 
the fact that there were, for instance, dozens of community television stations across 
the country (Canadian Heritage, 1997, pp. 42-44).  Indeed, doser examination shows 
that this reliance on private industry to engage in research and policy-making has 171 
driven the entire process of digital transition (Taylor, 2009).  Taylor compares the 
Canadian process to the digital television transition in the United States where nine 
representatives on a committee of 22 were from outside the industry in question 
(2009, p. 244).  Digital television transition is a process that will ultimately culminate 
in the 2013 auction of radio spectrum used until August 2011  for analogue television 
broadcasting (Sharp, 2011 ).  There are many potential uses for this spectrum, 
including the development of nation-wide community-owned and managed 
communication networks (Light, 2010).  However, the development of non-industry 
owned communications networks is doubtful as long as citizens and their 
communities are systematically excluded from the processes that could make such 
things possible.  Understanding that the spectrum is a political issue and that public 
access to the pertinent policy venues has been historically and systematically limited, 
the very concept of public consultation concerning spectrum policy in  Canada must 
be revisited and revised if future results are to ever differ from those presented th us 
far.  The spectrum policy system, as a set of venues for public consultation and public 
policymaking, is broken.  The remainder of this chapter continues this vein of analysis 
by continuing to interrogate the policy system and its failure to integrate citizen actors 
and non-market ideas. 
The third spectrum policy venue that will serve as an example here is one quite 
similar to the Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television.  The Digital 
Radio Co-ordinating Group (DRCG) was formed as early as 1989 by the Canadian 
Association of Broadcasters when Canadian interestifl digital radio broadcasting was 
inspired by developments in Europe (O'Neill, 2007, p. 74).
87  As in the case of digital 
television, government regulators looked to the industry for their expertise.  "While 
87  The Canadian Association of Broadcasters disbanded and reorganized in 2010. They did not reply 
to multiple interview requests related to this research. http://www.cab-acr.ca. 172 
representatives of government departments and agencies sit on this committee, their 
primary role is to provide advice and consultation on technical issues of common 
interest" (Digital Radio Co-ordinating Group, 2007, p.  1  ).88  Parallel to this industry-
driven group, the Ministry of Communications established a Task Force on the 
Introduction of Digital Radio in Canada (Groupe de travail sur la mise en oeuvre de la 
radio-diffusion audionumérique, 1995a, p. 3).  A much smaller working group than 
either the Digital TV task force or the Digital Radio Co-ordinating Group (each 
counting over 30 members), the Digital Radio task force had eight members, one of 
whom represented the nation's three community radio associations.  While the DRCG 
carried out engineering tests and studied the technical feasibility of digital radio, the 
Task Force appears to have been created to provide an official public face for a very 
private effort.  It's work culminated in the government-published pamphlet "Digital 
radio. The sound of the future: the Canadian vision" (Groupe de travail sur la mise en 
oeuvre de la radio-diffusion audionumérique, 1995b  ).  Lucie Gagnon, th en head of 
the Association des radiodiffuseurs communautaires du Québec (ARCQ), revealed to 
me that she felt her presence was a token gesture - as if she had been  chosen because 
she was "French, from the community sector, and a woman" (Gagnon, 2005).  Thus, 
only one civil society representative was included in  any of the bodies working on the 
country's future television and radio infrastructure.  Ultimately, the evolution to 
digital radio stalled for a number of reasons: changing listener habits (online 
listening) and resistance from the auto industry among them (Industry Canada, 2010b; 
O'Neill, 2007, p. 79).  This does not, however, discount the fact that relevant civil 
society organizations were not included in the processes developed ar.ound it. 
4.6.3 Industry Canada and the ITU 
88  In my former capacity as a director of the NCRA I attempted to join the Digital Radio Co-
ordinating Group. My request for membership was ignored. 173 
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a United Nations-based body 
responsible for coordinating the radio spectrum and satellite orbits internationally. 
Presently, the ITU counts 192 member states, 532 sector (industry) members, 148 
associate members (most1y industry) and five academie affiliates (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2011 ).  It main tains a table of frequency allocations that 
is the reference point for ail domestic spectrum regulation and holds a conference 
every 4-5 years to update the table and coordinate spectrum policy between countries. 
On the nationallevel, Industry Canada maintains a consultative structure that informs 
its actions at the ITU conference.  According to an anonymous Industry Canada 
employee, "any interested Canadians can participate in our participatory process. 
And when we go (to ITU meetings) they're also welcome to be members of the 
Canadian delegation to ITU-R meetings" (Industry Canada, 2010b). 
While this consultative process does exist, no information on participation 
mechanisms can be found on the website of the Canadian National Organization (the 
name for this body/process) (Industry Canada, 2011 a).  A website description shows a 
number of National Study Groups focused on  various technical issues concerning 
spectrum use and regulation, although none touch on social issues.  An email 
exchange with one of the Industry Canada representatives responsible for this process 
revealed that members -- "Canadian experts" -- are invited by executive members of 
the committee "as appropriate, to join in a CNO meeting."  The history of 
participation in these meetings is considered as "limited to the CNO Administration 
and not for public disclosure"  (Roderick, 2011).  However, the steering committee of 
the Canadian National Organization consists of Industry Canada, Bell Canada, 
Erisson Canada Inc., EXFO Inc., Microsoft Canada, Research in Motion, Rogers 
Communication Partnership, and TELUS Communications Inc. (Industry Canada, 2008b). 
As manner of experiment, I asked to be considered for membership in  the CNO. 
While my request was accepted, the weight of my participation - no matter my 
expertise- will be limited compared to dues-paying representatives of industry 
members.  Non-industry experts may request to participate, but the following 
obstacles disallow meaningful participation by citizen and civil society actors: 
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•  Only national governments, corporations and a small number of civil society 
organizations are members of the ITU.  No Canadian civil society 
organizations are members. 
• 
• 
Decision-making in study groups is done by consensus.  However, 
"participants from organizations that are not ITU Sector Members or 
Associates shall not prevent consensus" (Industry Canada, 2008b, p.  8). 
There is no mechanism to financially support civil society or citizen 
participation. 
Ultimately, I was granted membership in the Future Networks Study Group which 
meant being the recipient of no more than 10 emails over a period of 10 months, an 
invitation to an ITU workshop on digital signage (in Geneva), and an invitation to a 
telephone meeting discussing security and future networks that was ultimately 
attended by five Industry Canada staff, the chair (an independent consultant) and a 
second consultant. 
89 
Participation in Study Groups appears to be the only way in which a member of the 
public can participate in debate over spectrum policy in a way that may influence 
Canadian positions in negotiations with the ITU or the way that Industry Canada 
applies ITU spectrum standards.  I gained access through the following steps: 
89  While unable to attend, I was, as a member of the group, sent a copy of meeting minutes. ----------- - --------------------
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1.  I was lucky enough to have had coincidental contact with a senior bureaucrat 
at Industry Canada who served as my entry point. This was followed by four 
months of negotiations to obtain an interview with Industry Canada staff. 
2.  Post-interview follow-up discussion with Industry Canada staff led to a 
personalized introduction to a "gatekeeper" who coordinates participation in 
the CNO. 
3.  Two months spent negotiating and waiting to attain membership. 
I was allowed to join the Study Group of my choice and observed that each operates 
according to a uniquely economie or technical imperative.  Social effects and uses of 
spectrum-bound communication are wholly absent from the mandates of these 
committees.  Based on my experience and the data shown here I can conclude that 
domestic participation in the groups that set the international standards for spectrum 
policy-making is limited to a very small segment of Canadian society, heavily 
dominated by industry.  Marginally participatory, the structure of the organization and 
its decision-making processes are such that non-paying members, having somehow 
gained access, remain ultimately powerless. 
4.7 Lobbying and communications policy-making in Canada 
1 didn't know you had to provide cheese biscuits and wine in order to get 
legitimacy on Parliament Hill. Like who knew, right? Weil, now I know. 
And it's like, this is what I would tell people. "Go give people free cheese 
biscuits and wine and then you'll be taken seriously." That stuff needs to 
be made public, right? (Lithgow, 2010) 
As shown throughout the preceding analysis, spectrum policy-making in Canada has 
been structured and influenced by a close and collaborative relationship between 
private industry, federal regulators and elected officiais since at least the 1960s. 176 
While 1 have been able to show concrete evidence of this relationship, 1 believe the 
true extent of it remains hidden, or at least difficult to identify and trace.  This is due, 
at ]east in part, to the Canadian government's regulatory approach toward the Jobbying 
process and a tepid interest in Jobbying research on the part of Canadian 
communications academies and civil society advocates.  Marc Raboy's book on 
channels of influence in Canadian broadcasting remains unique as an academie text 
dedicated to communications policy lobbying in Canada (Raboy, 1995a).  A number 
of books on lobbying in Canada were published in the 1980s but tend to be either 
first-person accounts of Jobbying scandais (Harrison, 1988), general overviews of the 
issue of lobbying from municipal to federallevels across Canada (Malvern, 1985), or 
"how-to" manuals (Sarpkaya, 1988).  Since the 1990s, lobbying literature in Canada 
has largely concentrated on lobbying regulation, and the country is often used in 
comparative case studies on the subject (Chari et al., 2007; Holman & Luneburg, 
2012; Ronit, 2011; Rush & Rush, 1994).  Modest attention has been given to lobbying 
and environmental policy (Abelson &  Abelson, 1995; Montpetit, 2003; Savan, Gore, 
& Morgan, 2004) and a notable book by Health Canada whistle-blower Shiv Chopra 
recently exposed lobbying practices in food and drug regulation (Chopra, 2009).  An 
important exception to the dearth of of academie treatments of communication policy 
Jobbying is a recent book chapter by Richard Schultz.  In this piece, the author 
provides minute detail into the strategies used by former Minister of Industry Maxime 
Bernier to overcome widespread resistance both within and outside of the Privy 
Council to successfully issue a policy directive to the CRTC guiding them to make 
telecommunications decisions according to "the market" (Schultz, 2008). 
Today, lobbying plays an important yet immeasurable role in Canadian policy-
making.  lt is an activity that allows individuals and organizations to build --------
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relationships with public officiais and to use these relationships in order to gain 
support and legitimacy within the interconnected policy system.  While it is 
impossible to quantify the effects of lobbying on spectrum po  licy due to the Lobbyist 
Registry's general Jack of specificity regarding lobbying topics, it is included as part 
of the broader analysis provided here to provide a comprehensive account of the 
policy system. 
According to the Organization for Economie Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), "lobbying involves solicited communication, oral or written, with a public 
official to influence legislation, policy or administrative decisions" and is a concept 
that goes back many centuries (OECD, 2009, p. 20).  Regulation of lobbying is a 
fairly new phenomena, and Canada's Lobbyists Registration Act was first passed in 
1989.  While it required paid lobbyists to "provide information about themselves and 
the subject matter of their lobbying" (Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, 2010), 
no public official appears to have been responsible for the care-taking of this 
information until amendments in  1997 gave this responsibility to the Ethics 
Commissioner.  In 2004, the Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists became an official 
unit of Industry Canada (Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, 2010), today the 
second most heavily lobbied part of the federal government (Office of the 
Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, 2012).
9°  Finally, the Office of the Registrar of 
Lobbyists was moved to the portfolio of the Treasury Board as an independent entity 
in 2006. 
Lobbying in Canada is a difficult thing to analyze.  While an online database of 
90  The Registry of Lobbyists arnalgamates this data each day. While observing trends over the course 
of 2011, I noted that Industry Canada and the House of Commons were consistently the two most 
heavily lobbied sections of government. 178 
lobbyist activity exists, lobbyists are required to register their actions of their own 
accord.  I have been unable to ascertain if there is active "policing" of non-
registration and thus cannot say that the content of the database is either definitive or 
representative of wh at actually occurs.  In earl  y 2011, having judged the Registry's 
online sem·ch tools inadequate, I consulted directly with Registry staff.  Ultimately 
they provided me with a set of exported spreadsheets containing the entirety of the 
Lobbyist Registry.
91  Upon doser examination I came to realize that the data 
collected is insufficient to be able to concretely connect lobbying activities to discrete 
policy-making decisions.  Specifically, lobbyists are only required to provide broad 
topics relative to their meetings with public officiais.  "Telecommunications" or 
"broadcasting" can mean many different things and there is no easy way to determine 
more granular topics of discussion.  In addition, only paid lobbyists are required to 
file their activities.  This makes it impossible, for instance, to conduct an analysis 
comparing corporate lobbying in the field of telecommunications to the lobbying 
activities of civil society where such work is often conducted by unpaid volunteers.
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Accordingly, 
the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, fosters an industry 
where entry is virtually uncontrolled; and both consultant and in-house 
lobbyists can, as long as they are adequately supported financially, 
exploit access to a variety of decision points. Lobbyists thrive as 
nimble and versatile guides to complex, diffuse and dynamic systems. 
(OECD, 2009, p. 43) 
Such a regulatory environment is thus difficult for inexperienced and under-funded 
civil society organizations to navigate and take part in (Lithgow, 2010; Morrison, 
91  They also remarked that they on! y had two or three similar requests from academies but are eager 
for people to utilize their data and even offered me monthly updates on CD. 
92  For instance, as a director of the NCRA, I, and severa! others, lob  bied numerous MPs and the 
CRTC in an effort to gain political traction for the creation of the Community Radio Fund of 
Canada.  These meetings were never documented. 179 
2010).  Civil society organizations occasionally engage in  Jobbying, either at the 
behest of experienced insiders (Lithgow, 2010) or as a matter of refined practice by a 
uniquely experienced and placed individual (Morrison, 2010).  A regulated lobbying 
environment has thus created a system that appears to be calibrated for opacity rather 
than transparency. 
Influencing short-term and long-term policy-making processes is about much more 
than engaging in an act defined as lobbying.  It also includes a host of practices that 
have been embodied in the culture of communications regulation for decades. 
In terms of the commission (CRTC), um. The formai process that you 
see is the tip of the iceberg. And it doesn't necessarily indicate what's 
going on beneath the surface. There are a lot of informai contacts 
taking place, and that may or may not be recorded as lobbying visits, 
what have you. People can pick the phone up and cali somebody. 
People take each other out to lunch. People hire each other. They hire 
people, staff and commissioners, are hired back and forth and sorne of 
them have backgrounds - many of them have backgrounds - in 
commercial media or BDUs (broadcast distribution undertaking) or 
whatever. (Stevenson, 2010) 
The policies developed through decades of collaboration between corporate interests 
and federal regulators affect spectrum-enabled communication of every sort, not 
simply in its mechanics but also in  understanding what this form of communication 
truly entails.  Examples of this phenomena can be observed in this chapter's earlier 
analysis of the law-making processes that resulted in the 1989 Radiocommunication 
Act, 1991  Broac]casting Act, and 1993 Telecommunications Act where it appears that 
corporate actors were invited to explain to Parliamentary committees the relationship 
between proposed legislation, wireless communication and their specifie businesses. 
Indeed, in reading the minutes of committee meetings, it is hard to avoid the cozy 
familiarity between corporate actors and law-makers and a sense of respect and 180 
deference given to private sector acumen and expertise. 
4.8 The institutionalization of informality vs. the urgency of convergence 
The ability to engage in informed participation in spectrum policy-making requires 
that participants have the ability to engage in  meaningful dialogue and  that through 
such dialogue they can concretely become part of larger decision-making processes: 
In order to do so, citizens and the groups they organize and act through need access to 
knowledge of the radio spectrum and how it is regulated at every level of bureaucracy 
domestically and internationally.  In my research, I've found that communication-
oriented civil society groups in Canada, without exception, Jack this basic knowledge. 
This handicap has contributed to a regulatory system from which citizens and civil 
society are largely excluded. 
The spectrum policy-making system employs two general routes by which external 
parties participate in the making of policy:  1) formai inclusion to varying degrees; 2) 
informai methods of consultation and collaboration.  As documented in this chapter, 
the mere existence of systems for participation does not mean th at these systems are 
equitably accessible to all interested parties.  Access to these venues may be gained 
over time as relationships are developed between, for example, civil society groups 
and regulatory agencies.  However, these sorts of relationships require a heightened 
level of professionalism that is not necessarily a  natural part of the value-sets or 
organizational structures of these groups.  Groups that have succeeded in building 
such relafionships have only done so in recent years by "learning how to play the 
game" (Stevenson, 2010).  The rules of "the game," however, are difficult to gain 
access to and are more often gained through years of institutional trial and error rather 
than the availability of an actual rule-set or guide. Canada's communication and media system is today at a crossroads as media and 
communications actors- both corporate and community- actively engage in the 
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elaboration of a converged system.  This crossroads should be of no surprise, for the 
Canadian policy machine has been making preparations since the publication of 
Instant World by the Department of Communications in  1971  (Government of 
Canada, 1971).  The summary results of a series of studies undertaken on the future of 
communications technology and Canada, Instant World demonstrated that while the 
future was bright, it was also deathly complicated.  This first enquiry was, in essence, 
more concerned with the urgent matter of reliable infrastructure than how this 
infrastructure might be used for the common good.  Roughly twenty years later, a 
group of researchers at the Broadcast Technologies Research Branch of the 
Department of Communications issued an explora  tory report considering how it 
might be possible to merge the disparate worlds of broadcasting and computing 
(Phillips et al., 1992).  Written by a group that did not include a single economist, it 
relied on "psychologists, engineers and research scientists" and was "looking at 
possibilities" rather than at what could be done through regulation (CRTC, 2010d). 
Following a further twenty years of incubation, the CRTC issued two reports painting 
the future of converging policy and technology in a very different light and aiming to 
determine the precise regulatory implications of this change (CRTC, 201 Oa, 2011 a). 
A number of technological advancements underpin the social and 
economie changes leading to convergence: the digitizatiop of 
communications, information and audio-visual content; growth in 
broadband speeds, capacity and penetration; and the development of 
new network infrastructure such as fibre-based networks and mobile 
broadband. Convergence is transforming the communications 
landscape and blurring the boundaries between previously distinct 
spheres. (CRTC, 2011 a) 
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Canadian regulatory system is hopelessly unprepared for and over which it maintains 
increasingly less control, to paraphrase out-going CRTC chairman Konrad von 
Finkenstein (Pitts, 2012).  This odd situation, where a regulator is in the midst of 
losing power over that which it controls, presents what Robert McChesney has termed 
a "critical juncture", a crucial opening in the tightly woven fabric- or in the case of 
Canada a labyrinthine mesh - of the communications policy system (McChesney, 
2007, pp. 106-115).  Given the entrenched positions of the dominant actors in  the 
policy system, the innate instability of such moments presents a unique opportunity 
for political and policy reform and engagement. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the Canadian policy-making system consists of 
multiple venues of different yet overlapping responsibilities and different levels of 
accessibility.  Throughout this system there are markers of an institutionalization of 
informality that gives privileged access and influence to a small number of actors at 
the general exclusion of Canadian citizens.  It is complimented by a recognized lack 
of transparency with regard to decision-making methodology (House of Commons, 
2011 ), lack of information on basic po  licy practices, and inconsistency in public 
participation mechanisms where such mechanisms exist.  Thus, the important entry 
points for public participation in law-making are ineffective in integrating the 
concerns of citizens in an open, accessible and transparent manner. The ongoing 
convergence of communications technology that relies increasingly on the radio 
spectrum  presents a critical moment for communicative democracy.  To build or 
reform the spectrum policy system- no le_ss-than a system of social, economie and 
cultural governance - would require the informality that pervades this system to be 
brought to light.  It would require popular and political will and an interest in 
reforming not simply the spectrum policy system in the form it is often packaged in, 183 
but a holistic approach to reform that recognizes the need to rebuild this system upon 
a just foundation.  Such a holistic approach to policy reform demands that academies 
and activists expand their traditional media-centric boundaries to include the totality 
of the policy system.
93  At risk is nothing Jess than the fondamental ability of citizens 
to actively participate in democracy and to claim the power of citizenship as opposed 
that of the consumer. 
93  This includes incorporating other fields, such as copyright, which directly impact the 
communication and media system. 5. Case Study: Uruguay 
While wireless means of communication have been actively used in Uruguay since 
the early 1900s, regulation of the spectrum is stiJl very much in development.  Indeed, 
Uruguay presents a fascinating case where commercial and state-operated 
broadcasters and telecommunications companies compete with one another. 
Hundreds of community radio stations have requested licenses during a recent process 
of legalization, and potentially hundreds of other stations will continue to operate as 
"pirates."  Remarkably, Uruguay became the first country in the world with an 
entirely digitized wire-line communications infrastructure in  1997 (ANTEL, 2012). 
The cellular telephone penetration rate has increased from just 34.9% to  141.2% 
(URSEC, 2011) leap-frogging the need for a wired telephony infrastructure.  Over the 
past six years, the federal government has rolled out the One Laptop Per Child 
program  (OLPC, also known in Uruguay as Plan Ceibal) to 100% of public 
elementary students.  Wireless has become the way f01·ward, yet its users operate not 
so much in a policy vacuum, but a policy framework of porous, mobile and disparate 
form that is in constant, stuttering, evolution.  This case study of Uruguayan spectrum 
policy aims to document the practices that have led to the development of the cmTent 
system and which continue to drive it forward in the context of convergence.  It 
analyzes recent efforts to introduce formai regulatory systems and new mechanisms 
for public participation in policy-making.  I draw primarily upon secondary sources 
as guides for historical analysis while evaluation of the current system relies large! y 
upon extensive primary data gathered between 2009-2012.  Primary sources include 
parliamentary records and other documentation, and interviews undertaken with 
government mjnisters, law-makers, civil society organizations, regulators, union 
organizers, independent experts and the private sector as weil as follow-up 185 
communication with interview subjects.
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5.1 Legal frameworks and regulatory histories 
Unlike the history of communications policy-making in Canada, policy-making in 
Uruguay has not been accompanied by lengthy processes of examination and 
consultation that frame or provide an evidentiary foundation for laws and policy 
frameworks.  Instead, there is a history in which laws and Presidential decrees are 
scattered about, evidence perhaps of a law-making apparatus unable or unwilling to 
make communication a focal point.  The disjointed nature of this history, though, 
presents an opportunity to appreciate the evolution of communications policy and law 
as a narrative strongly connected to the evolution of a society as it moves into and out 
of dictatorship (1973-1985), through the neo-liberalism of the 1980s and 1990s and 
into its current process of democratization.
95  This is a phenomena that has been 
observed in severa] cases around the world (Priee et al., 2002) with Faraone noting, in 
2002, that "media reform has paralleled Uruguay's transition to democracy" (2002, p. 
222).  This chapter aims to evaluate the current state of the regulatory system in terms 
of democratie transition by assessing the ability of citizens to participate in the system 
in substantive ways. 
As with severa! other countries in the world, wired telephone systems were developed 
in Uruguay in the late 1870s. The country's first phone call was made in  1878 
(ANTEL, 2012).  In 1896, the first state telecommunications network was created by 
94  As in the case of Canada, only one private sector actor granted me an interview. This was 
conductedwith Rafael Inchausti, president of the National Association of Broadcasters of Uruguay 
(ANDEBU). 
95  Democratization of governance has been a focal point of the current government.  For example, 
the digital publication of Parliament, called "Constructing Democracy" presents itself as a tool for 
improving communication between the government and citizens. 
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Presidential decree and began to operate under the umbrella of the National Mail and 
Telegraph Directorate.  Uruguay would then join the ITU in  1903, weil ahead of both 
Canada and the United States, who joined in  1908 and 1912 respectively (International 
Telegraph Union, 1903, 1913).  In the following years, the government adopted a 
strategy of strengthening state institutions, nationalizing key private industries and 
developing the early framework for a social welfare state  (Frega, 2008).  In 1915, 
Parliament introduced a bill creating the General Mail, Telegraph  and Telephone 
Administration and granting the state a monopoly over postal, telegraph, and 
telephone service (Parlamento del Uruguay, 1915).
96  In the years immediately 
following, President José Batlle y Ord6nez introduced a reorganization of executive 
powers with the creation of the Consejo Nacional de Administraci6n (National 
Council of Administration) composed of six members of the ru ling party and three 
members of the minority party.  Under this structure, the President maintained control 
of foreign relations, national security and agriculture while the Council was 
responsible for all other domains of governance (Library of Congress, 1992; 
Rodrfguez Ayçaguer, 2008). 
In 1922, Radio Pradizabal, Uruguay's first commercial radio station, set up operations 
in downtown Montevideo (Maronna & Rico, 2007, p. 396; Maronna & Sanchez 
Vilela, 2006, p.  106).  It was quickly followed by CX14 El Espectador and Radio 
Montecarlo in 1924 (both still on the air today), and CX30 Radio Nacional in  1925 
(Maronna & Rico, 2007, p. 396).  As in the case of Canada, commercial radio 
broadcasting was born outside of any regulatory framework.  The 
96  1t is worth noting that Uruguay was quite forward-thinking in the early 1900s. For instance, this 
same bill also stipulates that children under 16 years of age may work a maximum of 6 hours per 
day (Art. 47); and workdays for women must not exceed 8 hours (Art. 48).  In case of childbirth, 
women were guaranteed 3 weeks paid Jeave before and after.  While perhaps not unique in terms 
of labour law, it is interesting to see social welfare integrated into otherwise technical policy. 187 
Radiocommunication Act was passed in 1928 and the Radiocommunication Services 
Directorate was given the task of spectrum management, although in sorne cases (it 
was not specified which) the Minister of Public Education would be involved 
(Bouissa, Curuchet, & Orcajo, 1998, p.  102; Inchausti, 2010; Parlamento del Uruguay, 
1928).  The following year, the government staked a daim to radio broadcasting with 
the creation of the public broadcaster, SODRE, which was given preferential 
treatment in the granting of frequencies, an arrangement still in place today 
(Parlamento del Uruguay, 1929).  Finally, the General Administration of State 
Electrical Plants and Telephones was created and given powers over the national 
telephone system and electrical plants.  Private telephone companies were permitted 
to continue to operate with the warning that their licenses were "precarious and 
revokable" (Parlamento del Uruguay, 1931).
97 
Times were tranquil with respect to spectrum policy from roughly 1931-1974, 
although Uruguayan history was otherwise quite tumultuous.  During this period, the 
country endured a brief dictatorship in the 1930s followed by a period of political 
reconstruction in the 1940-1950s.  A plebiscite in  1952 resulted in the creation of a 
nine-member presidential council taking the place of a singular President  (Ruiz, 
2008, p.  149).  While left-wing political parties had been active in Uruguay since at 
least the ] 920s, the political system nevertheless rem ai ned controlled by the two 
traditional parties- the Blancos and the Colorados.98  Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, the governrnent was increasingly a part of the Cold War.  Perhaps rnirroring 
global tensions, the 1960s were punctuated by regular violent episodes between ultra-
right and ultra-left groups, exernplified by the founding of the Tuparnaro guerrilla 
97  Today, commercial broadcasting licenses are known to be "precarious and revokable", depending 
ultimately on the political climate. 
98  In Canadian terms, the Blancos are similar to the Conservatives and the Colorados are similar to 
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movement and the formation of the national central union (Ruiz, 2008, pp.  140-160). 
In 1967, the Uruguayan government embarked on a process of economie reform 
designed by the International Monetary Fund and this first attempt at liberalization 
was met by resistance from organized labour.  Violent reaction on the part of the state 
(including torture) led to further instability (Ruiz, 2008, pp. 140-166).  It can 
therefore be assumed.  that during these four decades, communication policy fell by the 
wayside while successive governments focused on ostensibly more fundamental 
matters of economie and political stability.  A similar history can be seen in Argentina 
where communications practices and industries developed with little policy design or 
guidance and where recent political reform has also been accompanied by substantive 
reform in communications and media policy (Loreti, 2011; Mastrini, 2005). 
In 1974, one year into Uruguay's 13-year long dictatorship (1973-1985), the 
telecommunications corporation ANTEL was created as a state monopoly (Alonso et 
al., 2010; Parlamento del Uruguay, 1974).  The following year, a new broadcasting act 
was introduced, replacing the Radiocommunication Act of 1928 and defining the first 
normative framework for broadcast licensing.  This law, still in effect today, provides 
the presidency with the exclusive power to grant and revoke broadcast licenses 
(Parlamento del Uruguay, 1977).  The exact mechanisms by which this might occur 
remain non-codified and thus largely subject to the interpretation of each President. 
In the 1980s, the Presidency further concentrated power over the spectrum, first by 
creating the National Communications Directorate within the orbit of the Department 
of National Defence as a specialized entity for spectrum management.  This was done 
by Presidential decree in 1984, shortly before the end of the dictatorship (Alonso et 
al., 2010; Parlamento del Uruguay, 1984).  Shortly after, on June 12, 1985, the Senate 189 
unanimously approved legislation that would move the National Communications 
Directorate within ANTEL and away from direct Presidential influence.  Ultimately, 
the legislation was vetoed by the President, assuring that the spectrum would remain 
firmi y within the grasp of the Presidency, both in terms of technical management and 
the granting of licenses (Bouissa et al., 1998, p.  103).  The following 25 years would 
see responsibility for managing the spectrum relocated three times and power over it 
more centralized and rigidly defined. 
While the political establishment strengthened its hold on the radio spectrum, a 
variety of social movements in the 1980s began to collaborate and organize around 
the theme of communication.  This period bas been noted as the origin of Uruguay's 
community media movement and contributed to the formation of numerous 
community newspapers and radio stations (Bouissa enrl-:-;-1998; Light, 2012a; 
Robledo, 1998; San Martin, 2008, pp. 206-209).  The year 1989 saw the passage of a 
law that today serves, in part, as legal grounding for independent media and 
communications movements by declaring that in order to satisfy a citizen's defined 
right to free expression, everyone has the right to "found a medium of 
communication".  That said, while the Press Act of 1989 concerns itself with liberty 
of expression and freedom of the press, it also codified defamation as a criminal, as 
opposed to civil, offence and defines it in such a broad manner as to be potentially 
widded as a tool of censorship  (G6mez, 2005, sec. 2.1; Parlamento del Uruguay, 
1989).  The same legislation ensuring free speech also places strict limits on it, where 
the ultimate penalty is imprisonment. 
The concentration of power over wireless communications continued into the 1990s 
against the backdrop of privatization efforts underway in Uruguay and elsewhere in 190 
the region.  In 1990, a Presidential decree declared that ali wireless communication be 
Iicensed directly by the presidency (Alonso et al., 2010; Parlamento del Uruguay, 
1990).  This solidified an enduring practice whereby the regulator assures proper 
technical operating procedure while the presidency decides whether or not a license 
should be granted.  Then, in 1991, the State Corporations Act established a technical 
definition for telecommunications and provided the presidency with direct decision-
making powers over this broad domain as well (Alonso et al., 2010; Parlamento del 
Uruguay, 1991 ).  Telecommunications, in this document, is defined as: "ali 
transmission, emission or reception of signs, signais, texts, images, sounds or 
information of any sort by wire, radio, optical media or other electromagnetic 
systems" (Pa:rlamento del Uruguay, 1991 ).  Somewhat similar to the power 
relationships present in the Canadian spectrum policy system, enormous power is 
concentrated in  the executive branch of government.  While citizens are afforded the 
right to found communications media in order to facilitate free expression, the bounds 
of this free expression are qui te limited.  This tension, between a powerful executive 
branch that treats rights in modest if not contradictory ways, and a particula:rly 
empowered citizenry, who demand explicit recognition of rights while being willing 
to settle for Jess, is present throughout the recent history of communication policy-
making in Uruguay. 
While citizens may be empowered, this has not necessarily impeded efforts by the 
government to introduce private market reforms into the communication system.  A 
prime example of this is the introduction of cellular telephony.  With the introduction 
of the 1991  State Corporations Act, a popular referendum was organized by citizens, 
ultimately rejecting this new law.  Nevertheless, the government still sought to open 
up the telecommunications market to competition.  In 1992, following the defeat of 191 
the State Corporations Act, Ante] quietly created a secret subsidiary for cellular 
telephony and awarded a private contract to Aviatar S.A. (Jater called Movicom), 
today owned by Telefonica, one of the biggest multinational telecommunications 
companies.  This, however, was illegal and the arrangement was not made public. 
"The public face of cellular telephony was ANTEL, but in reality it was ali Movicom. 
Two years later, Antel began to offer cellular telephone service of its own.under the 
name Ancel.  The general public thought there were two separate companies and there 
were, except that juridically there was only one." (Riccardi, 2010).  Eventually this 
arrangement ended and Movicom became Uruguay's first private telecommunications 
provider, publicly breaking the state monopoly on telecommunications against the 
will of the public. 
The new millennium has been a time of broad regulatory reform in Uruguay with 
successive governments undertaking efforts to create  regulation and legislation in 
communication policy, which had been consistently Jacking in Uruguayan society 
(Riccardi, 2010).  Communications regulation be  gan with the creation of the current 
regulator, the Unidad Reguladora de Servicios de Comunincaci6n (URSEC), in 2001 
(Parlamento del Uruguay, 2001 ).  Staff charged with regulating the spectrum were 
shifted from the Department of National Defence to this new entity and it gradually 
gained funding, infrastructure and responsibility, including control of the spectrum 
and the licensing of telecommunications undertakings (Alonso et al., 2010; Budé, 
2010; Parlamento del Uruguay, 2003a, 2003b).99  Due to the constitutional 
_ -organization of the Uruguayan state, ail regulatory bodies must ultimately fall within 
the orbit of the presidency and for this reason it is impossible to have a regulator 
99  Every in-coming government must work within the preceding government's budget for one year 
while negotiating a new budget for the following five years. It can therefore take quite a long time 
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directly under the control of Parliament.  In the case of URSEC, it is directly 
responsible to the (MIEM (with regards to communications regulation) and the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (with regards to regulation of the postal service) 
(Budé, 2010).  The creation of the regulator did not necessarily mean th at regulatory 
activities were undertaken with immediate vigour.  In sorne respects, there was 
actually a loosening of policy application, especially with respect to unlicensed radio 
broadcasting.  Before the creation of URSEC, unlicensed community radio 
broadcasters had been subject to organized intimidation and forced to operate 
clandestinely.  With the development of a more extensive regulatory apparatus, these 
stations gradually found themselves tolerated by the regulator (Light, 201 1  ). 
While the Broadcasting Act of 1977 provides a general regulatory framework for 
radio and television, no further policy had been developed around it until quite 
recently.  In 2008, Daniel Martinez, then MIEM, decided to begin developing a more 
elaborate communications policy framework.  This resulted in a Presidential decree 
that, for the first time, provided a basic procedure for licensing commercial radio 
stations, (Parlamento del Uruguay, 2008a) but nothing more (Martfnez, 2010). 
Finally, through a lengthy process initiated in 2005 which ended in 2010, community 
radio broadcasting was legalized, resulting in a policy framework that is uniquely 
elaborate in the Uruguayan context (Light, 2012a).
100  The Community Radio Act of 
2007 created a volunteer-based regulatory commission charged with overseeing the 
Iicensing and regulation of this form of media.  The Honorary Community Radio 
Commission -_known as the CHARC- is supposed to be participatory and 
representative.
1 01 To fill this mandate it, includes members from a variety of social 
movements, the university sectors, and different sectors of the government 
100 This process is analyzed la ter in this chapter. 
101 CHARC stands for Comisiôn honoraria asesor de radiodifusiôn comunitaria. 193 
(Parlamento del Uruguay, 2007).  There are no representatives from the private sector. 
Finally, a Presidential decree issued in 2010 reserved "at !east one-third of the radio 
spectrum in every locality, on all analogue and digital frequency bands, and ali 
broadcast modalities" for community broadcasting (Parlamento del Uruguay, 2010). 
Part of the broader work informing the original proposed legislation (AMARC-ALC, 
2008), this spectrum reservation was either removed from mode! legislation before 
proposai to Parliament or during debate and revision. If  it had been included in the 
2007 Community Radio Act, the act itself would have sure! y met political resistance. 
Without the inclusion of the spectrum reservation clause, the Act essentially satisfied 
the most powerful parties involved.  Reinforcing political support on the left, the Act 
formally recognized community radio broadcasting.  For those opposed to pirate 
broadcasters, the Act imposed a regulatory structure upon formerly unregulated 
broadcasters and mandated the regulator to shutdown those operating outside the law 
(G6mez, 2010).  The decree reserving the spectrum was discretely made two years 
later, on December 30, 2010, by a new President acting, in part, on counsel of the 
National Director of Telecommunications, Gustavo G6mez.
1 02  G6mez, in a former 
activist role, had been responsible for the passage of the 2007 Community Radio Act. 
That said, it is difficult to discern whether this spectrum reservation is a serious 
proposition or political posturing.  As of 2012, no transition framework had been 
created to assure the availability of this "third" of broadcast frequencies. Ultimately, 
the transition would require a re-writing of the Broadcasting Act of 1977 which 
entitles commercial broadcasters to "life-term" licenses. 
While the communication and media infrastructures in Uruguay are weil developed, 
the idea of regulating them has never qui  te taken hold and is thus in a perpetuai state 
102 The mon th of January is vacation time in Uruguay and ali government functions either close or 
slow dawn.  Thus, any complaints would have been difficult to make in any official manner. 194 
of invention.  Communications policy-making capacity has been particularly sporadic, 
relying either on Parliament or the presidency for occasional bursts of legislation and 
direction. While technical regulation of the spectrum shifted from the Ministry of 
National Defence to URSEC in 2001, in 2005 spectrum policy matters were still a 
defence matter.  As a way of resolving this quickly, the office of the National Director 
of Telecommunications was created within the Ministry of Defence in 2005 to 
develop a broad range of communications policy as a civil, rather than defence, matter 
(Ponce de Leon, 2010).  Demonstrating a willingness on the part of the government to 
seriously address communication policy-making, it nonetheless was severely under-
resourced and ineffective during its first three years of existence (Martfnez, 2010; 
Ponce de Leon, 2010).  An initially proposed office of four was reduced to two during 
budget negotiations and it was decided that the post would remain essentially 
powerless while the Minister of Industry, Energy and Mining worked to introduce the 
idea of telecommunications po licy into the broader political culture.  This provided 
what was believed to be a necessary period of adaptation.  According to Martfn Ponce 
de Leon, then president of OSE (the state water company) and a director of Antel, 
creating an immediately empowered policy-maker immediately "would be like killing 
them" because of the political pressure.  "Sending somebody to do nothing wouldn't 
be worth it.  Sending somebody to get something done, they're not going to last" 
(Ponce de Leon, 2010).
103  Gradually the political climate began to adjust to the idea 
and Parliament awarded the National Telecommunications Directorate (DINA  TEL) 
the four original positions it had sought.  Gustavo Gomez, former head of legislation 
and policy for the World Association of Community Broadcasters- Latin America 
and Caribbean (AMARC-ALC), was appointed National Director of 
Telecommunications in early 2010.  Previously the driving force behind the 
103 Ultimately this is what occurred and Gustavo G6mez was replaced in  September 2011 (Franco, 
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legalization of community radio, G6mez was then given the task of developing a 
comprehensive legal framework for the Uruguay communication and media system. 
In the interim, G6mez had been advising the MIEM on how to develop and 
implement more comprehensive communication policy (Martfnez, 2010). 
In May 2010, G6mez stated that two centrallaws were needed: "one for 
telecommunications and a law for audiovisual communication services.  The first will 
regulate the entirety of the telecommunications infrastructure and the second will 
regulate the services that utilize this infrastructure" (G6mez, 2010).  In July of that 
year, the DINATEL struck a multisectorial committee to undertake the collective 
development of a potential audiovisual communication services law (Comité Técnico 
Consultivo, 2010).  Following a lengthy process at times threatened with Presidential 
veto, current MIEM Roberto Kreimerman expects a law to be proposed in  the first 
half of 2012 (Rodrfguez, 2012). 
5.2 The state of the spectrum in Uruguay 
Although the spectrum has been used for communication in Uruguay for close to 100 
years, only recently have academies and members of civil society begun to document 
its history, ownership, and regulatory practices.  In 2003, Luis Stolovich et al. 
researched the five families that dominated ownership of the Uruguayan media 
including the press, radio and television (Barreiro, Lima, Romano, & Stolovich, 
2004).  Later work in that decade analyzed the regulation of the spectrum in relation 
to  regulatory practices and concentration of ownership (Lanza &  Goldaracena, 
2009).  Further scholarship focuses on Uruguayan media concentration in comparison 
with other countries in Latin America (Becerra & Mastrini, 2010), and ownership of 
commercial television (Lanza & Buquet, 2011).  URSEC, Uruguay's communications 196 
regulator, only began to centrally collect documentation regarding the ownership of 
the entities it li censes in 2009 with the passage of Resolution 717/009 (URSEC, 
2009).  While this data is available for public use, the regulator provides minimal 
analysis of it, at !east for public consumption.  The Canadian example in the previous 
chapter relied on extensive public data to quantify  the distribution of spectrum 
licenses and framed this distribution as representative of the access of certain actors 
to the policy system.  The current discussion relies primarily upon the analysis of 
others who have undertaken the difficult task of aggregating regulator data and 
tracing the ownership of nu merous companies. 
Today, Uruguay has three cellular carriers.  State-owned Ante! accounts for 46% of 
the market, Movistar (owned by Spanish multi-national Telef6nica) claims 38%, and 
AM Wireless, known as Claro and property of Mexican businessman Carlos Slim, 
maintains 16% of the market.  There are no standard procedures for gran ting cellular 
telephony licenses and each entity received their license in  a different way.  Ante!, as 
discussed earlier, has the exclusive and democratically determined mandate to provide 
telephony in Uruguay.  Nevertheless, it contracted a private company then known as 
Aviatar S.A. in  1993 to construct a cellular network.  Once Ante! developed its own 
network, Aviatar S.A. was purchased by Telef6nica and a second cellular carrier 
(Movicom) was given legal status.  AM Wireless entered in 2004 when the 
government decided to further open the cellular telephony market (Riccardi, 2010). 
The number of licenses held by each is not public information.  In terms of coverage, 
however, Ante! covers 95% of the country (El Espectador, 2012).  lt is assumed that_ -
the other two cellular providers have acquired the necessary licenses to offer similar 
service. 197 
Since the return of democracy in  1985, commercial radio licenses have been awarded 
by the President in exchange for political favours and license attribution has been far 
from transparent (Lanza, 2010; Lanza &  Goldaracena, 2009; Martfnez, 2010). 
Broadcast licenses can be considered particularly complex political tools as they are 
granted forever but can be taken away at anytime, ail at the discretion of the President. 
While this practice was ushered in during the dictatorship, no democratie government 
has attempted to change it.  Past research has documented the attribution of 30-40 
radio licenses during the Lacalle government of the 1990s (Lanza & Goldaracena, 
2009, p. 240) and more than 50 licenses by the second Sanguinetti government (2000-
2005) (Lanza &  Goldaracena, 2009, p. 241; Lanza & G6mez, 2007).  Today, there are 
271  licensed commercial radio stations compared to 9 licenses held by the public 
broadcaster, SODRE, and 92 community radio stations (URSEC, 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c, 2012d).  Actions of the current government have shown modest reform in this 
area.  In addition to introducing legislation legalizing community radio, the 
Presidency revoked four radio licenses from the Rupeni<:'in family and charged their 
company with income tax fraud.  Two other radio stations also saw their licenses 
revoked during investigation by the Justice Department (Lanza & Goldaracena, 2009, 
p. 246).  However, there is also suspicion that the Frente Amplio has been co-opted 
and, in terms of communication policy, is operating like previous right-wing 
governments.  According to investigations undertaken by Edison Lanza, civil society 
organization Grupo Medios y Sociedad (GMS) and independent daily paper La 
Diaria, Mexican media magnet Angel Gonzalez has spent the past four years 
establishing a radio network, in clear violation of the foreign ownership limits stated 
in Uruguay's 1977 Broadcasting Act.  In 2008, the Presidency authorized the transfer 
of ten licenses to Gonzalez (Lanza & Goldaracena, 2009, pp. 245-247).  More 
recently, Gonzalez was documented meeting with the MIEM and has shown an ability 198 
to side-step Uruguayan foreign ownership laws by collaborating with the government 
and obfuscating his legal arrangement with the radio stations in question through 
creating various contracts and power-sharing arrangements (Rodriguez, 2012).  A 
similar strategy was used previously by cable television companies to disguise the 
creation of an oligopoly that has monopolized most of Uruguay's television market 
(Garcia Rubio, 1994). 
Recently, Lanza and Buquet (2011) documented the extent to which three 
corporations, ali involved in  multiple industries, have come to dominate television 
broadcasting, including over-the-air, satellite, and cable.  These three companies, 
known by the  ir television channels (  4, 10, and 12) have, over the years, developed an 
elaborate network of over-the-air and cable television broadcasters over which they 
have either direct or indirect corporate control allowing them to centralize content 
production.  Through a web of partnerships they control 95.5% of the television 
market in the country (Lanza & Buquet, 2011, p. 23), own numerous radio stations 
and are beginning to expand into the online content market (Lanza & Buquet, 2011, 
pp. 16--21). 
The state of the spectrum in Canada and Uruguay is fairly si mil ar, po  licy aside. In 
both cases, a false sense of diversity can be observed through simple statistical 
evaluation.  Things don't look that bad.  When one strips away the facade, however, 
the domination of the policy system, and thus of the communication system more 
broadly, is unavoidable.  In each case, smokescreens are mounted, seemingly in an 
attempt to make the task of the observer that much more difficult.  The remainder of 
this chapter will take a deep look inside the Uruguayan spectrum policy system as it 
stands today. 199 
5.3 Law-making and participation 
Laws in Uruguay originate in Parliament or by Presidential decree but there are 
certain mechanisms that aliow for oversight and intervention on the part of the 
electorate. 
104  Elected representatives from both houses may propose laws th at are then 
studied in committee.  If both houses agree on content, it is sent to the presidency for 
final approval.  If  they do not agree, Parliament must meet in a general assembly to 
coliectively debate and come to final agreement on the content.  The President may 
veto ali or part of any law, but may be defeated by a vote of 3/5 of the Parliament. 
Presidential decrees are made by the President in consultation with his cabinet.  They 
may only be overturned by the citizenry through referendum or plebiscite. 
As in the Canadian case, proposed legislation in Uruguay is studied by specialized 
parliamentary committees of each house.  Committees do not necessarily publish a 
cali for comments or a notice of the hearing in advance.  However, civil society 
organizations typically are in tune with what is happening legislatively and will often 
request an invitation (Yanes, 2010).  Legislators will also ask people and 
organizations to attend.  The multiple political parties that compose each commission 
must ultimately agree upon which witnesses to invite (Abdala, 2010). 
At the constitutionallevel, citizens are provided with an important amount of 
oversight power in the form of plebiscites and referenda.  Often treated equivocally, in 
this case they refer to two distinct political procedures (Urruty Navatta, 2009). 
Specifically, a plebiscite refers to a pronouncement on the part of the electorate 
concerning the approval or disapproval of a constitutional change.  Constitutional 
reforms may originate through a number of Parliament-centric processes, but must 
104 Bath houses are elected.  The law-making process is mapped out on the Uruguayan parliament 
website: http://mi.parlamento.gub.uy/organigrama.html. 200 
have ultimate approval from the electorate.  A referendum, in  the Uruguayan context, 
refers to a popular vote that may alter or annul a new law, enacted either by 
Parliament or by Presidential decree, within one year of its initial approval (Urruty 
Navatta, 2009).  In the case of constitutional change, signatures must be collected 
from 10% of the electoral body while the threshold is 25% for laws (Gallardo, 2006, 
p. 461 ).  Both mechanisms have been used to various degrees and have a lengthy 
history.  In 1980, the Uruguayan dictatorship held a plebiscite on constitutional 
reforms that would have given the military absolute veto power over ail government 
policy.  It was soundly defeated and this defeat was in part responsible for the end of 
the dictatorship and the transition back to democracy (Library of Congress, 1992).  A 
citizens referendum in 1989 approved a law granting amnesty to ail involved in armed 
conflict during the dictatorship period while giving the President the power to 
investigate illegal acts during this period (Gallardo, 2006, p. 462).  Another 
referendum was held in 1992, successfully annulling the then-President's plan to 
massively privatize state services through passage of the State Corporations Act of 
1991.  This made Uruguay "the only country in the world that has been consulted on 
full-scale privatization and which has rejected the possibility by referendum" (Barrett 
et al., 2008, p.  101).  In 2003, the government introduced legislation that would have 
opened up the state monopoly on fuel to broad competition and joint ventures with 
foreign partners, but this, too, was overruled by a citizen-initiated referendum (Rilla, 
2006, pp. 339-340).  Most recently, a collection of civil society groups successfully 
organized a plebiscite that effectively inserted the human right to water into the 
national constitution with the assurance that it may never be privatized (Santos & 
Villareal, 2005, p.  173).  Thus, while there exists a strong executive with veto power 
and a strong law-making structure in the body of Parliament, legal, social and political 
structures permit the electorate to play the ultimate role of decision-maker, albeit with 201 
considerable effort.  The mechanisms that have safe-guarded a strong welfare state in 
Uruguay have in Canada only been adopted in efforts to scale back the welfare state 
(D. D. Barney & Laycock, 1999)  and through constitutional changes affecting the 
composition of the Canadian state and the re1ationship between the provinces and the 
federal government, namely the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 and the Quebec 
referendum of 1995. 
Based on my interviews with key informants and the general strategy adopted by the 
Frente Amplio government, it can be safely assumed that the laws underlying 
Uruguay's radio spectrum are ripe for revision (G6mez, 2010; Kaplûn, 2009, 2010; 
Martfnez, 2010).  Indeed, many of the civil society organizations I interviewed 
consider the long-standing broadcasting act to be an illegitimate remnant of the 
dictatorship.  The legislative process that produced Uruguay's most recent spectrum-
oriented law, the Community Radio Act of 2007, can th us be seen as the beginning of 
a process of reform.  Two further processes, the development of the Audiovisual 
Services Act and the recent public consultation on digital television held in November 
2011  (DINA  TEL, 2012) represent the continuation of this reform.  Ali three processes 
will be analyzed in the following section considering the future of communication 
policy-making in Uruguay. 
5.3.1 The·Community Broadcasting Act of 2007 
Community radio broadcasting in Uruguay began largely in the 1980s following the 
end of the dictatorship and served as a common ground for various social movements 
working towards rebuilding the social fabric of Uruguayan society.  Un  til the election 
of the left-wing Frente Amplio government in 2004, these stations were regularly 
persecuted by a government regulator (from 2001  onward this was URSEC) that often 1 
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closed them down and confiscated their equipment (Bouissa et al., 1998; Curuchet, 
Girola, & Orcajo, 2006; Robledo, 1998).  During the presidential campaign of 2004, 
the Frente Amplio stated that it would legalize community radio.  The process, 
however, dragged on until 2008.  The inability of the  government to quickly enact 
new legislation disappointed sorne advocates who believed there was a limited 
window within which it would be possible to act (Kaplûn, 2005).  However, Daniel 
Martinez, parliamentarian, leader of the Socialist Party and MIEM from 2008-2010, 
believes the delay was the result of an over-loaded Parliament.  "Never has there been 
a legislative period in the history of Uruguay th at had as many laws approved and that 
has worked as muchas this previous one" (Martînez, 2010).  Examining the 
parliamentary record, one can see that community radio legislation was introduced 
roughly eight months after the new government came into power in March 2005.  It 
was then examined by two parliamentary committees between November 17, 2005 and 
December 11, 2007, and even tu ally gained Presidential approval December 22, 2007. 
It was studied in committee over 22 individual sessions, 16 of which included 
testimony from a variety of witnesses  (Parlamento del Uruguay, 2012).  Analyzing 
the consultation process and its ability to integrate a diverse variety of stakeholders 
will help to establish the leve] to which this process was successful as a step toward 
the political goal of "democratization", while also providing an ethical template 
against which future law- and policy-making processes can be measured. 
Witness Category  ·  Number of Witnesses 
Civil society  16 
- Regulators  8 
Private sector ·  8 
Human rights law  5 
University sector  5 
Table 5.1: Community radio law hearing participation, Uruguay, 2005-2007 203 
The composition of the witness pool and the testimony presented demonstrates a 
number of things. First, while civil society organizations represent the largest number 
of intervenors, these groups and their input are far from homogenous.  As one would 
expect, the two associations representing community radio stations were present. 
One, AMARC-Uruguay, supported legislation wh ile the other, Ecos, was opposed. 
105 
Other groups included Uruguay's central union PIT-CNT; the Evangelical Christian 
Community Radio Network; and the Uruguayan Institute of Legal and Social Studies 
(IELSUR), a group of lawyers that organizes around human rights and has 
participated in  the development of various proposed laws (Prats, 201 0).  Three 
organizations of commercial radio broadcasters intervened in opposition.  One 
commercial broadcasting representative, during an interview, displayed extreme 
hostility towards community broadcasting, claiming that radio is a "service of public 
interest" and only professional broadcasters can satisfy such a need (Inchausti, 
2010).
1 06  (That said, "professional" is self-proclaimed by commercial broadcasters 
and there are no colleges or universities in Uruguay that offer training for 
broadcasting.)  Often, commercial broadcasting organizations sent two to five 
representatives while civil society was represented by much smaller numbers, 
frequently just one person per group.  Therefore, while commercial groups 
demonstrated "strength in numbers", civil society organizations provided a greater 
variety of perspectives that were nonetheless oriented in support of the proposed 
legislation.  In addition, the entire process was "book-ended" by very specifie types of 
legal counsel.  Towards the beginning, in  2006, the Commissioner of the Inter-
-
105 Since their formation in the 1990s, ECOS has consfstently argued that the entire media system 
should be overhauled. They opposed any regulation of community radio in advance of this 
process. 
106 My interview with Rafael Inchausti of ANDEBU did not consider the question of community 
broadcasting.  His commentary, which takes up much of the 90-minute interview, occurred 
independently of my line of questioning. Other commercial radio groups refused interview 
requests, stating that Inchausti represented their views. 204 
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American 
States, Victor Abramovich, informed the committee that the law would not create a 
precedent for the commission.  This consideration was important as certain laws 
adopted in member states may create legal precedence for other members of the 
IACHR, obliging them to adopt similar legislation (Loreti, 2011 ).  The same day, the 
UNESCO Chair for Freedom of Expression, Analia Eledias, informed the committee 
on how the proposed law could foster freedom of expression.  Towards the end of the 
entire committee process, externallegal counsel was invited to provide judgement on 
the integration of this law into the greater legal framework and a number of 
international human rights organizations appeared. (Parlamento del Uruguay, 2012). 
The Community Radio Act of 2007 was quite substantial. It officialized a previously 
illegal communication act and created a new and participatory regulatory structure. 
By creating the CHARC, the law purposely extended the regulatory system into the 
domain of civil society.  While it is still the President who grants licenses, the act of 
regulation itself is no longer exclusively in the hands of the state. 
Examination of the parliamentary record and interviews with third parties 
demonstrate the existence of a productive and respected extra-parliamentarian system 
of legislative development.  The original Community Radio Act was crafted by a 
group of civil society organizations including AMARC-Uruguay, the Uruguayan 
Press Association (APU), IELSUR, the Universidad de la Reptiblica, and the 
Universidad de la Republica communication studies program (Imaz, 2010).  It 
benefited from the legal-expertise and coordination of Edison Lanza, law and 
communications professor, journalist and member of APU and Gustavo G6mez.  Its 
success was also the result of a multi-pronged strategy that included an international 
study on democratie broadcasting legislation and a series of public workshops 205 
organized with the cooperation of the government and the international community 
(AMARC-ALC, 2008; Lanza, 2010; Light, 2011).  This pattern was repeated with 
Uruguay's recent Access to Information Act of 2008, with Lanza again playing a 
central role (Lanza, 2010; Parlamento del Uruguay, 2008b) and displays a marked 
capacity for civil society to develop legislation; a recognition, perhaps, on the part of 
legislators that their law-making capacity is limited; and, according to Daniel 
Martinez, the ability of legislators to incorporate the work and viewpoints of civil 
society into legislation (2010). 
5.3.2 The Honorary Community Radio Commission 
The Honorary Community Radio Commission (CHARC) was created by the 
Community Radio Act of 2007.  It's purpose is consultative- it reviews applications 
by community radio stations and then recommends to the presidency whether or not 
to grant li censes.  The CHARC only recommends the approval of licenses; it does not 
have the power to shut down unlicensed broadcasters (Prats, 2010).  The initial work 
of the Commission consisted of processing 412 applications following the passage of 
the law, a census of currently operating stations and a cali for applications (Light, 
2012a).  In ad vance of the 2009 election, it recommended 38 of these with the intent 
to recommend a total of 84 (G6mez, 2010).
107  It currently has nine members 
including representatives from the following organizations: the Minister of Industry, 
Energy and Mining; the Minister of Education and Culture; Parliament; AMARC-
Uruguay; Ecos; IELSUR; APU; the private university sector; and the Universidad de 
la Repûblica.  Ali members are permanent except for those held by AMARC-Uruguay 
and Ecos in recognition that the community radio movement and its representative 
bodies may change (Prats, 2010).  A remarkable integration of a recently clandestine 
107 It is forbidden for the president to issue broadcast licenses within 6 months before and 6 months 
following an election. 206 
and outlawed community into a regulatory body, the CHARC would appear, 
according to Gustavo Gômez, to be an exemplary mode! due to its participatory 
design (2010).  Given the preceding analysis of URSEC, how does the CHARC 
function on the inside and what does this mean for both the democratie project of this 
regulatory ex periment and the general effort of the government to "democratize"? 
The CHARC was proposed and created as a volunteer organization with no budgetary 
structure, the strategy being "to take advantage of political conditions to create a tool, 
a defective tool but a tool ali the same" (Lanza, 2010).  Lack of budgetary resources 
seems to be the root of severa! other problems.  While URSEC provided the 
commission with a meeting place, it was given no human or material resources. 
Eventually it was given the use of a telephone and computer.  While one member 
believes it imperative that the commission be able to personally visit stations before 
approving applications (and even did so on his own time), no vehicle nor travel funds 
have been put at the CHARC's disposai (Orcajo, 201 0).  Members also spoke to me of 
being buried under applications and subject to direct political pressure from elected 
politicians whose constituents had applied for licenses.  As of May 2012, the situation 
had not changed. 
Most of the burden has been shouldered by a few  members as participation by state 
and university actors has been poor.  Parliament never appointed a representative; the 
Minister of Education and Culture representative has never attended a meeting; and 
IELSUR and the private university sector seldom participate.  Conclusions of active 
members demonstrate that what for sorne may be considered a "proof of concept" has 
been undertaken as a labour of love.  That said, in either case it has reached its limits. 
For Edison Lanza, it is impossible to create any sort of institutionalization without 207 
financial resources (Lanza, 2010).  Oscar Orcajo described the situation as 
"intolerable" and believes that the fondamental ability to satisfy the demands of the 
Community Radio Act are at risk.  The Jack of participation on the part of 
organizations that fought to attain their positions on the commission also creates 
problems of legitimacy and transparency (Orcajo, 2010).  Martin Prats, chair of the 
CHARC, explained that this situation was not unique to community broadcasting and 
that honorary commissions had been invoked by laws concerning other areas as weil 
(Prats, 2010).  Here we find the skeleton of a bold proposition for civil society 
integration in regulatory reform and a group of individuals exhausted by an enormous 
effort as the literai cogs of democratie reform. 
5.4 Ongoing experiments in policy reform 
Following the passage of the Community Radio Act of 2007 and the appointment of 
Gustavo G6mez as National Director of Telecommunications, two further processes 
of policy reform have been undertaken, one of which has been completed.  Each of 
these efforts is central to the Uruguayan government's strategy regarding convergence 
in that they address critical points of physical and legal infrastructure and the future 
of spectrum management. 
5.4.1 The Audiovisual Communication Services Act 
The Technical Consultative Committee for a new Audiovisual Communication 
Services Law was convened by the National Telecommunications Directorate 
(DINATEL) in July 2010.  The membership was quite diverse and composed of 15 
private individuals, each from a broad range of private, political and university 
groups.  Gustavo G6mez was the only state representative.  Gabriel Kapun, 
communications professor at the Universidad de la Republica del Uruguay, was the 208 
committee chair. 
108  Telecommunications corporations were not represented, although 
Sutel, the union of ANTEL, was.  The committee was initiated as a forum of 
discussion amongst people of diverse opinions as an exploratory first step towards 
developing legislation.  The committee's final report clearly states that differences in 
opinion between members were to be "treated in  a climate of dialogue and respect" 
(Comité Técnico Consultivo, 2010, p. 2).  The committee met 15 times over a period 
of four months and its general theme of discussion, immediately set by G6mez, was 
"how to guarantee diversity and pluralism in the media: contributions to the revision 
and reform of the Broadcasting Act (of 1977) in Uruguay" (Comité Técnico 
Consultivo, 2010, p. 2).  The goal was to determine how togo about developing a 
legal framework that encompasses telecommunications, television, and radio 
broadcasting.  Given the high level of media concentration in Uruguay, recent changes 
in media law in neighbouring Argentin  a (Lore  ti, 2011 ), and the closeness of actors in 
both countries media reform movements (Lanza, 2010), diversity and pluralism can 
only be brought about through the introduction and safeguard of new and independent 
media actors. 
As with the 2007 Community Radio Act, discussion here was framed by international 
standards for freedom of expression.  Through discussions of the attribution of 
frequencies, it was decided that adjudication procedures must be "competitive, public, 
just and transparent, assuring equal opportunity and without discrimination of any 
sort".  It was further decided that, in competitive applications, the central evaluative 
element should be the "communicational proposition" and that economies should 
play a small role in application review, as this could li mit the possibility of new 
108 The heads of departments, schools, faculties, etc. in Uruguay often play important roles in bringing 
the expertise developed inside academia into other venues. 209 
entrants.
109  It was also noted that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 
(IAHRC) considers spectrum auctions to be "anti-democratic" (Comité Técnico 
Consultivo, 2010, p. 4) again displaying respect for the ethical standards put forward 
by this international body.  This is important and appears to demonstrate a desire by 
the policy-maker to include a broad range of actors in the development of a legislative 
framework in parallel with internationally recognized standards of justice.  However, 
the complexity of this task and the incongruities of the powers at play can be seen in 
the composition of this committee, namely the exclusion of telecommunications 
providers and the inclusion of private sector actors who have made statements 
contrary to this goal (see the previous footnote concerning Inchausti). 
As noted earlier, the media and communications system in Uruguay is highly 
concentrated in the hands of very few private corporations and there is a high level of 
cross-ownership between broadcast media and the press.  Therefore, an audiovisual 
communication services law would need to address this situation.  Ultimately, the 
committee agreed that a "reasonable equilibrium" should be established between the 
public, private, and community media sectors, again mirroring the spirit of the 
Community Radio Act of 2007.  In order to satisfy this standard, limits would need to 
be imposed on the concentration currently visible in the private sector and the 
committee suggested that UNESCO's media development indicators be utilized as a 
model of reference (Comité Técnico Consultivo, 2010, p. 5; Unesco, 2008).  To this 
effect, UNESCO's indicators advise the creation of laws to prevent monopoly 
domination of the media and monopoly cross-ownership.  UNESCO also 
recommends laws that force divestment in order to neutralize existing concentration 
109 This line of enquiry was not developed any further by the committee but would ideally include 
subsidies of sorne sort to assure that new actors can focus on facilitating communication rather 
than on capital accumulation. --------- ~ ., 
i 
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(Unesco, 2008, pp. 33-36).  Based on the incorporation of Jegitimate expert views 
embodied in international human rights bodies into the law-making process around 
the 2007 Community Radio Act, the incorporation of UNESCO's indicators do not 
necessarily imply a Jack of ability to create domestic standards.  To the contrary, this 
practice demonstrates a very sophisticated and engaged approach to creating such 
standards. 
The Audiovisual Communication Services Act has not y  et, as of June 2012, been 
introduced in Parliament.  Should it become law, it will be, in part, the result of the 
discussions presented above and will be subject to further examination and debate. 
While too early to evaluate the ultimate role of the consultative committee, at the very 
least it has proposed a new space for debate and exploration while serving as an 
opportunity for groups who may often be opposed to one another to work collectively 
toward consensus.  This was done in earnest, over severa! meetings and over a lengthy 
period of time.  The choice to exclude telecommunications corporations, both private 
and public, from this consultative group may show a determination on the part of the 
policy-maker (DINA  TEL) to consider these entities primarily as providers of 
communication infrastructure, and an understanding that the presence of such 
industrial giants would surely affect the ability of a group of small businesses and 
civil society organizations to work together.  Likewise, the absence of law-makers 
ensures that the process is one that will inform the subsequent law-making process 
rather than being the table around which the law is written.  However, the choice to 
exclude these powerful actors may also demonstrate an effort by the National Director 
of Telecommunication to begin to solidify political power of his own among more 
familiar faces.  While the committee demonstrates sorne general consultative 
potential, it is ultimately quite limited and, politics aside, should be seen more as a 211 
tool of orientation than a form of public, democratie and representative consultation 
that would necessarily include the general public as opposed to a set of actors chosen 
by the policy-maker.  That said, forging persona! bonds and encouraging constructive 
debate among typically opposing forces can also be seen as a political strategy aimed 
at avoiding conflict at a later date.  Ultimately, a bill of sorne form may be presented 
to parliamentary committees who will go about their loosely structured processes of 
consultation.  While the consultative committee is certainly a novel approach to 
exploration and the beginning of a collaborative relationship between the policy-
maker and stakeholders, it would be useful to develop a step of further consultation 
with the general public, the results of which could provide further insight into the 
desirable content of such a broad piece of legislation. 
5.4.2 Digital television migration 
The eventual migration to digital television broadcasting first entered public discourse 
as part of the Frente Amplio political agenda developed between 2003-2004.  At this 
point, however, it was considered simply a subject of strategie importance that should 
be studied further.  Gradually, digital television became a trade issue with Brazil, 
which developed its own technical standard and was undertaking efforts to assure that 
other countries in Latin America, especially its fellow trade partners in MERCOSUR, 
adopted it (Kaplun, 2008, p. 4).  Uruguay's move towards transition has been marked 
by much debate and a series of false starts.  In 2006, the President convened a 
national committee to examine the issue, largely focusing on practices undertaken 
elsewhere (Kaplun, 2008, p. 6).  By August 2006, the President had decided to adopt 
the European standard, based on recommendations of this committee (La Republica, 
2007).  Eventually, the government reversed its position, officially adopting the 
Brazilian standard by issue of a Presidential decree in June 2011  (Parlamento del 212 
Uruguay, 2011 ).  Technically, there is not mu ch of a difference between the two digital 
television standards and the choice was based more on geopolitics than the technical 
suitability of one standard over another.  In adopting the Brazilian standard, Uruguay 
is able to take advantage the economies of scale generated by a continental market.  In 
addition, Uruguay's software industry has been developing rapidly in recent years and 
tapping into a continent-wide standard would provide more potential for this domestic 
industry.  With this selection of a technical standard finally taken care of, DINA  TEL 
put in place a public consultation on the future of digital television.  This was an 
important opportunity to both engage with the Uruguayan public on the topic of the 
radio spectrum and to set in place a process capable of disrupting the monopolistic 
tendencies of the current media system. 
Uruguay's public consultation on digital television was largely organized online and 
was the practical outcome of an IDRC-funded project looking at the potential for 
using Web 2.0 tools to engage the public on policy-making topics.
110  It was organized 
into two parts.  The first engaged the public by recording and posting videos of 
interviews with varions citizens on the tapies of inclusion and transparency in state 
institutions; regulation and regulators; and uses of the radio spectrum.  It included 
various articles and documentation about digital television,communications 
regulation, as weil as discussion forums where citizens can debate and discuss.  The 
·second part called on citizens to submit their opinions to the Minister of Industry, 
Energy and Mining (MIEM) for inclusion in the decision-making process. 
Ultimately, the success of this consultative tool to enhance citizen participation in 
110 Entitled "Impacta 2.0", this project between the Association for Progressive Communication 
(APC) and Comunica (coincidentally my research partner in Uruguay) was carried out in Ecuador, 
Peru and Uruguay. http://impacto2.cornunica.org/. 213 
policy-making can be measured by the degree to which the substance of the public 
interventions was reflected in actual policy outcomes.  We could also ask, who is the 
audience targeted by the consultation and did this audience, in fact, participate?  The 
introduction of this tool insists that "the greatest plurality of voices appears to be a 
healthy thing for the democratie system and for audiences in  general" while posing a 
number of technical questions.  Fin ally, the designers state th at "academies, 
politicians, government, civil society organizations and citizens will meet in the same 
forum" (2011 ).  Who, then, are the active participants within the online consultation 
community?  Whose voices are represented and whose voices are missing?  Secondly, 
does the pool of intervenors who submitted officialletters to the MIEM resemble that 
assembled online?  Based on these factors, did the consultation successfully engage 
with its target audience and were the views of this audience incorporated into the 
making of po  licy? 
Part One of the online consultation website consists of impromptu interviews with 
everyday citizens.  Each is asked a series of questions about what sort of 
programming digital television should diffuse and whether digital television should 
be public or free (the commercial option is not presented).  Interview subjects are a 
broad selection from adolescent to senior in age, and of 11  interview subjects, six are 
women and five are men.  The group is not racially diverse, but representative of the 
fairly homogenous composition of Uruguayan society.  It is difficult to ascertain 
socioeconomic status.  The videos appear to have been made more as a publicity tool 
than as a measurable portion of the consultation process. 
Part Two of the online consultation consists of a number of online discussion forums. 
Participants, however, were not required to provide detailed persona] information, 214 
making it impossible to undertake an in-depth analysis of these individuals and their 
activity.  In sharp contrast to the diversity present in the videos, only two of the 24 
active participants in online discussion forums clearly identify themselves as women 
while 22 clearly identify as men.  In addition, ali informational documents (which are 
accompanied by a photo of each author) are written by male experts.  Thus, while the 
target audience may have been diverse in video representation, ultimately a small 
group of men (sorne obviously experts, sorne obviously not) express their views on 
the future of television and regulation. 
While the online consultation was developed by both the Fundaci6n Comunica and 
the DINA  TEL, an analysis of public submissions to the official consultation process 
demonstrates a certain disconnect between the two steps of this process. 
111  The 
breakdown is as follows: 
lntervenor type  Number of intervenors 
Non-expert  1  9 
Expert  7 
Commercial entity 
1  7 
Community/municipal  3 
Table 5.2: Digital television consultation, Uruguay, 2011 
An obvious effort was put into the online Web 2.0 consultation tool; it is well 
designed with easily accessible information.  However, both pieces of the consultation 
process were unveiled with a one-mon  th deadline for submissions.  This limited time 
period, coupled with the complexity of the topic, presents an important barrier to 
substantive public participation.  For instance, AMARC-Uruguay submitted a two-
page brief (which is critical of the short time delay) while that of ANDEBU is 20 
111 Digital television consultation submissions: http://www.miem.gub.uy/gxpsites/hgxppOOl? 
5.11.549.0.S.O.PAG:CONC:485:2:D:8179:1:PAG:MNU:E:30:9:MNU;,. 215 
pages long.  While non-expert citizens makeup the largest number of intervenors, 
severa) briefs begin with or include the phrase "1 am not qualified to submit an 
analysis of the proposed law or decree but here is what I think".  It appears the online 
tool was created with two goals in mind: to mobilize citizens to intervene in this 
consultative process; and to provide citizens with the knowledge they need to 
participate substantively.  Based on the content of submissions, however, these things 
did not occur and the process as a whole remained dominated by experts and 
commercial entities.  Recent research has shown that the consultation process was 
fundamentally broken when, in mid-process, Gustavo G6mez was replaced, 
demonstrating perhaps the extent to which a consultation of this sort was associated 
with an individual rather than wholly integrated into the policy-making approach of 
the government (Beltramelli, Alonso, & Steibel, 2012) 
Digital television policy will ultimately be defined in one of three possible ways.  If 
tradition proves more powerful than the impetus for reform, it will be defined as a law 
by parliamentary process or through Presidential decree.  If, however, DINA  TEL is to 
evolve as a policy-maker responsible for developing and implementing 
communication and media policy in Uruguay, digital television policy will be created 
as just that: policy.  In this way, it could be made more accessible to a public that has 
the ability to engage directly with a responsible regulatory entity rather than through a 
legislative process that citizens do not appear to engage with in the first place (at ]east 
according to the available evidence).  If  the current government's goal of 
"democratizat-ion" is to reach the depths of communication policy-making, it will 
need to put more effort into making the machinations of policy-making transparent, 
democratie, accountable and accessible at their point of inception.  Up to this point, 
the new structures for public participation appear to be experiments more than mature 216 
and capable tools. 
Addendum: The President of Uruguay, José (Pepe) Mujfca, introduced Uruguay's 
digital television broadcasting law on May 11, 2012.  Ultimately it was issued by 
presidential decree, a process that makes it difficult to ascertain the exact origins of 
the content of the law as it was ultimately crafted behind closed doors.  The bill 
provides for the following: 21  digital television channels have been designated for 
Montevideo, the capital city.  Seven will be for public television (a combination of 
national and municipal broadcasters), seven will be for commercial television 
(existing analogue broadcasters will migrate to digital), and seven will be for 
community broadcasters.  In the cities and towns other than Montevideo (which are 
much smaller), the distribution of channels is similar but adjusted to 9 per locality 
given the lower population.  In addition, one digital television channel has been 
designated for use by the national television broadcaster (TV Nacional) throughout 
the rural interior of the country.  The legislation introduces important changes for the 
licensing of television broadcasters.  First, in order to gain access to a digital channel, 
each existing analogue broadcasters must respond to a cali for applications.  With this 
new license cornes a term limit of 15 years after which the station must apply for 
renewal.  The legislation also requires digital television broadcasters to provide equal 
airtime to all political candidates, free of charge, during election campaigns.  Finally, 
it gives ANTEL the legal ability to enter into the digital television mârket on its own 
or in collaboration with TV Nacional (Government of Uruguay, 2012). 
Shortly after the introduction of the digital television broadcasting law, ANDEBU 
(the association of commercial broadcasters) announced that they would be officially 
challenging it.  According to Rafael Inchausti, president of ANDEBU, the 217 
broadcasters to not agree with the imposed term limit (until now licenses have been 
granted indefinitely), and interpret the need to provide equal airtime to political 
candidates as an unjust "tax" (El Pais, 2012). 
5.5 Participation in the existing policy system 
The communication policy system in Uruguay today consists of two primary entities: 
the National Telecommunications Directorate which exists as a policy-maker and 
URSEC which is the regulator.  While the previous sections have explored the law-
and policy-making process with an eye to the future, this section focuses on the 
current system, how it has been constructed, and the experiences of individuals inside 
it, outside it and those operating in a foggy space in between. 
5.5.1 Regulator? Who, me?! 
While it is usually noted that URSEC was formed in 2001, the reality is in fact more 
complicated.  Rather th an crea  te a regulator in 2001, the technical group responsible 
for the radio spectrum within the Ministry of National Defence was sim ply moved 
elsewhere in the institutional hierarchy of the state, now answering to the Minister of 
Industry, Energy and Mining.  It did not gain its own reformulated organizational 
structure until 2008 and in the meantime relied on numerous staff "on loan" from 
ANTEL to meet its needs.  In May 2010, URSEC was still experiencing severe 
staffing shortages.  Having been granted 145 positions during budget negotiations in 
2005-2006, only 85 were filled by 2010.  Additionally, although Urugua~ received 
World Bank financing to strengthen their telecommunications regulator and hired 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to undertake their executive hiring process, two of the four 
most senior management positions remained vacant, including the legal department 
(Riccardi, 2010).  It's historie lack of resources has meant that while it is a regulator, URSEC wields no palpable power.  According to the Chief of Radio Frequencies, 
broadcast licenses have only been revoked twice - this because in the twenty years 
since the licenses had been granted, neither station had engaged in a single act of 
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broadcasting (Budé, 2010).  In addition, although an estimated 300 illegal FM radio 
broadcasters operate in the metropolitan area of Montevideo al  one (Gesuele, 2010) 
the regulator has only two trucks at their disposai to monitor unlicensed 
broadcasting.
112  This lack of ability to punish, an act often seen as central to the 
ability to regulate, has led to a certain Jack of socialization on the part of the 
regulator; URSEC simply does not exist in the public consciousness (Riccardi, 2010). 
The situation is not unique to URSEC, though, and other regulatory institutions are 
equally odd cases.  The central bank was founded in  1967 but isn't seen to be a 
financial regulator (Riccardi, 2010).  Other institutions continue to exist to regulate 
water and energy industries, even though the privatization of these industries has been 
reversed, meaning that state institutions essentially regulate state monopolies (Ponce 
de Leon, 2010; Riccardi, 2010). 
URSEC manages ali  use of the radio spectrum in Uruguay.  While the presidency may 
grant television and radio broadcast licenses, URSEC, in fact, takes care of the rest by 
managing and granting cellular telephone licenses, CB radio, satellite, etc (Budé, 
2010; Riccardi, 2010).  In a di vide not unlike the situation in Canada, use of the 
spectrum is managed by two separate yet connected entities, each subject to its own 
particular forms of poli  ti cal pressure.  Lobbying is known to occur here (Imaz, 201 0), 
but more widespread is a kind of political power very much connected to wealth, 
political parties and media ownership (Yanes, 2010). 
112 Montevideo is a city of 1.5 million people. The broadcasters are generally small unlicensed 
commercial or religious radio stations. Aldo Gesuele, a community radio activist and radio 
aficionado, has been documenting these stations since 2009.  Regulators were unaware of their 
presence, but not surprised by it either. 219 
No matter the new processes introduced by the creation of the CHARC, URSEC 
undertakes no public hearings regarding the licenses that it does administer.  This is 
not because such a thing is impossible, but because "nobody ever wanted it that way. 
Quite simply, it's a political decision" (Budé, 2010).  In addition, unlike the case of 
Canada, Uruguay has no system for domestic consultation regarding ITU policy 
decisions (Budé, 2012).  Ultimately, the spectrum is regulated in  a number of 
locations, each closed to public intervention. 
5.5.2 Regulator? What regulator? 
To date, community radio stations are the only civil society organizations that come 
into regular contact with URSEC.  Those within the pool of individuals interviewed 
with the most knowledge concerning the regulator are individuals sitting on the 
CHARC either as representatives of community radio associations or NGOs whose 
work revolves around freedom of expression.  Generally, their perception is that 
URSEC does not have the resources to be an effective regulator and because of this 
they do not have the competence needed to carry out their work successfully (Lanza, 
2010; Prats, 2010).  URSEC is entirely inaccessible to both civil society organizations 
and the general public with neither staff nor other types of resources available or 
dedicated to working with either (Fernandez & Almeida, 2010; Imaz, 2010; Prats, 
2010).  In addition, there is a strong belief  that URSEC is permanently co-opted by 
the presidency.  For example, early in its existence, it was understood that URSEC 
was assembled in order to to open the telecommunications market (Lanza, 2010; 
Molina, 2010).  However, as political winds have changed, its task has been reoriented 
to assure a competitive marketplace and a strong state telecommunications 
corporation (Jurado, 2010; Molina, 2010).
113 
113 I attempted multiple times to interview the current president of ANTEL, Carolina Cosse, leading 
up to her political appointment in 2010. Eventually scheduled, Cosse cancelled the interview at the 220 
URSEC's Jack of status as a "respected" regulatory institution ultimately has to do 
with fondamental questions of democracy, transparency and political will.  It thus 
touches quite pointedly on a subject that people tend to avoid in Uruguay - the anti-
democratic tendency to centralize discretionary executive power (Lanza, 2010).  Yet 
while politics may slow down cycles of change, other realities also affect the ability of 
regulators to emerge - chief among them issues of education and finances.  Shortly 
after the creation of URSEC, Uruguay experienced a severe economie cri sis th at saw 
its currency devalued, massive emigration and sudden growth in extreme poverty 
(Departamento de Historia del Uruguay, 2008).  At the same moment that the state 
lost massive financial resources, it also ]ost a large number of educated professionals. 
Multiplying the problem is the fact that Uruguay's universities do not necessarily have 
programs set up to equip and educate professionals who could be qualified to work for 
a telecommunications regulator (Riccardi, 2010).  This phenomena is not isolated to 
URSEC and can be seen in the case of water regulation as weil  (Genta, 2010). 
5.6 Obstacles to democratie evolution 
Since the left came to power following the 2004 elections, Uruguay has been 
undergoing a process of profound change in the use of wireless communication 
technology.  In 2005, during my first visit to this country, I knew two people with 
cellular telephones - a Canadian and an American.  Today, there are more cellphones 
than people and  almost every adolescent has a laptop with Wi-Fi.  The community 
radio stations I was researching in 2005 were underground, today many are licensed 
and broadcasting online.  There are over 270 licensed commercial radio stations, over 
300 illegal broadcasters and over 400 groups of people that have a  pp  lied for 
community radio licenses.  This in a country of 3.4 million people.  The radio 
last minute. 
------------------- - ----------------- - --- -~  -~ ,----~~------------- - - - -------------- - --- - - -- -------- -- ------------------
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spectrum occupies a special place here, literally replicating the social fabric that exists 
in flesh, bone and voice. 
While the need to communicate "over-the-air" by various means evolves at breakneck 
speed, Uruguay's ability to regulate the spectrum remains minimal, obtuse, and 
ultimately undemocratic.  This is not for lack of trying, but fundamentally due to the 
inability to identify and rectify glaring and established obstacles to democratie 
practice.  The most important obstacle is that of unchecked executive power and its 
ultimate ability to rule the airwaves by Presidential decree.  Safe-guarding the 
spectrum in such an opaque and politicized location works against ali efforts to set it 
free, to see it regulated in a transparent, democratie and just manner.  Y  et such issues 
are not simply spectral; they speak to the reality of a society still very much in 
democratie transition, no matter its lofty discourse, vibrant political sphere and 
exemplary demonstrations of participatory governance. 
Regulation does not need to only be the purview of experts and ultimately oriented 
towards profit.  Undertaken in a truly democratie, transparent, participatory, and 
consistent manner regulation is the means to assure that a common good is shared 
equitably and justly.  For such a thing to happen, though, th ose with power and th ose 
in search of power must somehow come to find a way forward based on collaboration 
rather than competition.  Sorne parts of the story told here march in this direction but 
they appear to do so more as experiment than respected practice.  That said, these 
experiments are perhaps an initiation to a further phase in a process of 
democratization and should thus be seen as examples to learn from, in Uruguay and 
elsewhere. If  democratie practice is to be replicated and refined along the entire 
chain of the communication policy system, it must begin with a solid foundation in 222 
the basic structure of the political and legal system of a country.  Otherwise, as seen 
throughout this chapter, attempts at reform, no matter how well intentioned, will 
continue to find themselves powerless.  Ultimately, these attempts at reform are 
experiments of the politicalleft in power for the first time, trying to alter a legacy 
that, in terms of communication policy, has been the corrupt antithesis of the 
democratie apparatus that is in sorne ways avant-garde.  Y  et while growing pains may 
be a valid excuse in the beginning of reform, two years into their second mandate, the 
left appear to have adopted certain practices of the right.  The state has fallen victim 
to the seemingly greater powers that dominate spectrum policy worldwide.  As with 
the Uruguayan water movement, it will be up to civil society and citizens to recognize 
the spectrum as their own and to make it so. Conclusions and propositions 
This sixth and final chapter finds itself- at the time of writing in June 2012- framed 
by unique political circumstances that speak to the issues of democracy, participation 
and communication that are at the heart of this thesis.  Canadians are currently 
governed by a federal majority accused repeatedly of stifling fondamental debate 
within Parliament and limiting the access of citizens to gcivernment information.  On 
June 4, over 500 "environmental groups, corporations, and other political 
commentators" simultaneously blacked out their websites in an act of protest in 
opposition to the government's efforts to stifle environmental voices through 
measures contained in a proposed budget bill (CBC News, 2012).  Shortly afterwards, 
opposition MPs proposed over 1000 amendments to this same bill as a means of 
forcing public debate on its content (Payton, 2012).  Provincially, Québec cégep and 
university students (including myself) are striking in opposition to the provincial 
government's decision to increase tuition by 75% over the next five years.  After over 
three months of strike, failed negotiations, and hundreds of demonstrations, the 
Québec government introduced legislation imposing severe limits on free speech and 
the freedom of assembly (Robitaille, 2012).  In each case, governments have 
attempted to introduce dramatic changes to broad-reaching legal frameworks without 
the use of any form of public consultation.  The Occupy Wall Street movement, which 
began in the U.S. and spread throughout Canada and many other countries, has 
demonstrated even broader dissatisfaction with the ability of democratie governments 
to represent the interests of citizens on an on-going basis.  The Occupy movement is 
also iinked to sorne of the central topics of this thesis as it speaks to the exclusion of 
non-expert voices and values from the regulation of national and international 
monetary systems - technical deviees many believe central to modern society (Klein, 
2011 ).  Sometimes characterized as a continuation or amplification of the an  ti-224 
globalization movement that began to take aim at new regulatory venues such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in  1999, the Occupy movement insists that our 
political systems disproportionately representa small minority of individuals and that 
this is un just in the context of democracy (Klein, 2011 ).  Ultimately these social 
movement happenings beg the question: Does the decision-making role of a citizen 
really end at the ballot box?  If  not, how do. we develop and implement practices that 
both facilitate and ensure the responsiveness of government and the ability of citizens 
to understand, debate and communicate their thoughts in ways that are more 
effectively connected to the exercise of political authority? 
This thesis traces the history of humankind's social relationship with the radio 
spectrum as a communication medium, demonstrating the origins of numerous 
approaches to understanding the spectrum and the ways in which these approaches 
have been incorporated into the spectrum policy system.  The treatment of spectrum 
policy is holistic and considers a broad range of communication practices including 
radio and television broadcasting, cellular telephony, and community wireless 
networks.  My theoretical and methodological approaches are rooted, in part, in the 
political economy tradition of communication research, and seek to present a 
cartography of the spectrum policy system that incorporates multiple histories and 
perspectives pertaining to the spectrum's use.  With the spectrum as the focal point, 
the first half of this thesis explores an interweaving history of ideas, scientific 
exploration, geo-politics and communication technology.  Through this history, I 
charted the development of opposing forms of communication practice and social 
organization with regards to the use of the radio spectrum.  I demonstrated how the 
dominant juridical and economie forces of today originate in the l9
1
h century and I 
illustrated the extent to which, from this early period, the spectrum has been a point ------------ ------------ - ------
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of regulatory collaboration for government and private industry while it has been 
largely kept out of sight of the greater public.  The history of spectrum use is thus 
framed by the efforts of government and private enterprise to utilize wireless 
communication technologies as a means of social control or direction (for instance, as 
a tool for constructing national identity, developing ideas of regulatory legal and 
technical authority) and for the creation of monetary value (through the ownership 
and sale of the means of communication).  Throughout the history of the use of the 
spectrum for communication, however, many social movements have resisted these 
dominant forces by appropriating the means of communication and using them for 
precisely that end.  The spectrum, 1 assert, is today central to our ability to 
communicate, to be active political agents in society and for this reason its use and 
regulation should be subject to practices that meet the highest democratie standards -
participatory, transparent and accountable. 
The poli tics of the spectrum, as demonstrated through the two case studies presented 
here and in the preceding historical and theoretical treatments, are not as weil defined 
as such a tidy phrase would suggest.  More often than not, "the poli tics of the 
spectrum" are presented as an easily explained systematic and administrative 
structure, an  innocuous and logical flow-chart.  An application enters the bureaucratie 
chain and a radio or television station or cellular or wireless broadband provider pops 
out the other.  As sets ofregulatory frameworks, policies and laws that attempt to 
guide (or respond to, or enforce) the ever-changing relationships between humans and 
human feats of engineering, the poli tics of the spectrum are the result of necessarily 
social processes.  As such, they are prone to reflect the power relations evident in the 
broader political and social systems in which they are entrenched.  The first two 
chapters of this thesis explore, generally, the ways these processes have unfolded since 226 
the mid-1800s.  While I documented the important place of individual actors and 
social movements that have worked to propose and promote alternate visions of the 
spectrum, its management and its use, I clearly demonstrated that the extent of their 
influence has been quite limited.  Historically, the spectrum bas been the realm of 
technical, political and economie experts, generally excluding citizens from 
fundamental debate.  Today it is highly contested territory and while it may- as a 
medium of communication -be of mu tuai interest to ail, the management of the 
spectrum is in fact founded on conflict, couched in the more innocent term of 
competition.  That said, sitting at the crossroads of convergence, our societies have 
the opportunity to ensure that our future communication networks are built upon 
ethical, rather than simply economie and conflict-riven, grounds.  As this thesis bas 
shown, this requires a fundamental reconfiguration of the ways in which the spectrum 
is thought about and regulated. 
The case studies utilized in this research project serve to illustrate the conflictual 
nature of spectrum policy today and tie this status to regulatory systems that provide 
inadequate mechanisms for public participation.  Indeed, in many of the venues 
examined, the public bas little or no opportunity for effective participation in 
decision-making.  As documented throughout these pages, this stands in stark contrast 
to the long history of collaboration and cooperation between governments, regulators, 
and telecommunications and broadcasting corporations.  Developing spectrum-
oriented communication systems under such conditions greatly limits the range of 
possible technical and regulatory outputs as it tends to incorporate the priorities of a 
small range of actors.  Throughout the history of the electromagnetic spectrum as a 
communication medium, the parameters of use and regulation have been built upon 
seemingly unquestioned assumptions that serve to further entrench the status quo. 227 
The spectrum is a limited natural resource; because the spectrum is scarce, its use 
must be heavily managed. If  wireless communications systems are to function weil, 
use of the spectrum must be heavily regulated by the State.  The monetary value of 
the spectrum persists because, like gold, it is considered to be scarce.  Unlike gold, 
however, the spectrum is not innately scarce in its quantity.  In and of itself it is 
limitless. Our ability to use it is not- especially within the current regulatory 
parameters that function according to exclusivity.  Although the practice may weil 
challenge established regulatory and industrial practices, it is possible to share radio 
frequencies, thereby using the spectrum more efficiently.  In Chapter One, I showed 
how the concept of spectrum sharing can be traced back to the 1  940s and focused on a 
number of community-based movements and other initiatives that have adopted this 
strategy in more recent years.  Increasingly, the development and use of technology 
that permits us to share the spectrum is bleeding into the mainstream with the support 
of high-tech start-ups and non-traditional telecommunications corporations such as 
Google (Google Talk) and Microsoft (Skype).  According to a recent United States 
presidential advisory committee presentation on the subject, spectrum sharing 
technology "could potentially increase efficiency by a factor of 40,000" (Chen, 2012). 
Clearly such a thing could have a radical effect on the future of spectrum policy and 
communication practices.  Powerful corporate actors may !end clout to such a 
proposition but it is equally, if not more important, that the future of such ideas be 
decided upon collectively and publicly. 
The case studies of_ C-anada and Uruguay demon  strate a number of obstacles th at 
impede the possibility of introducing fondamental change into each nation's spectrum 
po  licy system.  One of the most substantial problems that exists in each system is the 
regular use of smokescreens by corporate actors.  A smokescreen is "something said 228 
or done to conceal the truth".
114  In the current context it is the practice taking 
advantage the regulatory system and its reporting mechanisms in order to conceal or 
obscure unjust practices from public view.  In both the Canadian and Uruguayan 
cases, a cursory glanee gives one the impression that there is diversity amongst the 
participants in law- and policy-making processes, diversity in the distribution of 
spectrum licenses, and diversity in the ownership and control of the entities that hold 
these licenses.  When one digs deeper, however, it becomes evident that this 
superficial diversity obscures the concentrations of power that persist at fundamental 
Jevels throughout the relevant systems.  While participatory law-making and policy-
making processes may exist, not ali participants are treated equally,  nor do these 
processes operate according to equal and transparent standards.  In Uruguay, the 
creation of loosely defined ownership and content-sharing networks allows for 
economie and administrative control of television stations by a tripartite oligopoly. 
As shown in Chapter Four, two of Canada's largest telecommunications corporations 
collaboratively operate a shell company allowing them to "hoard" spectrum and to 
manipulate the wireless broadband market rather than use it to provide a 
communications infrastructure.  Would these practices and the resulting concentration 
of spectrum licenses exist in a climate of transparency and participatory, responsive 
and responsible democracy? 
Institutionalizing Participatory Access 
As noted in Chapter One, sharing the spectrum - treating it as_ a commons - is an 
inherently political act, especially givën the historical and current trends I, and others, 
have documented.  Far from a disorderly rule-Jess approach to spectrum management, 
it is one that demands participation on the part of the users, designers, and regulators 
114 Collins English Dictionary- Complete & Unabridged lOth Edition. 2009 229 
of wireless technology.  As shawn in the first two chapter of this thesis, the spectrum 
has been shared in different ways during different times in history.  Today, the most 
pervasive method of spectrum sharing is through the use of unlicensed spectrum for 
the provision of Wi-Fi.  To move beyond this simple arrangement to a broader 
treatment of the spectrum as a commons requires that public participation be 
considered and integrated as a central part of any law-making or policy-making 
process.  In both case studies presented here, public participation in the making of 
spectrum policy is considered a technique employed at the discretion of those 
managing consultative processes.  As I have shawn, no standard exists in Canada or 
Uruguay for how and when to engage in public consultations nor what actually 
constitutes meaningful participation.  The creation of such a standard would provide a 
much needed ethical and democratie template for the making of communication law 
and regulation and more generally.  While the Canadian and Uruguayan cases are 
each unique in terms of traditions of political participation, introducing such an 
approach to law- and policy-making would serve to reinforce the broad democratie 
frameworks upon which each country is founded. 
The first step towards facilitating the institutionalization of public participation is to 
demonstrate the inadequacies of the current system to those who are in control of it 
and to those affected by it, and to determine if the political will to bring about such 
change exists (Hicks & Buccus, 2009).  While this thesis documents these 
inadequacies in the spectrum policy systems of Canada and Uruguay, the 
determination of existing political will with respect to_introducing profound change 
into these systems is a further project.  Nevertheless, based upon the analysis I have 
provided thus far, certain recommendations can be made that may aid in a practical 
process of introducing the change that I believe is needed in the spectrum policy 230 
system.  First, much could be gained through the introduction of basic po  licy 
frameworks and guidelines for public participation.  It appears that currently, 
consultative processes are re-invented every time they are undertaken, making it 
difficult to compare these processes and their outcomes to one another.  The provision 
of frameworks and guidel ines that would be applicable from the leve! of law-making 
through policy-making would render these activities more accessible and transparent. 
Second, it would be helpful to determine both the interest of civil society 
organizations in introducing such fondamental change into the political system and 
their capacity for undertaking such work.  In Chapter Two, I looked to commons-
related social movements outside the realm of communications in order to draw out 
strategies for re-conceptualizing the spectrum as a something fondamental to social, 
political, and economie !ife.  Proposing the institutionalization of public participation 
would similarly provide an opportunity for diverse civil society organizations to work 
together to democratize the Canadian and Uruguayan political systems in  important 
ways.  Such an approach would also allow the organizations examined in  this thesis, 
many of whom do not have the operational capacity to undertake such a project on 
their own, to cooperate with and learn from other members of civil society. 
For too long the poli tics of the spectrum have been dominated by a destructive 
discourse of "us versus them" that unnecessarily pits members of society against one 
another.  There is much at stake today with critical debates on concentration of media 
(and medium) ownership, foreign ownership and convergence either currently taking 
place or on the horizon.  So, too, are there many opportunities to open ou-r social, 
political and technical communications networks to an ethos of sharing and 
collaboration.  The !ife-force that is the electromagnetic spectrum, if it is to be 
rendered accessible to ali in its borderless expanse, must be met by a political 231 
structure that goes beyond simplistic dichotomies, a political structure capable of true 
and continuous dialogue, inclusion, and fondamental change. 
Earlier in these pages, 1 proposed the epistemological strategy of !ife-media as a new 
way to go about understanding and embodying the politics of the spectrum and 1 
provided examples of social movements that have undertaken similar tasks.  To 
propose new ways of thinking is at the very least a beneficiai philosophical exercise 
but what about the real, immediate, palpable world.  How might these words, 
thoughts, and inspirations become actions?  What use is this tome you have just 
finished reading if it remains just that?  Throughout the numerous interviews 1 
conducted with users of the radio spectrum and individuals active within the spectrum 
policy system, 1 sought to determine the extent to which "different" 
conceptualizations of the spectrum exist.  What 1 learned is that, unequivocally, most 
people who use the spectrum and are engaged in activism around it don't know the 
first thing about it.  Of all the civil society organizers 1 spoke with in Canada and 
Uruguay, only one was able to explain exactly what the spectrum is and to  then 
engage critically with his explanation (Stevenson, 2010).  Coincidentally, this 
individual is also pursuing his PhD in communication at the University of Toronto. 
Of all the law and policy-makers 1 spoke with, only the telecommunications engineers 
were able to address the subject of the spectrum in a similar manner.  Thus, the 
knowledge gap is not merely one that exists between "experts" and "amateurs" but is 232 
instead widespread even within the very bodies that make the laws and policies that 
govern the spectrum and our relationship to it.  Knowledge about the spectrum exists 
largely technical, specialized to a state of distant rarefaction. 
The extent to which actors within the spectrum policy system and those that interact 
with it lack substantial knowledge about their primary object of orientation 
demonstrates an important and widespread educational problem.  Indeed, the capacity 
of society to think about the spectrum in, not just a new way, but in any way at ali, is 
more limited than I had ever imagined.  If  my observations, analyses and judgements 
are to find a role outside the bounds of the written pages of the academe, they must 
first be aimed at addressing this fundamental problem.  Stay tuned. 1 
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